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8506
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Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong]
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Full Idea:
I favour the Realist view that while we can distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties, but the two 'factors' are too intimately together to speak of a relation between them.
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From:
David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3)
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A reaction:
Is Armstrong being a bit of an ostrich here? We could talk of part-whole relationships, or internal relations, or set membership, or coinciding objects, or bundles. We certainly ought to have a go. Armstrong approaches Quine here!
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16625
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In hylomorphism all the explanation of actions is in the form, and the matter doesn't do anything [Bacon]
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Full Idea:
Prime, common matter seems to be a kind of accessory and to stand as a substratum, whereas any kind of action seems to be a mere emanation of form. So it is that forms are given all the leading parts.
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From:
Francis Bacon (Philosophical Studies 1611-19 [1617], p.206), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.2
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A reaction:
This is a very striking criticism of hylomorphism. The revolution was simple - that actually matter seems to do all the real work, and the form can take a back seat.
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7076
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Mill wondered if he would be happy if all his aims were realised, and answered no [Mill, by Critchley]
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Full Idea:
Mill, in his crisis of 1827, asked himself whether he would be happy if all his objects in life were realised, and had to answer that he would not.
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From:
report of John Stuart Mill (Autobiography [1870]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.3
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A reaction:
The reply is either that happiness is in the striving, or that his aims in life were wrong, or that happiness is impossible. It seems to contradict Kant's definition (Idea 1452).
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