Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against 'Ostrich Nominalism'', 'Autobiography' and '12: Colossians'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy [Paul]
     Full Idea: Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy.
     From: St Paul (12: Colossians [c.55], 2.8)
     A reaction: The same might be said of preaching. The two sorts of spoiling seem to be fanaticism and wickedness. While reason can lead to fanaticism, I believe (with Socrates) that it is unlikely to corrupt morally.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers (like Devitt) think of reality as made up of things. Others, like me, think of it as made up of facts or states of affairs.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3)
     A reaction: Devitt is a follower of Quine on this. Personally I rather like 'processes'. Unanalysed things with predication (Quine) don't look promising. I currently favour things with active powers, which give rise to properties. See Shoemaker and Ellis.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: I favour the Realist view that while we can distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties, but the two 'factors' are too intimately together to speak of a relation between them.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3)
     A reaction: Is Armstrong being a bit of an ostrich here? We could talk of part-whole relationships, or internal relations, or set membership, or coinciding objects, or bundles. We certainly ought to have a go. Armstrong approaches Quine here!
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: A philosophical account of a general sort is required of what it is for different tokens to be of the same type. To refuse to give such an account is to be a metaphysical ostrich.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §1)
     A reaction: This defines Ostrich Nominalism (a label Armstrong aims at Quine). I certainly sympathise with Armstrong. If there is no more to a class (a type) than just having members (tokens), nothing is explain. What is natural, essential, intensional etc.?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Mill wondered if he would be happy if all his aims were realised, and answered no [Mill, by Critchley]
     Full Idea: Mill, in his crisis of 1827, asked himself whether he would be happy if all his objects in life were realised, and had to answer that he would not.
     From: report of John Stuart Mill (Autobiography [1870]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.3
     A reaction: The reply is either that happiness is in the striving, or that his aims in life were wrong, or that happiness is impossible. It seems to contradict Kant's definition (Idea 1452).