19 ideas
17892 | For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel] |
Full Idea: I uphold the belief that for clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (works [1930]), quoted by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability 1.5 | |
A reaction: [written in 1961] This contradicts the implication normally taken from his much earlier Incompleteness Theorems. |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: In Armstrong's version of the correspondence theory, the truth-making relation is not one-one, but one-many or many-one. Thus 'p or q' has two truth makers, p and q. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], p.129), quoted by Pascal Engel - Truth Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Interesting. Armstrong deals in universals. He also cites many swans as truth-makers for 'there is a least one black swan'. Not correspondence as we know it, Jim. |
6299 | Axioms are often affirmed simply because they produce results which have been accepted [Resnik] |
Full Idea: Many axioms have been proposed, not on the grounds that they can be directly known, but rather because they produce a desired body of previously recognised results. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], One.5.1) | |
A reaction: This is the perennial problem with axioms - whether we start from them, or whether we deduce them after the event. There is nothing wrong with that, just as we might infer the existence of quarks because of their results. |
9188 | Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved the completeness of standard formalizations of first-order logic, including Frege's original one. However, an implication of his famous theorem on the incompleteness of arithmetic is that second-order logic is incomplete. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (works [1930]) by Michael Dummett - The Philosophy of Mathematics 3.1 | |
A reaction: This must mean that it is impossible to characterise arithmetic fully in terms of first-order logic. In which case we can only characterize the features of abstract reality in general if we employ an incomplete system. We're doomed. |
10620 | Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel] |
Full Idea: At that time (c.1930) a concept of objective mathematical truth as opposed to demonstrability was viewed with greatest suspicion and widely rejected as meaningless. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (works [1930]), quoted by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 28.2 | |
A reaction: [quoted from a letter] This is the time of Ramsey's redundancy account, and before Tarski's famous paper of 1933. It is also the high point of Formalism, associated with Hilbert. |
17883 | Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner] |
Full Idea: Gödel was quick to point out that his original incompleteness theorems did not produce instances of absolute undecidability and hence did not undermine Hilbert's conviction that for every precise mathematical question there is a discoverable answer. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (works [1930]) by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability Intro | |
A reaction: The normal simplistic view among philosophes is that Gödel did indeed decisively refute the optimistic claims of Hilbert. Roughly, whether Hilbert is right depends on which axioms of set theory you adopt. |
6304 | Mathematical realism says that maths exists, is largely true, and is independent of proofs [Resnik] |
Full Idea: Mathematical realism is the doctrine that mathematical objects exist, that much contemporary mathematics is true, and that the existence and truth in question is independent of our constructions, beliefs and proofs. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.12.9) | |
A reaction: As thus defined, I would call myself a mathematical realist, but everyone must hesitate a little at the word 'exist' and ask, how does it exist? What is it 'made of'? To say that it exists in the way that patterns exist strikes me as very helpful. |
17885 | Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner] |
Full Idea: Eventually Gödel ...expressed the hope that there might be a generalised completeness theorem according to which there are no absolutely undecidable sentences. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (works [1930]) by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability Intro | |
A reaction: This comes as a bit of a shock to those who associate him with the inherent undecidability of reality. |
10614 | The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel] |
Full Idea: The concept of truth of sentences in a language cannot be defined in the language. This is the true reason for the existence of undecidable propositions in the formal systems containing arithmetic. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (works [1930]), quoted by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 21.6 | |
A reaction: [from a letter by Gödel] So they key to Incompleteness is Tarski's observations about truth. Highly significant, as I take it. |
6300 | Mathematical constants and quantifiers only exist as locations within structures or patterns [Resnik] |
Full Idea: In maths the primary subject-matter is not mathematical objects but structures in which they are arranged; our constants and quantifiers denote atoms, structureless points, or positions in structures; they have no identity outside a structure or pattern. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.10.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a very promising idea for the understanding of mathematics. All mathematicians acknowledge that the recognition of patterns is basic to the subject. Even animals recognise patterns. It is natural to invent a language of patterns. |
6303 | Sets are positions in patterns [Resnik] |
Full Idea: On my view, sets are positions in certain patterns. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.10.5) | |
A reaction: I have always found the ontology of a 'set' puzzling, because they seem to depend on prior reasons why something is a member of a given set, which cannot always be random. It is hard to explain sets without mentioning properties. |
6302 | Structuralism must explain why a triangle is a whole, and not a random set of points [Resnik] |
Full Idea: An objection is that structuralism fails to explain why certain mathematical patterns are unified wholes while others are not; for instance, some think that an ontological account of mathematics must explain why a triangle is not a 'random' set of points. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.10.4) | |
A reaction: This is an indication that we are not just saying that we recognise patterns in nature, but that we also 'see' various underlying characteristics of the patterns. The obvious suggestion is that we see meta-patterns. |
6295 | There are too many mathematical objects for them all to be mental or physical [Resnik] |
Full Idea: If we take mathematics at its word, there are too many mathematical objects for it to be plausible that they are all mental or physical objects. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], One.1) | |
A reaction: No one, of course, has ever claimed that they are, but this is a good starting point for assessing the ontology of mathematics. We are going to need 'rules', which can deduce the multitudinous mathematical objects from a small ontology. |
6296 | Maths is pattern recognition and representation, and its truth and proofs are based on these [Resnik] |
Full Idea: I argue that mathematical knowledge has its roots in pattern recognition and representation, and that manipulating representations of patterns provides the connection between the mathematical proof and mathematical truth. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], One.1) | |
A reaction: The suggestion that patterns are at the basis of the ontology of mathematics is the most illuminating thought I have encountered in the area. It immediately opens up the possibility of maths being an entirely empirical subject. |
6301 | Congruence is the strongest relationship of patterns, equivalence comes next, and mutual occurrence is the weakest [Resnik] |
Full Idea: Of the equivalence relationships which occur between patterns, congruence is the strongest, equivalence the next, and mutual occurrence the weakest. None of these is identity, which would require the same position. | |
From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.10.3) | |
A reaction: This gives some indication of how an account of mathematics as a science of patterns might be built up. Presumably the recognition of these 'degrees of strength' cannot be straightforward observation, but will need an a priori component? |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Armstrong has difficulty explaining how laws entail regularities. There is no real modality in the basic components of the world, but he wants to support counterfactuals. His official position is a kind of fictionalism. | |
From: comment on David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], 49-51) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 4.4.4 | |
A reaction: Armstrong seems to be up against the basic problems that laws won't explain anything if they are merely regularities (assuming they are not decrees of a supernatural force). |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Armstrong has a distinctive conception of (fundamental) properties as contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997]) by David Lewis - A world of truthmakers? p.220 | |
A reaction: Armstrong tries to get a naturalistically founded platonism (which he claims is Aristotelian), but the idea that one thing can be multiply located strikes me as daft (especially if the number of its locations increases or decreases). |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], p.115), quoted by Pascal Engel - Truth Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Armstrong's 'truth-make principle'. It seems to be a necessity which is neither natural nor analytic, making it metaphysically necessary. Or is it part of the definition of truth? |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §6.3.3 | |
A reaction: Obviously logical necessity is not causal, but as a proposal for simplifying accounts of necessity in nature, this is wonderfully simple and appealing. Is his proposal an elevation of causation, or a degradation of necessity? |