29 ideas
| 7490 | Because of Darwin, wisdom as a definite attainable state has faded [Watson] |
| Full Idea: As well as killing the need for God, Darwin's legacy transformed the idea of wisdom, as some definite attainable state, however far off. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.31) | |
| A reaction: Where does this leave philosophy, if it is still (as I like to think) the love of wisdom? The best we can hope for is wisdom as a special sort of journey - touring, rather than arriving. |
| 7461 | The three key ideas are the soul, Europe, and the experiment [Watson] |
| Full Idea: The three key ideas that I have settled on in the history of ideas are: the soul, Europe, and the experiment. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: The soul is a nice choice (rather than God). 'Europe' seems rather vast and indeterminate to count as a key idea. |
| 7464 | The big idea: imitation, the soul, experiments, God, heliocentric universe, evolution? [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Candidates for the most important idea in human history are: mimetic thinking (imitation), the soul, the experiment, the One True God, the heliocentric universe, and evolution. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.03) | |
| A reaction: From this list I would choose the heliocentric universe, because it so dramatically downgraded the importance of our species (effectively we went from everything to nothing). We still haven't recovered from the shock. |
| 7465 | Babylonian thinking used analogy, rather than deduction or induction [Watson] |
| Full Idea: In Babylon thought seems to have worked mainly by analogy, rather than by the deductive or inductive processes we use in the modern world. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.04) | |
| A reaction: Analogy seems to be closely related to induction, if it is comparing instances of something. Given their developments in maths and astronomy, they can't have been complete strangers to the 'modern' way of thought. |
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: In Armstrong's version of the correspondence theory, the truth-making relation is not one-one, but one-many or many-one. Thus 'p or q' has two truth makers, p and q. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], p.129), quoted by Pascal Engel - Truth Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: Interesting. Armstrong deals in universals. He also cites many swans as truth-makers for 'there is a least one black swan'. Not correspondence as we know it, Jim. |
| 21563 | The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The contention of the 'no classes' theory is that all significant propositions concerning classes can be regarded as propositions about all or some of their members. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.200) | |
| A reaction: Apparently this theory has not found favour with later generations of theorists. I see it in terms of Russell trying to get ontology down to the minimum, in the spirit of Goodman and Quine. |
| 21565 | Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In Richard's puzzle, we use the notion of 'definition', and this, oddly enough, is not definable, and is indeed not a definite notion at all. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.209) | |
| A reaction: The background for this claim is his type theory, which renders certain forms of circular reference meaningless. |
| 21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The 'vicious-circle principle' says 'whatever involves an apparent variable must not be among the possible values of that variable', or (less exactly) 'whatever involves ALL must not be one of ALL which it involves. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.204) | |
| A reaction: He offers this as a parallel to his 'no classes' principle. That referred to classes, but this refers to propositions, and specifically the Liar Paradox (which he calls the 'Epimenedes'). |
| 7466 | Mesopotamian numbers applied to specific things, and then became abstract [Watson] |
| Full Idea: To begin with, in Mesopotamia, counting systems applied to specific commodities (so the symbol for 'three sheep' applied only to sheep, and 'three cows' applied only to cows), but later words for abstract qualities emerged. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.04) | |
| A reaction: It seems from this that we actually have a record of the discovery of true numbers. Delightful. I think the best way to describe what happened is that they began to spot patterns. |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong has difficulty explaining how laws entail regularities. There is no real modality in the basic components of the world, but he wants to support counterfactuals. His official position is a kind of fictionalism. | |
| From: comment on David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], 49-51) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 4.4.4 | |
| A reaction: Armstrong seems to be up against the basic problems that laws won't explain anything if they are merely regularities (assuming they are not decrees of a supernatural force). |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong has a distinctive conception of (fundamental) properties as contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997]) by David Lewis - A world of truthmakers? p.220 | |
| A reaction: Armstrong tries to get a naturalistically founded platonism (which he claims is Aristotelian), but the idea that one thing can be multiply located strikes me as daft (especially if the number of its locations increases or decreases). |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], p.115), quoted by Pascal Engel - Truth Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: Armstrong's 'truth-make principle'. It seems to be a necessity which is neither natural nor analytic, making it metaphysically necessary. Or is it part of the definition of truth? |
| 7477 | Modern democracy is actually elective oligarchy [Watson] |
| Full Idea: What we regard as democracy in the twenty-first century is actually elective oligarchy. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.06) | |
| A reaction: Even dictatorships want to be called 'democracies'. The modern system is a bit of a concession to Plato, and he would probably have preferred it to his system, because at least the rulers tend to be more educated than the direct assembly. |
| 7478 | Greek philosophers invented the concept of 'nature' as their special subject [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Greek philosophers may have invented the concept of 'nature' to underline their superiority over poets and religious leaders. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.06) | |
| A reaction: Brilliant. They certainly wrote a lot of books entitled 'Peri Physis' (Concerning Nature), and it was the target of their expertise. A highly significant development, along with their rational methods. Presumably Socrates extends nature to include ethics. |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
| Full Idea: In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §6.3.3 | |
| A reaction: Obviously logical necessity is not causal, but as a proposal for simplifying accounts of necessity in nature, this is wonderfully simple and appealing. Is his proposal an elevation of causation, or a degradation of necessity? |
| 7462 | DNA mutation suggests humans and chimpanzees diverged 6.6 million years ago [Watson] |
| Full Idea: The basic mutation rate in DNA is 0.71 percent per million years. Working back from the present difference between human and chimpanzee DNA, we arrive at 6.6 million years ago for their divergence. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.01) | |
| A reaction: This database is committed to evolution (a reminder that even databases have commitments), and so facts of this kind are included, even though they are not strictly philosophical. All complaints should be inwardly digested and forgotten. |
| 7470 | During the rise of civilizations, the main gods changed from female to male [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Around the time of the rise of the first great civilizations, the main gods changed sex, as the Great Goddess, or a raft of smaller goddesses, were demoted and male gods took their place. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.05) | |
| A reaction: Why? War, perhaps? |
| 7474 | Hinduism has no founder, or prophet, or creed, or ecclesiastical structure [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Traditional Hinduism has been described as more a way of living than a way of thought; it has no founder, no prophet, no creed and no ecclesiastical structure. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.05) | |
| A reaction: This contrast strikingly with all later religions, which felt they had to follow the Jews in becoming a 'religion of the book', with a sacred text, and hence a special status for the author(s) of that text. |
| 7479 | Modern Judaism became stabilised in 200 CE [Watson] |
| Full Idea: The Judaism we know today didn't become stabilized until roughly 200 CE. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.07) | |
| A reaction: By that stage it would have been subject to the influences of Christianity, ancient Greek philosophy, and neo-Platonism. |
| 7481 | The Israelites may have asserted the uniqueness of Yahweh to justify land claims [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Archaeology offers datable figures that seem to support the idea that the Israelites of the 'second exile' period converted Yahweh into a special, single God to justify their claims to the land. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.07) | |
| A reaction: The implications for middle eastern politics of this wicked observation are beyond the remit of a philosophy database. |
| 7480 | Monotheism was a uniquely Israelite creation within the Middle East [Watson] |
| Full Idea: No one questions the fact that monotheism was a uniquely Israelite creation within the Middle East. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.07) | |
| A reaction: I take the Middle East to exclude Greece, where they were developing similar ideas. Who knows? |
| 7471 | The Gathas (hymns) of Zoroastrianism date from about 1000 BCE [Watson] |
| Full Idea: The Gathas, the liturgical hymns that make up the 'Avesta', the Zoroastrian canon, are very similar in language to the oldest Sanskrit of Hinduism, so they are not much younger than 1200 BCE. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.05) | |
| A reaction: This implies a big expansion of religion before the well-known expansion of the sixth century BCE. |
| 7473 | Zoroaster conceived the afterlife, judgement, heaven and hell, and the devil [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Life after death, resurrection, judgement, heaven and paradise, were all Zoroastrian firsts, as were hell and the devil. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.05) | |
| A reaction: He appears to be the first 'prophet'. |
| 7484 | Jesus never intended to start a new religion [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Jesus never intended to start a new religion. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.08) | |
| A reaction: An intriguing fact, which makes you wonder whether any of the prophets ever had such an intention. |
| 7483 | Paul's early writings mention few striking episodes from Jesus' life [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Paul's writings - letters mainly - predate the gospels and yet make no mention of many of the more striking episodes that make up Jesus' life. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.07) | |
| A reaction: This is not proof of anything, but it seems very significant if we are trying to get at the facts about Jesus. |
| 7475 | Confucius revered the spiritual world, but not the supernatural, or a personal god, or the afterlife [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Confucius was deeply religious in a traditional sense, showing reverence towards heaven and an omnipresent spiritual world, but he was cool towards the supernatural, and does not seem to have believed in either a personal god or an afterlife. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.05) | |
| A reaction: The implication is that the spiritual world was very remote from us, and beyond communication. Sounds like deism. |
| 7476 | Taoism aims at freedom from the world, the body, the mind, and nature [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Underlying Taoism is a search for freedom - from the world, from the body, from the mind, from nature. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.05) | |
| A reaction: Of all the world's religions, I think Taoism is the most ridiculouly misconceived. |
| 7463 | The three basic ingredients of religion are: the soul, seers or priests, and ritual [Watson] |
| Full Idea: Anthropologist distinguish three requirements for religion: a non-physical soul which can survive death; individuals who can receive supernatural inspiration; and rituals which can cause changes in the present world. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.01) | |
| A reaction: The latter two, of course, also imply belief in supernatural powers. |
| 7468 | In ancient Athens the souls of the dead are received by the 'upper air' [Watson] |
| Full Idea: An official Athenian war monument of 432 BCE says the souls of the dead will be received by the aither (the 'upper air'), though their bodies remain on earth. | |
| From: Peter Watson (Ideas [2005], Ch.05) | |
| A reaction: Intriguing. Did they think anything happened when they got there? There are also ideas about Hades, and the Isles of the Blessed floating around. |