16 ideas
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: In Armstrong's version of the correspondence theory, the truth-making relation is not one-one, but one-many or many-one. Thus 'p or q' has two truth makers, p and q. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], p.129), quoted by Pascal Engel - Truth Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Interesting. Armstrong deals in universals. He also cites many swans as truth-makers for 'there is a least one black swan'. Not correspondence as we know it, Jim. |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Armstrong has difficulty explaining how laws entail regularities. There is no real modality in the basic components of the world, but he wants to support counterfactuals. His official position is a kind of fictionalism. | |
From: comment on David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], 49-51) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 4.4.4 | |
A reaction: Armstrong seems to be up against the basic problems that laws won't explain anything if they are merely regularities (assuming they are not decrees of a supernatural force). |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Armstrong has a distinctive conception of (fundamental) properties as contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997]) by David Lewis - A world of truthmakers? p.220 | |
A reaction: Armstrong tries to get a naturalistically founded platonism (which he claims is Aristotelian), but the idea that one thing can be multiply located strikes me as daft (especially if the number of its locations increases or decreases). |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], p.115), quoted by Pascal Engel - Truth Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Armstrong's 'truth-make principle'. It seems to be a necessity which is neither natural nor analytic, making it metaphysically necessary. Or is it part of the definition of truth? |
7621 | Special relativity, unlike general relativity, was operationalist in spirit [Putnam on Einstein] |
Full Idea: Einstein's interpretation of special relativity was operationalist in spirit (in marked contrast to the interpretation he gave to general relativity). | |
From: comment on Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History Ch.5 | |
A reaction: The late twentieth century was polluted with daft relativism, and I hold Einstein partly responsible, suspecting that he was a bad philosopher. The later development of Einstein's view noted here is interesting. |
13048 | Good explications are exact, fruitful, simple and similar to the explicandum [Carnap, by Salmon] |
Full Idea: Carnap's four criteria for giving a good explication are similarity to the explicandum, exactness, fruitfulness and simplicity. | |
From: report of Rudolph Carnap (Logical Foundations of Probability [1950], Ch.1) by Wesley Salmon - Four Decades of Scientific Explanation 0.1 | |
A reaction: [compressed] Salmon's view is that this represents the old attitude, that the contribution of philosophy to explanation is the clarification of the key concepts. Carnap is, of course, a logical empiricist. |
22955 | Einstein took causation to be the bedrock of physics [Einstein, by Coveney/Highfield] |
Full Idea: It is difficult to overplay Einstein's commitment to the concept of causality as the bedrock of physics. | |
From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by P Coveney / R Highfield - The Arrow of Time 3 'problem' | |
A reaction: I normally avoid arguments from authority, but this carries a bit of weight (e.g. when Russell tries to oppose it). What happens to Einstein's theories if you remove causation from them? |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §6.3.3 | |
A reaction: Obviously logical necessity is not causal, but as a proposal for simplifying accounts of necessity in nature, this is wonderfully simple and appealing. Is his proposal an elevation of causation, or a degradation of necessity? |
20638 | General relativity assumes laws of nature are the same in all frames of reference [Einstein, by Close] |
Full Idea: Einstein came to general relativity from the principles that the laws of nature are the same in all frames of reference. | |
From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Frank Close - Theories of Everything 5 'Cosmological' | |
A reaction: I wish physicists would tell us a bit more about the ontological status of the 'laws of nature'. Presumably they are not supernatural, so there is an aspect of nature which is constant in all frames of reference. Explanation please. |
20636 | Newton is a special case of Einstein's general theory, with an infinite speed of light [Einstein, by Close] |
Full Idea: Einstein's general relativity included Newton's theory as a special case: Newton's theory corresponds to the speed of light being infinite relative to the speed of the interacting bodies. | |
From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Frank Close - Theories of Everything 5 'Gravity' | |
A reaction: So Newton's theory was NOT wrong, but he made the false assumption that the speed of light was infinite. |
21230 | The theory is 'special' because it sticks to observers moving straight, at constant speeds [Einstein, by Farmelo] |
Full Idea: Einstein's first theory is 'special' because it only deals with observers who move in a straight line at constant speeds with respect to one another. | |
From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Graham Farmelo - The Strangest Man 03 | |
A reaction: Most theories of this period seem to have focused on the simplest cases, for obvious reasons. |
21231 | Assume the speed of light is constant for all observers, and the laws of physics are the same [Einstein, by Farmelo] |
Full Idea: Einstein assumed that when each observer measures the speed of light in a vacuum, they find the same value, regardless of their speed; and that measurements will lead to agreement on the laws of physics. | |
From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Graham Farmelo - The Strangest Man 03 | |
A reaction: So are the laws of physics constant for all observers, irrespective of their speed? |
20634 | General Relativity says there is no absolute force or acceleration [Einstein, by Close] |
Full Idea: Einstein's General Theory arose from the idea that there is no absolute measure of force and acceleration. | |
From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Frank Close - Theories of Everything 5 'Gravity' | |
A reaction: If absolutely everything is only true relative to something else you wonder what the point of measuring anything is. How big can a 'frame of reference' or 'inertial frame' be. Is the multiverse a frame of reference? |
20648 | Mass is a measure of energy content [Einstein] |
Full Idea: The mass of a body is the measure of its energy content. | |
From: Albert Einstein (works [1915]), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence 04 'Intro' | |
A reaction: If I knew what energy was, this would be very illuminating. This idea is e=mc^2 in words. We now have the Higgs field to consider when trying to understand mass. |
21232 | Space-time arises from the connection between measurements of space and of time [Einstein, by Farmelo] |
Full Idea: Einstein noted that the measurements of space and time are not independent but inextricably linked, leading to the idea of unified space-time (introduced by his former teacher Minkowski). | |
From: report of Albert Einstein (works [1915]) by Graham Farmelo - The Strangest Man 03 | |
A reaction: Notice the instrumentalist assumptions behind this. |
7626 | I do not believe in a personal God [Einstein] |
Full Idea: I do not believe in a personal God and I have never denied this but have expressed it clearly. | |
From: Albert Einstein (works [1915]), quoted by Richard Dawkins - The God Delusion Ch.1.15 | |
A reaction: This is an important corrective to those who claim Einstein as religious, on the basis of remarks about God not playing dice etc. See the whole of Dawkins's chapter on Einstein for full discussion. |