23 ideas
3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Philosophical arguments are never incontrovertible - well, hardly ever. Their purpose is to help expound a position, not to coerce agreement. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.419) | |
A reaction: A bit over-cautious, perhaps. Most philosophers are converted to a position when they hear a single key argument, though it is probably 'tipping the balance' of previous discussions. |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: In Armstrong's version of the correspondence theory, the truth-making relation is not one-one, but one-many or many-one. Thus 'p or q' has two truth makers, p and q. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], p.129), quoted by Pascal Engel - Truth Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Interesting. Armstrong deals in universals. He also cites many swans as truth-makers for 'there is a least one black swan'. Not correspondence as we know it, Jim. |
3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.412) | |
A reaction: This seems to me the central truth about brains, and we should not be lured into abandoning it. We should not, however, exclude the possibility that there is a non-physical reality. |
3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
Full Idea: In the case of millions of pixels making up a picture on a computer screen, the supervenience is reduction. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.414) | |
A reaction: Since 'supervenience' seems a suspect relationship about which no one is clear, this is a point very much worth making. |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Armstrong has difficulty explaining how laws entail regularities. There is no real modality in the basic components of the world, but he wants to support counterfactuals. His official position is a kind of fictionalism. | |
From: comment on David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], 49-51) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 4.4.4 | |
A reaction: Armstrong seems to be up against the basic problems that laws won't explain anything if they are merely regularities (assuming they are not decrees of a supernatural force). |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Armstrong has a distinctive conception of (fundamental) properties as contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997]) by David Lewis - A world of truthmakers? p.220 | |
A reaction: Armstrong tries to get a naturalistically founded platonism (which he claims is Aristotelian), but the idea that one thing can be multiply located strikes me as daft (especially if the number of its locations increases or decreases). |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997], p.115), quoted by Pascal Engel - Truth Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Armstrong's 'truth-make principle'. It seems to be a necessity which is neither natural nor analytic, making it metaphysically necessary. Or is it part of the definition of truth? |
18076 | Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher] |
Full Idea: Kuhn contends that almost all theories are falsified at almost all times. | |
From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 07.1 | |
A reaction: This is obviously meant to demolish Karl Popper. |
22191 | Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham] |
Full Idea: In Kuhn's view scientists are decidedly not interested in falsifying their paradigm, because without a paradigm there is no systematic inquiry at all. | |
From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Geoffrey Gorham - Philosophy of Science 3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be one of the stronger aspects of Kuhn's account. You'd be leaving the big house, to go out on the road with a tent. |
22183 | Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn] |
Full Idea: The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience which cannot be forced. | |
From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]), quoted by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 5 | |
A reaction: This is the controversial part of Kuhn, which says that the most important decisions are not really rational. Anyone who thought the interpretation of a bunch of evidence is logical needed their head examined. But it IS rational. |
6162 | Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn] |
Full Idea: Kuhn and Feyerabend adopt a description theory of reference; the term 'electron' refers to whatever satisfies the descriptions associated with electrons, and since these descriptions vary between theories, so too must the reference. | |
From: comment on Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This is a key idea in modern philosophy, showing why all of reality and science were at stake when Kripke and others introduced a causal theory of reference. All the current debates about externalism and essentialism grow from this problem. |
22184 | Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of incommensurability stems from Kuhn's belief that scientific concepts derive their meaning from the theory in which they play a role. | |
From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 5 | |
A reaction: Quine was the source of this. Kripke's direct reference theory was meant to be the answer. |
7619 | Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn] |
Full Idea: To tell us that Galileo had 'incommensurable' notions and then go on to describe them at length is totally incoherent. | |
From: comment on Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History Ch.5 | |
A reaction: How refreshingly sensible. Incommensurability is the sort of nonsense you slide into if you take an instrumental view of science. But scientists are continually aim to pin down what is actually there. Translation between theories is very difficult! |
3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A mind is an organ of representation. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.421) | |
A reaction: This does not seem to necessarily involve awareness, so it seems to put intentionality at the centre of things. It is a good slogan. |
3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Human pain might be one thing. Martian pain might be something else. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.420) | |
A reaction: A key suggestion in support of type-type physicalism, and against the multiple realisability objection to the identity theory |
3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
Full Idea: My reductionism about mind began as part of an a priori reductionism about everything. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.412) | |
A reaction: He says this is 'a priori' to avoid giving hostages to fortune, but I think is the best explanation of the total evidence facing us |
3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology is a powerful instrument of prediction, …which associates with each mental state a typical causal role. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.416) | |
A reaction: This seems a good account of why we should take folk psychology very seriously, even if it is sometimes wrong (e.g. about people who are mentally ill). |
3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I don't believe that folk psychology says there is a language of thought. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.422) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Jerry Fodor. Certainly folk psychology is a strong theory, but a so-called 'language of thought' (the brain's machine code) seems a much weaker one. |
3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If the famous brain in a bottle is your exact duplicate in brain states, but only experiences the computer's virtual reality, so that you share no objects of acquaintance, then according to externalists you share no beliefs whatsoever. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.424) | |
A reaction: A very nice reductio ad absurdum of the idea that all concepts and beliefs have external meaning. |
3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
Full Idea: There is nothing to support the thesis that wide content is the only kind of content, or that it is any way pre-eminent or basic. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.424) | |
A reaction: The idea that all content is 'wide' seems quite wrong. We can't all be wrong about the meaning of a word, because the underlying facts have not yet been discovered. |
3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
Full Idea: According to externalists, Davidson's 'swampman' is your exact duplicate in brains states, but hasn't had time to become acquainted with much, so he has virtually no beliefs. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.425) | |
A reaction: An implausible fantasy, but it does highlight the fact that beliefs and concepts are primarily internal states. |
4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Wide content is derivative, a product of narrow content and relationships of acquaintance with external things. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.430) | |
A reaction: I would say: content is a mental state, but it is created and fixed by a community, and wide content is the part fixed by experts in the community. We can all be wrong about meanings, and occasionally most of us are wrong about a specialised meaning. |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A World of States of Affairs [1997]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §6.3.3 | |
A reaction: Obviously logical necessity is not causal, but as a proposal for simplifying accounts of necessity in nature, this is wonderfully simple and appealing. Is his proposal an elevation of causation, or a degradation of necessity? |