9 ideas
6558 | A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds [Emerson] |
Full Idea: A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. | |
From: Ralph Waldo Emerson (Self-Reliance [1841], p.37) | |
A reaction: A remark to warm the hearts of pragmatists, Wittgensteinians, Nietzscheans and the post-modern mob. But pay careful attention to the word "foolish". Robert Fogelin gives a very balanced view of the matter (e.g. Idea 6557). |
15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Armstrong says what is actual (namely a certain roster of universals) might have been impossible. Hence his modal logic is S4, without the 'Brouwersche Axiom'. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by David Lewis - Armstrong on combinatorial possibility 'The demand' | |
A reaction: So p would imply possibly-not-possibly-p. |
8628 | I hold that algebra and number are developments of logic [Jevons] |
Full Idea: I hold that algebra is a highly developed logic, and number but logical discrimination. | |
From: William S. Jevons (The Principles of Science [1879], p.156), quoted by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) §15 | |
A reaction: Thus Frege shows that logicism was an idea that was in the air before he started writing. Riemann's geometry and Boole's logic presumably had some influence here. |
7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
Full Idea: Armstrong takes properties to be universals, and believes there are no 'uninstantiated' universals. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by John Heil - From an Ontological Point of View §9.3 | |
A reaction: At first glance this, like many theories of universals, seems to invite Ockham's Razor. If they are always instantiated, perhaps we should perhaps just try to talk about the instantiations (i.e. tropes), and skip the universal? |
9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
Full Idea: Armstrong says all properties are categorical, but a dispositional predicate may denote such a property; the dispositional predicate denotes the categorical property in virtue of the dispositional role it happens, contingently, to play in this world. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.1 | |
A reaction: I favour the fundamentality of the dispositional rather than the categorical. The world consists of powers, and we find ourselves amidst their categorical expressions. I could be persuaded otherwise, though! |
10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
Full Idea: Armstrong thinks universals play two roles, namely grounding objective resemblances and grounding causal powers. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11 | |
A reaction: Personally I don't think universals explain anything at all. They just add another layer of confusion to a difficult problem. Oliver objects that this seems a priori, contrary to Armstrong's principle in Idea 10728. |
4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I suggest that we reject the notion that just because the predicate 'red' applies to an open class of particulars, therefore there must be a property, redness. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], p.8), quoted by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §6 | |
A reaction: At last someone sensible (an Australian) rebuts that absurd idea that our ontology is entirely a feature of our language |
10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
Full Idea: Armstrong conflates the type-token distinction with that between universals and particulars. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], xiii,16/17) by Harold Hodes - Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic 147 n23 | |
A reaction: This seems quite reasonable, even if you don’t believe in the reality of universals. I'm beginning to think we should just use the term 'general' instead of 'universal'. 'Type' also seems to correspond to 'set', with the 'token' as the 'member'. |
10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
Full Idea: Armstrong says that if it can be proved a priori that a thing falls under a certain universal, then there is no such universal - and hence there is no universal of a thing being identical with itself. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], II p.11) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 11 | |
A reaction: This is a distinctively Armstrongian view, based on his belief that universals must be instantiated, and must be discoverable a posteriori, as part of science. I'm baffled by self-identity, but I don't think this argument does the job. |