Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Community and Citizenship', 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)' and 'Is There a Marxist Doctrine?'

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18 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Philosophical arguments are never incontrovertible - well, hardly ever. Their purpose is to help expound a position, not to coerce agreement.
     From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.419)
     A reaction: A bit over-cautious, perhaps. Most philosophers are converted to a position when they hear a single key argument, though it is probably 'tipping the balance' of previous discussions.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Most people won't question an idea's truth if they depend on it [Weil]
     Full Idea: The majority of human beings do not question the truth of an idea without which they would literally be unable to live.
     From: Simone Weil (Is There a Marxist Doctrine? [1943], p.163)
     A reaction: I assume that this inability grows stronger with age, as the dependence on the idea runs deeper. Hence for most people the beliefs which sustain them have a higher value than truth. Obviously we should all make love of truth our guiding idea!
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth.
     From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.412)
     A reaction: This seems to me the central truth about brains, and we should not be lured into abandoning it. We should not, however, exclude the possibility that there is a non-physical reality.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
     Full Idea: In the case of millions of pixels making up a picture on a computer screen, the supervenience is reduction.
     From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.414)
     A reaction: Since 'supervenience' seems a suspect relationship about which no one is clear, this is a point very much worth making.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A mind is an organ of representation.
     From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.421)
     A reaction: This does not seem to necessarily involve awareness, so it seems to put intentionality at the centre of things. It is a good slogan.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Human pain might be one thing. Martian pain might be something else.
     From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.420)
     A reaction: A key suggestion in support of type-type physicalism, and against the multiple realisability objection to the identity theory
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
     Full Idea: My reductionism about mind began as part of an a priori reductionism about everything.
     From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.412)
     A reaction: He says this is 'a priori' to avoid giving hostages to fortune, but I think is the best explanation of the total evidence facing us
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Folk psychology is a powerful instrument of prediction, …which associates with each mental state a typical causal role.
     From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.416)
     A reaction: This seems a good account of why we should take folk psychology very seriously, even if it is sometimes wrong (e.g. about people who are mentally ill).
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
     Full Idea: I don't believe that folk psychology says there is a language of thought.
     From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.422)
     A reaction: This is aimed at Jerry Fodor. Certainly folk psychology is a strong theory, but a so-called 'language of thought' (the brain's machine code) seems a much weaker one.
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
     Full Idea: If the famous brain in a bottle is your exact duplicate in brain states, but only experiences the computer's virtual reality, so that you share no objects of acquaintance, then according to externalists you share no beliefs whatsoever.
     From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.424)
     A reaction: A very nice reductio ad absurdum of the idea that all concepts and beliefs have external meaning.
Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
     Full Idea: There is nothing to support the thesis that wide content is the only kind of content, or that it is any way pre-eminent or basic.
     From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.424)
     A reaction: The idea that all content is 'wide' seems quite wrong. We can't all be wrong about the meaning of a word, because the underlying facts have not yet been discovered.
A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
     Full Idea: According to externalists, Davidson's 'swampman' is your exact duplicate in brains states, but hasn't had time to become acquainted with much, so he has virtually no beliefs.
     From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.425)
     A reaction: An implausible fantasy, but it does highlight the fact that beliefs and concepts are primarily internal states.
Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Wide content is derivative, a product of narrow content and relationships of acquaintance with external things.
     From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.430)
     A reaction: I would say: content is a mental state, but it is created and fixed by a community, and wide content is the part fixed by experts in the community. We can all be wrong about meanings, and occasionally most of us are wrong about a specialised meaning.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action [Weil]
     Full Idea: It is naïve to be astonished when we do not stick to firm resolutions. Something stimulated the resolution, but that something was not powerful enough to bring us to the point of carrying it out. Making the resolution may even have exhausted the stimulus.
     From: Simone Weil (Is There a Marxist Doctrine? [1943], p.169)
     A reaction: Socrates says it is a change of belief. Aristotle says it is a desire overcoming a belief. Weil gives a third way: that it is a fading in the strength of the original belief/desire impetus.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
In a violent moral disagreement, it can't be that both sides are just following social morality [Weil]
     Full Idea: If two men are in violent disagreement about good and evil, it is hard to believe that both of them are blindly subject to the opinion of the society around them.
     From: Simone Weil (Is There a Marxist Doctrine? [1943], p.171)
     A reaction: What a beautifully simple observation. Simone would have become a major figure if she had lived longer. No philosopher has ever written better prose.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Citizenship involves a group of mutually supporting rights, which create community and equality [Miller,D]
     Full Idea: The idea of citizenship is that rights support each other. Protective and welfare rights provide a basis for a political role. This underpins a sense of membership, and an obligation to provide welfare. Rights confer equal status and self-respect.
     From: David Miller (Community and Citizenship [1989], 3)
     A reaction: A helpful eludation of what a richer concept of citizenship than mere membership might look like. Communitarians have a different concept of rights from that of liberals.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
Socialists reject nationality as a false source of identity [Miller,D]
     Full Idea: The socialist tradition has been overwhelmingly hostile to nationality as a source of identity, usually regarding it merely as an artificially created impediment to the brotherhood of man.
     From: David Miller (Community and Citizenship [1989], 2)
     A reaction: I have some sympathy with this, especially when nationalism is expressed in terms of enemies, but the question of what community a person can plausibly identify with is difficult. We start in hunter gather tribes of several hundred.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
When war was a profession, customary morality justified any act of war [Weil]
     Full Idea: At the time when war was a profession, fighting men had a morality whereby any act of war, in accordance with the customs of war, and contributing to victory, was legitimate and right.
     From: Simone Weil (Is There a Marxist Doctrine? [1943], p.173)
     A reaction: Note the caveat about 'customs', which were largely moral. See the discussion of killing the non-combatant prisoners in Shakespeare's 'Henry V'.