16 ideas
2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
Full Idea: Philosophy marks the limits of human theoretical intelligence. Philosophy is an attempt to overstep our cognitive bounds, a kind of magnificent failure. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.209) | |
A reaction: No one attempts to overstep boundaries once they are confirmed as such. The magnificent attempts persist because failure is impossible to demonstrate (except, perhaps, by Gödel's Theorem). |
2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
Full Idea: Our thoughts have a kind of duality, corresponding to their surface appearance to introspection and their underlying logical reality. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.147) |
2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
Full Idea: The prevailing view in cognitive psychology is that the mind consists of separate faculties, each with a certain cognitive task: linguistic, social, practical, theoretical, abstract, spatial and emotional. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.40) | |
A reaction: 'Faculties' are not quite the same as 'modules', and this list mostly involves more higher-order activities than a modules list (e.g. Idea 2495). The idea that emotion is a 'faculty' sounds old-fashioned. |
2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
Full Idea: Free will is mental causation in action. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.167) |
8353 | Freedom involves acting according to an idea [Anscombe] |
Full Idea: Freedom at least involves the power of acting according to an idea. | |
From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Causality and Determinism [1971], §2) | |
A reaction: Since 'you' presumably have to sit above the idea and pass a judgement on it, then the same principle should apply to acting on a desire, which presumably 'you' could reject because it just wasn't attractive enough. |
8352 | To believe in determinism, one must believe in a system which determines events [Anscombe] |
Full Idea: 'The ball's path is determined' must mean 'there is only one possible path for the ball (assuming no air currents)', but what ground could one have for believing this, if one does not believe in some system for which it is a consequence? | |
From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Causality and Determinism [1971], §2) | |
A reaction: This seems right, but it doesn't follow that one has to know the full details of the system. The system might just be the best explanation, or even a matter of vague faith. It might, though, be just that you can't imagine any other outcome. |
2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
Full Idea: All matter must contain the potential to underlie consciousness, since there is nothing special about the matter that composes brain tissue. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.100) | |
A reaction: This seems to me one of the most basic assumptions which we should all make about the mind. The mind is made of the brain, and the brain is made of food. However, there must be something 'special' about the brain. |
2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
Full Idea: You can look into your mind until you burst and not discover neurons and synapses, and you can stare at someone's brain from dawn till dusk and not perceive the consciousness that is so apparent to the person whose brain it is. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.47) | |
A reaction: This is a striking symmetry of ignorance, though hardly enough to justify McGinn's pessimism about understanding the mind. 'When you are in the grass you can't see the whole of England; if you can see the whole of England, you won't see the grass'. |
2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
Full Idea: There is information in a system if there are symbols in it that refer to things and that together form strings that can be true or false. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.225) | |
A reaction: We can also directly apprehend information by perception. Are facts identical with correct information? Can a universal generalisation be information? |
22817 | Citizenship involves a group of mutually supporting rights, which create community and equality [Miller,D] |
Full Idea: The idea of citizenship is that rights support each other. Protective and welfare rights provide a basis for a political role. This underpins a sense of membership, and an obligation to provide welfare. Rights confer equal status and self-respect. | |
From: David Miller (Community and Citizenship [1989], 3) | |
A reaction: A helpful eludation of what a richer concept of citizenship than mere membership might look like. Communitarians have a different concept of rights from that of liberals. |
22816 | Socialists reject nationality as a false source of identity [Miller,D] |
Full Idea: The socialist tradition has been overwhelmingly hostile to nationality as a source of identity, usually regarding it merely as an artificially created impediment to the brotherhood of man. | |
From: David Miller (Community and Citizenship [1989], 2) | |
A reaction: I have some sympathy with this, especially when nationalism is expressed in terms of enemies, but the question of what community a person can plausibly identify with is difficult. We start in hunter gather tribes of several hundred. |
2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |
Full Idea: Causation in the material world works by energy transfer of some sort: transfer of motion, of electrical energy, of gravitational force. | |
From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.92) |
8351 | With diseases we easily trace a cause from an effect, but we cannot predict effects [Anscombe] |
Full Idea: It is much easier to trace effects back to causes with certainty than to predict effects from causes. If I have one contact with someone with a disease and I get it, we suppose I got it from him, but a doctor cannot predict a disease from one contact. | |
From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Causality and Determinism [1971], §1) | |
A reaction: An interesting, and obviously correct, observation. Her point is that we get more certainty of causes from observing a singular effect than we get certainty of effects from regularities or laws. |
4777 | The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe] |
Full Idea: The word "cause" can be added to a language in which are already represented many causal concepts; a small selection: scrape, push, wet, carry, eat, burn, knock over, keep off, squash, make, hurt. | |
From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Causality and Determinism [1971], p.93) | |
A reaction: An interesting point, perhaps reinforcing the Humean idea of causation as a 'natural belief', or the Kantian view of it as a category of thought. Or maybe causation is built into language because it is a feature of reality… |
10363 | Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Anscombe has inspired the view that causation is an intensional relation, and takes it to be relative to the descriptions of the primary relata. | |
From: report of G.E.M. Anscombe (Causality and Determinism [1971], 1) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1 | |
A reaction: It seems too linguistic to say that there is nothing more to it. It seems relevant in human examples, but if a landslide crushes a tree, what difference does the description make? 'It was just a few rocks and some miserable little tree'. No excuse! |
8350 | Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe] |
Full Idea: Since Mill it has been fairly common to explain causation one way or another in terms of 'necessary' and 'sufficient' conditions. | |
From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Causality and Determinism [1971], §1) | |
A reaction: Interesting to see what Hume implies about these criteria. Anscombe is going to propose that causal events are fairly self-evident and self-explanatory, and don't need analyses of conditions. Another approach is regularities and laws. |