67 ideas
19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The central notion of philosophy since Kant is 'correlation' - that we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux's charge is that philosophy has thereby completely failed to grasp the scientific revolution, which has used mathematics to make objectivity possible. Quine and Putnam would be good examples of what he has in mind. |
19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The Copernican Revolution is not so much the decentring of observers in the solar system, but (by the mathematizing of nature) the decentring of thought relative to the world within the process of knowledge. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
A reaction: In other words, I take it, the Copernican Revolution was the discovery of objectivity. That is a very nice addition to my History of Ideas collection. |
19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The major shift that has occurred in the conception of thought from Kant's time to ours is from the unknowability of the thing-in-itself to its unthinkability. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux is making the case that philosophy is alienating us more and more from the triumphant realism of the scientific revolution. He says thinking has split from being. He's right. Modern American pragmatists are the worst (not Peirce!). |
19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Ever since Kant, to think science as a philosopher has been to claim that science harbours a meaning other than the one delivered by science itself. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
A reaction: The point is that science discovered objectivity (via the mathematising of nature), and Kant utterly rejected objectivity, by enmeshing the human mind in every possible scientific claim. This makes Meillassoux and I very cross. |
19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Since Kant, objectivity is no longer defined with reference to the object in itself, but rather with reference to the possible universality of an objective statement. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux disapproves of this, as a betrayal by philosophers of the scientific revolution, which gave us true objectivity (e.g. about how the world was before humanity). |
19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: So long as we continue to believe that there is a reason why things are the way they are rather than some other way, we will construe this world is a mystery, since no such reason will every be vouchsafed to us. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Giving up sufficient reason sounds like a rather drastic response to this. Put it like this: Will we ever be able to explain absolutely everything? No. So will the world always be a little mysterious to us? Yes, obviously. Is that a problem? No! |
19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The principle of non-contradiction itself is without reason, and consequently it can only be the norm for what is thinkable by us, rather than for what is possible in the absolute sense. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: This is not Meillassoux's view, but describes the modern heresy of 'correlationism', which ties all assessments of how reality is to our capacity to think about it. Personally I take logical non-contradiction to derive from non-contradiction in nature. |
19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: For contemporary logicians, it is not non-contradiction that provides the criterion for what is thinkable, but rather inconsistency. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: The point is that para-consistent logic might permit isolated contradictions (as true) within a system, but it is only contradiction across the system (inconsistencies) which make the system untenable. |
19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Paraconsistent logics were only developed in order to prevent computers, such as expert medical systems, from deducing anything whatsoever from contradictory data, because of the principle of 'ex falso quodlibet'. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) |
19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Paraconsistent logics are only ever dealing with contradictions inherent in statements about the world, never with the real contradictions in the world. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: Thank goodness for that! I can accept that someone in a doorway is both in the room and not in the room, but not that they are existing in a real state of contradiction. I fear that a few daft people embrace the logic as confirming contradictory reality. |
19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: We must establish the thesis that what is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
A reaction: The truth of this thesis would permanently establish mathematics as the only possible language of science. Personally I have no idea how you could prove or assess such a thesis. It is a lovely speculation, though. 'The structure of the possible' (p,127) |
19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: We maintain that it is absolutely necessary that every entity might not exist. ...The absolute is the absolute impossibility of a necessary being. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: This is the main thesis of his book. The usual candidates for necessary existence are God, and mathematical objects. I am inclined to agree with Meillassoux. |
19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: It is necessary that there be something rather than nothing because it is necessarily contingent that there is something rather than something else. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: The great charm of metaphysics is the array of serious answers to the question of why there is something rather than nothing. You'll need to read Meillassoux's book to understand this one. |
19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: It is incumbent upon us to break with the ontological requisite of the moderns, according to which 'to be is to be a correlate'. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: He blames Kant for this pernicious idea, which has driven philosophy away from realist science, when it should be supporting and joining it. As a realist I agree, and find Meillassoux very illuminating on the subject. |
19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: My term 'precariousness' designates a possibility of not-being which must eventually be realised. By contrast, absolute contingency designates a pure possibility; one which may never be realised. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: I thoroughly approve of this distinction, because I have often enountered the assumption that all contingency is precariousness, and I have never seen why that should be so. In Aquinas's Third Way, for example. The 6 on a die may never come up. |
19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The very notion of chance is only conceivable on condition that there are unalterable physical laws. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Laws might be contingent, even though they never alter. Chance in horse racing relies on the stability of whole institution of horse racing. |
19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: What distinguishes transcendental idealism from speculative idealism is the fact that the former does not posit the existence of the transcendental subject apart from its bodily individuation. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: These modern French philosophers explain things so much more clearly than the English! The 'speculative' version is seen in Berkeley. On p.17 he says transcendental idealism is 'civilised', and speculative idealism is 'uncouth'. |
19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: All aspects of the object that can give rise to a mathematical thought rather than to a perception or a sensation can be meaningfully turned into the properties of the thing not only as it is with me, but also as it is without me. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: This is Meillassoux's spin on the primary/secondary distinction, which he places at the heart of the scientific revolution. Cartesian dualism offers a separate space for the secondary qualities. He is appalled when philosophers reject the distinction. |
19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: How is mathematical discourse able to describe a reality where humanity is absent? | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: He is referring to the prehistoric world. He takes this to be a key question about the laws of nature. We extrapolate mathematically from the experienced world, relying on the stability of the laws. Must they be necessary to be stable? No, it seems. |
19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Hume's question can be formulated as follows: can we demonstrate that the experimental science which is possible today will still be possible tomorrow? | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Could there be deep universal changes going on in nature which science could never, even in principle, detect? |
19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The transcendental subject simply cannot be said to exist; which is to say that the subject is not an entity, but rather a set of conditions rendering objective scientific knowledge of entities possible. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux treats this as part of the Kantian Disaster, which made an accurate account of the scientific revolution impossible for philosophers. Kant's ego seems to have primarily an epistemological role. |
16369 | There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati] |
Full Idea: For Papineau there is just one file, which is initialised on the first encounter with the object, stored in memory, reactivated on further encounters, and consolidated with familiarity. Accumulation of information shows it is the same file. | |
From: report of David Papineau (Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts [2006]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 7.2 | |
A reaction: Recanati attempts to refute this view, defending a more complex taxonomy of files. I'm sympathetic to Papineau, as distinct shift in file type doesn't sound very plausible. Simplicity suggests Papineau as a better starting-point. |
19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The standard objection is that if the laws of nature were actually contingent, we would already have noticed it. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux offers a sustained argument that the laws of nature are necessarily contingent. In Idea 19660 he distinguishes contingencies that must change from those that merely could change. |
19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: We must ask how we are to explain the manifest stability of physical laws, given that we take these to be contingent? | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Meissalloux offers a very deep and subtle answer to this question... It is based on the possibilities of chaos being an uncountable infinity... It is a very nice question, which physicists might be able to answer, without help from philosophy. |
21167 | Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Gravity is an odd sort of force, not least because it only ever works one way. Electromagnetism attracts and repels, but with gravity there are only positive masses always attract. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 05) | |
A reaction: This leads to speculation about anti-gravity, but there is no current evidence for it. |
21176 | In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: At the origin of the universe gravity becomes so powerful that general relativity breaks down, giving infinity for every answer. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09) |
21147 | Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The theory of electromagnetism that incorporates both special relativity and quantum mechanics is quantum electrodynamics (QED). It was developed by Dirac and others, and perfected in the 1940s. The field is a collection of quanta. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: This builds on Maxwell's earlier classical theory. QED is said to be the best theory in all of physics. |
21155 | Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Photons, the field quanta of the electromagnetic force, have zero rest mass, so virtual photons can exist indefinitely and travel any distance, meaning the electromagnetic force has an infinite range. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
21161 | In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The standard model says that the fields of all fundamental forces should merge at extremely high energies, meaning there is also a unified, high-energy field out there. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 03) | |
A reaction: Not quite sure what 'out there' means. This idea is linked to the quest for dark energy. Is this unified phenomenon only found near the Big Bang? |
21146 | Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Electrons in atoms move at high speeds, so they are subject to the special theory of relativity. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: Presumably this implies a frame of reference, and defining velocities relative to other electrons. Plus time-dilation? |
21148 | The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Experiments show that the nuclear binding force does not follow the inverse square law, but is repulsive at the shortest distances, then attractive, then fades away rapidly as distance increases further. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: So how does it know when to be strong? Magnetism doesn't vary according to distance, and light obeys the inverse square law, because everything is decided at the output. - See 21151 for an explanation. It interacts after departure. |
21151 | Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: In QCD the particles that carry the strong force are called gluons. ...Gluons carry their own colour charges, so they can interact with each other (unlike photons) via the strong nuclear force (which limits the range of the force). | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: So the force varies in strength with distance because the degree of separation among the spreading gluons varies? The force has one range, which is squashed when close, effective at medium, and loses touch with distance? |
21152 | The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The strong force holds quarks together within protons and neutrons, and residual effects of the strong force bind protons (whch repel one another) and neutrons together in nuclei. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: So the force is much stronger between quarks (which can't escape), and only 'residual' in the nucleus, which must be why smashing nuclei open is fairly easy, but smashin protons open needs higher energies. |
21142 | Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Classifying hadrons according to charge, strangeness and spin revealed patterns of eight and ten particles (SU(3) symmetery). The mathematics then showed that these are built from a basic group of only three members. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) |
21143 | Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ (proton, duu; neutron, ddu; lambda, dus), or with spin 3/2 (omega-minus, sss). | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) |
21150 | Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Just as mixing three colours of light gives white, so the three colour charges of quarks can add up to give no colour. This is what happens in the proton, which always contains one blue-charge quark, one red and one green. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
21145 | The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: There are four fundamental forces: gravity, electromagnetism, and the weak and strong nuclear forces. Particle physics has so far failed to encompass the force of gravity. The forces that shape our world are themselves the effect of particles. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: Philosophers must take note of the fact that forces are the effects of particles. Common sense pictures forces imposed on particles, like throwing a tennis ball, but the particles are actually the sources of force. The gravitino is speculative. |
21153 | The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The beta decay of the neutron (into a proton, an electron and an antineutrino) can be described in terms of the weak force, which is 10,000 times weaker than the strong force. It allows the quarks and leptons to change from one type to another. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: This seems to make it the key source of radioactivity. Perhaps it should be called the Force of Change? |
21154 | Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The quantum field theory of the weak force needs three carrier particles. The W+ and W- are electrically charged, and enable the weak force to change the charge of a particle. The Z° is uncharged, and mediates weak interactions with no charge change. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
21156 | The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The W and Z particles are heavy, and so cannot travel far from their parents. The weak force therefore has a very short range. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
21164 | Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Why do the proton and electron charges mirror each other so perfectly when they are such different particles? | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 04) | |
A reaction: We seem to have reached a common stage in science, where we have a wonderful descriptive model (the Standard Model), but we cannot explain why what is modelled is the way it is. |
21170 | The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The standard model cannot explain dark matter, or dark energy (which is causing expansion to accelerate). It cannot explain how matter survived annihilation with anti-matter in the Big Bang, or explain gravity. The strength of each force is unexplained. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 06) | |
A reaction: [compressed] P.141 adds that the model has to be manipulated to keep the Higgs mass low enough. |
21140 | Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) | |
A reaction: As an outsider all I can do is collect descriptions of such properties from the experts. The experts appear to be happy with the numbers inserted in the equations. |
21149 | Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Quarks have a property akin to electric charge, called their colour charge. It comes in three varieties, red, green and blue. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) |
21158 | Fermions, with spin ½, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Particles with half-integer spin, such as electrons, protons or quarks (all spin ½) have an asymmetry in their wavefunction that makes them antisocial. These particles (Fermions) cannot share a quantum state. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: This is said to explain the complexity of matter, with carbon an especially good example. |
21165 | Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Spin is a quantum-mechanical property of a particle akin to rotation about its own axis. Particles of different spins respond to magnetic fields in different ways, so it is a relatively easy thing to measure. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 04) | |
A reaction: I wish I knew what 'akin to' meant. Maybe particles are not rigid bodies, so they cannot spin in the way a top can? It must be an electro-magnetic property. Idea 21166 says spin has two possible directions. |
21157 | Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Particles obeying the laws of quantum mechanics have wave-like properties - moving as a quantum wave-function, spread out in space, with wavelengths that get shorter as their energy increases. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: Thus X-rays are dangerous, but long wave radio is not. De Broglie's equation. |
21163 | The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Most of a proton's or neutrino's mass is contained in the interaction energies of a 'sea' of quarks, antiquarks and gluons that bind them. ...You might feel solid, but in fact you're 99 per cent binding energy. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 04) | |
A reaction: This is because energy is equivalent to mass (although gluons are said to have energy but no mass - puzzled by that). This is a fact which needs a bit of time to digest. Once you've grasped we are full of space, you still have understood it. |
21168 | Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: There are two types of mass: gravitational mass quantifies how strongly an object feels gravity, while inertial mass quantifies an object's resistance to acceleration. There proven equality is at the heart of General Relativity. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 05) | |
A reaction: It had never occurred to me that these two values might come apart. Doesn't their identical values demonstrate that they are in fact the same thing? Sounds like Hesperus/Phosphorus to me. The book calls it 'mysterious'. |
21138 | Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The proton (938.3 MeV) is lighter than the neutron (939.6 MeV) and does not decay, but the heavier neutron can change into a proton by emitting an electron. (If you gather a bucketful of neutrons, after ten minutes only half of them would be left). | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) | |
A reaction: Protons are more or less eternal, but some theories have them decaying after billions of years. Smashing protons together is a popular pastime for physicists. |
21144 | Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Quarks can change from one variety to another, and the top, bottom, charm and strange quarks all rapidly decay to the up and down quarks of everyday life. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) | |
A reaction: Hence the universe is largely composed of up and down quarks and electrons. The other quarks seem to be more important in the early universe. |
21141 | Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: When a neutron decays into a proton and an electron (one example of beta decay), the energy of the two particles adds up to less than the starting energy of the neutron. Pauli and Fermi concluded that a neutrino (an electron antineutrino) is emitted. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 01) | |
A reaction: I'm wondering how much they could infer about the nature of the new particle (which was only confirmed 26 years later). |
21169 | Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Neutrinos are the only particles that seem just to spin anticlockwise. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 06) | |
A reaction: See 21166. Anti-neutrino spin is the opposite way. Which way up do you hold the neutrino when pronouncing that it is 'anticlockwise? |
21166 | Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: In the conventional standard model neutrinos have antiparticles - which spin in the opposite direction, and have the opposite lepton number. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 05) |
21171 | The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: In the very early hot universe the electromagnetic and weak nuclear forces were one. The early emergence of the Higgs field led to electroweak symmetry breaking. The W and Z bosons grew fat, and the photon raced away mass-free. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 07) |
21179 | Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: String theory, together with its supersymmetric particles, has recently been rewritten in the space-time described by loop quantum gravity (which says that space-time ust be made from finite chunks). | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09) |
21178 | String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: String theory has now been incorporated into Ed Witten's M-Theory, which is a mathematical framework that lives in 11-dimensional space-time, involving higher-dimensional objects called p-branes, of which strings are a special case. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09) |
21175 | String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: A future accelerator might create 'stringballs', when two strings slam into one another and, rather than combining to form a stretched string, make a tangled ball. Finding them would prove string theory. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 08) | |
A reaction: This is the only possible test for string theory which I have seen suggested. How do you 'slam strings together'? |
21177 | String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: String theory works as a quantum theory of gravity because string vibrations can describe gravitons, the hypothetical carriers of the gravitational force. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 09) | |
A reaction: Presumably the main aim of a quantum theory of gravity is to include gravitons within particle theory. This idea has to be a main attraction of string theory. Compare Idea 21166. |
21162 | Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Peter Higgs says he is a fan of supersymmetry, largely because it seems to be the only route by which gravity can be brought into the scheme. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 03) | |
A reaction: Peter Higgs proposed the Higgs boson (now discovered). This seems a very good reason to favour supersymmetry. A grand unified theory that left out gravity doesn't seem to be unified quite grandly enough. |
21159 | Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Supersymmetry posits heavy boson partners for all fermions, and heavy fermions for all bosons. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: The main Fermions are electron, proton and quark. Do extra bosons imply extra forces? Peter Higgs favours supersymmetry. |
21173 | Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The key to supersymmetry is that in the high-energy soup of the early universe, particles and their superpartners were indistinguishable. Each pair existed as single massless entities. With expansion and cooling this supersymmetry broke down. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 08) |
21172 | The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The old front-runner theory, supersymmetry, has fallen from grace as the Large Hadron Collider keeps failing to find it. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 07) |
21160 | The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: The point about the Higgs field is that even the lowest-energy state of space is not empty. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 02) | |
A reaction: So where is the Higgs field located? Even if there is no utterly empty space, the concept of location implies a concept of space more basic than the fields (about 16, I gather) which occupy it. You can't describe movement without a concept of location. |
21174 | Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.] |
Full Idea: Whatever dark matter is made of, it must have mass to feel and generate gravity; but no electric charge, so it does not interact with light. The leading candidate has been the weakly interacting massive particle (WIMP), much heavier than a proton. | |
From: New Scientist writers (Why the Universe Exists [2017], 08) | |
A reaction: Note that it must 'generate' gravity. The idea of a law of gravity which is externally imposed on matter is long dead. Heavy WIMPs have not yet been detected. |
19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Since Descartes conceives of God as existing necessarily, whether I exist to think of him or not, Descartes assures me of a possible access to an absolute reality - a Great Outdoors that is not a correlate of my thought. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: His point is that the ontological argument should be seen as part of the scientific revolution, and not an anomaly within it. Interesting. |
19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Once the absolute has become unthinkable, even atheism, which also targets God's inexistence in the manner of an absolute, is reduced to a mere belief, and hence to a religion, albeit of the nihilist kind. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim. Rather hard to agree or disagree, though the idea that atheism must qualify as a religion seems odd. If it is unqualified it does have the grand quality of a religion, but if it is fallibilist it just seems like an attitude. |