27 ideas
1606 | You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Everyone who enters into a debate about reality automatically becomes a Platonist. Since such debates are the essence of philosophy, every philosopher is a Platonist. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.199) | |
A reaction: This is correct |
1595 | Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Philosophy, the attempt to articulate the vision of beauty itself, is the attempt to satisfy the highest human desire. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.120) | |
A reaction: A million miles away from modern philosophy, but still an ideal to be taken seriously. |
1571 | 'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Logos can mean i) a thought or reasoning, ii) the word which expresses a thought, iii) a rational structure outside human thought. These meanings give 'logos' an extraordinary range. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], Intro. 12) |
1572 | In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: In the seventeenth century only a certain type of logos was deemed legitimate, namely that identified with technical knowledge (or 'techné'). | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], Intro. 15) |
1573 | The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: What is supposed to identify the person of logos from the one without is the commitment to giving reasons explaining why one opinion is superior to another. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], Intro. 17) |
1592 | Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Logos cannot refute the radical, consistent and self-conscious relativist. Therefore it must admit that, like the relativist, it itself is essentially a matter of desire. It wants to say what is right and wrong, true and false, and for others to agree. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.108) |
1593 | Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.109) |
1603 | Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Logos is not unconditionally good, but good contingent on there being some other person (out there) who is willing to talk with logos, to approach it even as an opponent. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.175) |
1598 | We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Is the arché (basis) intelligible, or is it chaos? Upon this question hinges all, for answering it determines whether poetry or logos is the form of human speech that best does justice to the world. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.139) |
1584 | Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: The modern scientific world view, with all its hope for clarity and precision, has a flipside, …which is its abandonment of rationality in the world of human significance. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.74) |
1591 | Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Unfortunately for the logos there is no argument that can, without begging the question, establish the goodness of argumentation. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.106) |
1599 | Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: To debate about suspending all our presuppositions requires a common ground which, upon being established, immediately renders the debate superfluous. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.144) |
15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: I favour restricting the term 'logical truth' to what logicians would count as such, excluding both analytic truths like 'Bachelors are unmarried' and Kripkean necessities like 'Gold is an element'. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], I) | |
A reaction: I agree. There is a tendency to splash the phrases 'logical truth' and 'logical necessity around in vague ways. I take them to strictly arise out of the requirements of formal systems of logic. |
1605 | Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: There are two extremes: the Aristotelian views reality simply as reality, and the sophist or poet view reality only as an object of desire. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.199) |
15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: The view I now favour says that the causal features of a property, both forward-looking and backward-looking, are essential to it. And it says that properties having the same causal features are identical. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III) | |
A reaction: In this formulation we have essentialism about properties, as well as essentialism about the things which have the properties. |
15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: The controversial claim of my theory is that the causal features of properties are essential to them - are features that they have in all possible worlds. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III) | |
A reaction: One problem is that a property can come in degrees, so what degree of the property is necessary to it? It is better to assign this claim to the fundamental properties (which are best called 'powers'). |
15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: I now reject the formulation of the causal theory which says that a property is a cluster of conditional powers. That has a reductionist flavour, which is a cheat. We need properties to explain conditional powers, so properties won't reduce. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III) | |
A reaction: [compressed wording] I agree with Mumford and Anjum in preferring his earlier formulation. I think properties are broad messy things, whereas powers can be defined more precisely, and seem to have more stability in nature. |
15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: If it is possible that there could be possible states of affairs that are not nomologically possible, don't we therefore need a notion of metaphysical possibility that outruns nomological possibility? | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI) | |
A reaction: Shoemaker rejects this possibility (p.425). I sympathise. So there is 'natural' possibility (my preferred term), which is anything which stuff, if it exists, could do, and 'logical' possibility, which is anything that doesn't lead to contradiction. |
15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Once the obstacle of the deeply rooted conviction that necessary truths should be knowable a priori is removed, ...causal necessity is (pretheoretically) the very paradigm of necessity, in ordinary usage and in dictionaries. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VII) | |
A reaction: The a priori route seems to lead to logical necessity, just by doing a priori logic, and also to metaphysical necessity, by some sort of intuitive vision. This is a powerful idea of Shoemaker's (implied, of course, in Kripke). |
15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: We have abundant empirical evidence that when we can imagine some phenomenal situation, e.g., imagine things appearing certain ways, such a situation could actually exist. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI) | |
A reaction: There seem to be good reasons for holding the opposite view too. We can imagine gold appearing to be all sorts of colours, but that doesn't make it possible. What does empirical evidence really tell us here? |
15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Imaginability can give us access to conceptual possibility, when we come to believe situations to be conceptually possible by reflecting on their descriptions and seeing no contradiction or incoherence. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI) | |
A reaction: If take the absence of contradiction to indicate 'logical' possibility, but the absence of incoherence is more interesting, even if it is a bit vague. He is talking of 'situations', which I take to be features of reality. A priori synthetic? |
6672 | Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Moore's Paradox says it makes no sense to assert 'I believe that p, but p is false', even though it makes perfectly good sense to assert 'I used to believe p, but p is false' or 'You believe p, but p is false'. | |
From: report of G.E. Moore (works [1905]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.10 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure if this really deserves the label of 'paradox'. I take it as drawing attention to the obvious fact that belief is commitment to truth. I think my assessment that p is true is correct, but your assessment is wrong. ('True' is not redundant!) |
1577 | Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Relativism is disease, is pollution, for it negates the efficacy of logos. It destroys the possibility of a complete rational debate of fundamental questions. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.41) |
15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Perhaps 'grue' has causal features, but only derivatively, in virtue of its relation to green. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III) | |
A reaction: I take grue to be a behaviour, and not a property at all. The problem only arises because the notion of a 'property' became too lax. Presumably Shoemaker should also mention blue in his account. |
1578 | If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: If relativism offers an accurate description of human values, then rhetoric replaces logos as the most fundamental human activity. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.47) | |
A reaction: Or putting it another way, logos (reason) becomes meaningless. I suppose, though, that a relativist can conduct conditional reasoning (but must belief in some rules of reason). |
1596 | Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Logos originates not in a cognitive capacity for the apprehension of objects, but in the desire to give birth to beautiful speeches. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.124) | |
A reaction: It is hard for us to grasp this, but it might be quite life-enhancing if we could return to that old way of thought. |
15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: One way to get the conclusion that laws are necessary is to combine my view of properties with the view of Armstrong, Dretske and Tooley, that laws are, or assert, relations between properties. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], I) | |
A reaction: This is interesting, because Armstrong in particular wants the necessity to arise from relations between properties as universals, but if we define properties causally, and make them necessary, we might get the same result without universals. |