Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity', 'Cosmic Apprentice' and 'Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations''

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3 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Scientists know everything about nothing, philosophers nothing about everything [Sagan,D]
     Full Idea: The scientist learns more and more about less and less, until she knows everything about nothing, whereas a philosopher learns less and less about more and more until he knows nothing about everything.
     From: Dorion Sagan (Cosmic Apprentice [2013])
     A reaction: [Came via Twitter] Not sure if this is true, but it is too nice to miss.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
     Full Idea: 'Ultimate sortals' are said to be non-subordinated, disjoint from one another, and uniquely paired with each object. Because of this, the ultimate sortal cannot be a satisfactory explication of the notion of an ontological category.
     From: comment on David Wiggins (Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity [1971], p.75) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §26
     A reaction: My strong intuitions are that Wiggins is plain wrong, and Westerhoff gives the most promising reasons for my intuition. The simplest point is that objects can obviously belong to more than one category.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm]
     Full Idea: If I obtain my conception of pain from pain that I experience, then it will be a part of my conception of pain that I am the only being that can experience it. For me it will be contradiction to speak of another's pain.
     From: Norman Malcolm (Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [1954]), quoted by Alvin Plantinga - De Re and De Dicto p.44
     A reaction: This obviously has the private language argument in the background. It seems to point towards a behaviourist view, that I derive pain from external behaviour in the first instance. So how do I connect the behaviour to the feeling?