Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity', 'works' and 'Self, Body and Coincidence'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties

14534	Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum]
	Full Idea: Shoemaker ventured the theory in 1980 that properties just are clusters of powers, but he has subsequently abandoned this, and now thinks properties bestow their bearers with causal powers.
	From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Self, Body and Coincidence [1999], p.297) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 1.1
	A reaction: Like Mumford and Anjum, I prefer the earlier theory. I think taking powers as basic is the only story that really makes sense. A power is intrinsic and primitive, whereas properties are complex, messy, partly subjective, and higher level.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind

13128	'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
	Full Idea: 'Ultimate sortals' are said to be non-subordinated, disjoint from one another, and uniquely paired with each object. Because of this, the ultimate sortal cannot be a satisfactory explication of the notion of an ontological category.
	From: comment on David Wiggins (Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity [1971], p.75) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §26
	A reaction: My strong intuitions are that Wiggins is plain wrong, and Westerhoff gives the most promising reasons for my intuition. The simplest point is that objects can obviously belong to more than one category.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind

13074	Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: On Suarez's account, only natural kinds and their members have real essences.
	From: report of Francisco Suárez (works [1588]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.3.1 n21
	A reaction: Interesting. Rather than say that everything is a member of some kind, we leave quirky individuals out, with no essence at all. What is the status of the very first exemplar of a given kind?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation

7563	The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley]
	Full Idea: The 'influx' model of causation says that causes involve a process of contagion, as it were; when the kettle boils, the gas infects the water inside the kettle with its own 'individual accident' of heat, which literally flows from one to the other.
	From: report of Francisco Suárez (works [1588]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Ch.2
	A reaction: This nicely captures the scholastic target of Hume's sceptical thinking on the subject. However, see Idea 2542, where the idea of influx has had a revival. It is hard to see how the water could change if it didn't 'catch' something from the gas.