Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity', 'The Ages of the World' and 'On the Nature of Acquaintance'

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3 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: Russell argued that the only 'logically proper' names are those which denote particular entities with which one can be acquainted. The best examples are 'this' and 'that'; other apparent names turn out, when analysed, to be definite descriptions.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Acquaintance [1914]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
     A reaction: This view is firm countered by the causal theory of reference, proposed by Kripke and others, in which not only people like Aristotle are 'baptised' with a name, but also natural kinds such as water. It is hard to disagree with Kripke on this.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
     Full Idea: 'Ultimate sortals' are said to be non-subordinated, disjoint from one another, and uniquely paired with each object. Because of this, the ultimate sortal cannot be a satisfactory explication of the notion of an ontological category.
     From: comment on David Wiggins (Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity [1971], p.75) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §26
     A reaction: My strong intuitions are that Wiggins is plain wrong, and Westerhoff gives the most promising reasons for my intuition. The simplest point is that objects can obviously belong to more than one category.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We don't choose our characters, yet we still claim credit for the actions our characters perform [Schelling]
     Full Idea: Nobody has chosen their character; and yet this does not stop anybody attributing the action which follows from his character to themself as a free action.
     From: Friedrich Schelling (The Ages of the World [1810], I.93)
     A reaction: This pinpoints a very nice ambivalence about our attitudes to our own characters. We all have some pride and shame about who we are, without having chosed who we are. At least when we are young. But we make the bed we lie in.