Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity', 'Hippocrates of Cos on the mind' and 'Identity through Possible Worlds'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
     Full Idea: 'Ultimate sortals' are said to be non-subordinated, disjoint from one another, and uniquely paired with each object. Because of this, the ultimate sortal cannot be a satisfactory explication of the notion of an ontological category.
     From: comment on David Wiggins (Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity [1971], p.75) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §26
     A reaction: My strong intuitions are that Wiggins is plain wrong, and Westerhoff gives the most promising reasons for my intuition. The simplest point is that objects can obviously belong to more than one category.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
If there are essential properties, how do you find out what they are? [Chisholm]
     Full Idea: It seems to me that if Adam does have essential properties, there is no procedure at all for finding out what they are.
     From: Roderick Chisholm (Identity through Possible Worlds [1967], p.85)
     A reaction: My tentative suggestion is that the essential properties are those which explain the nature, power, function and role of Adam in the 'actual' world. Whatever possibilities he acquires, he had better retain the capacity to be the First Man.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa? [Chisholm]
     Full Idea: If Adam lived for 931 years in a possible world, instead of his actual 930 years, ..then Adam and Noah could gradually exchange their ages and other properties...and we could trace Adam in a world back to the actual Noah, and vice versa.
     From: Roderick Chisholm (Identity through Possible Worlds [1967], p.81-2)
     A reaction: [very compressed] Chisholm was one of the first to raise this problem for possible worlds, though it had been Quine's objection to modal logic all along. Only Adam having essential properties seems to stop this slippery slope, says Chisholm.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
All of our happiness and misery arises entirely from the brain [Hippocrates]
     Full Idea: Men ought to know that from the brain, and from the brain alone, arise our pleasures, joys, laughter and jests, as well as our sorrow, pains, griefs and tears.
     From: Hippocrates (Hippocrates of Cos on the mind [c.430 BCE], p.32)
     A reaction: If this could be assertedly so confidently at that date, why was the fact so slow to catch on? Brain injuries should have convinced everyone.