15 ideas
14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
Full Idea: It is widely agreed that '¬', '&', and 'v' are 'truth functions': the truth value of a compound sentence formed using them is fully determined by the truth value or values of the component sentences. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'Equiv') | |
A reaction: A candidate for not being a truth function might be a conditional →, where the arrow adds something over and above the propositions it connects. The relationship has an additional truth value? Does A depend on B? |
13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
Full Idea: 'Ultimate sortals' are said to be non-subordinated, disjoint from one another, and uniquely paired with each object. Because of this, the ultimate sortal cannot be a satisfactory explication of the notion of an ontological category. | |
From: comment on David Wiggins (Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity [1971], p.75) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §26 | |
A reaction: My strong intuitions are that Wiggins is plain wrong, and Westerhoff gives the most promising reasons for my intuition. The simplest point is that objects can obviously belong to more than one category. |
14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Subjunctive conditionals are intimately connected with dispositional properties and causation. ...Consequently, a position some find attractive is that possible worlds theory applies to subjunctives, while the no-truth theory applies to indicatives. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'Indicative') | |
A reaction: My intuitions are to reject this and favour a unified account, where both sorts of conditionals are mappings of the relationships among the facts of actuality. Nice slogan! |
14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
Full Idea: (A&B)→A is a logical truth, but A can be true and B false, so that (A&B) is false. So some conditionals with false antecedent and true consequent are true. If → is a truth function, then whenever A is false and B is true (A→B) is true. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'Equiv') | |
A reaction: This is his third and final step in showing the truth table of → if it is truth functional. |
14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
Full Idea: (A→A) is a logical truth, so some conditionals with antecedent and consequent the same truth value are true. But if '→' is a truth function, that will be true for all cases. Hence whenever A and B are alike in truth value, (A→B) is true. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'Equiv') | |
A reaction: His second step in demonstrating the truth table for →, assuming it is truth functional. |
14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Modus ponens is intuitively valid, but in A,A→B|B if A is true and B is false that must be because A→B is false. So A→B is false when A is true and B is false. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'Equiv') | |
A reaction: This is his first step in showing how the truth functional account of A→B acquires its truth table. If you are giving up the truth functional view of conditionals, presumably you are not also going to give up modus ponens? |
14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
Full Idea: In the possible worlds account modus ponens is validated (the closest world, the actual, is a B-world just if B is true), and modus tollens is validated (if B is false, the actual world is not an A-world, so A is false). | |
From: Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'Famous') | |
A reaction: [see Jackson for slightly fuller versions] This looks like a minimal requirement for a decent theory of conditionals, so Jackson explains the attractions of the possible worlds view very persuasively. |
14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
Full Idea: In the no-truth theory of conditionals they have justified assertion or acceptability conditions but not truth conditions. ...The motivation is that only assertions have truth values, and conditionals are arguments, not proper assertions. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'No-truth') | |
A reaction: Once I trim this idea down to its basics, it suddenly looks very persuasive. Except that I am inclined to think that conditional truths do state facts about the world - perhaps as facts about how more basic truths are related to each other. |
14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
Full Idea: In the possible worlds account of conditionals A⊃B is not sufficient for A→B. If A is false then A⊃B is true, but here nothing is implied about whether the world most like the actual world except that A is true is or is not a B-world. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'Possible') | |
A reaction: The possible worlds account seems to be built on Ramsey's idea of just holding A true and seeing what you get. Being committed to B being automatically true if A is false seems highly counterintuitive. |
14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |
Full Idea: One addition to the truth functional account of conditionals is that A be somehow relevant to B. However, sometimes we use conditionals to express lack of relevance, as in 'If Fred works he will fail, and if Fred doesn't work he will fail'. | |
From: Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'Possible') | |
A reaction: This certainly seems to put paid to an attractive instant solution to the problem. |
22971 | In moving from capitalism to communism a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is needed [Marx] |
Full Idea: Between the capitalist and communist society lies the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
A reaction: This hugely influential idea was catastrophic for the twentieth century, because the leaders of the proletarian dictatorship adored and abused the power, and wouldn't give it up for some feeble next stage. |
22970 | Freedom is making the state subordinate to its society [Marx] |
Full Idea: Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed on society into one completely subordinate to it. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
A reaction: The intermediate stage is dictatorship of the proletariat (presumably exercised by the communist leadership). No twentieth century marxist state ever got near the freedom which Marx was seeking. A liberal society might achieve it! |
22969 | People who only have their labour power are the slaves of those permitting them to work [Marx] |
Full Idea: The man who possesses no other property than his labour power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labour. He can only work with their permission. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], I) | |
A reaction: In a world of vast multinationals, the person giving the permission to work is nearly always dependent on some higher level permission. In any sort of society people can only work with the consensus of other people. |
22000 | From each according to his ability, to each according to his need [Marx] |
Full Idea: From each according to his ability, to each according to his need. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875]), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 9 | |
A reaction: Singer says this was not original to Marx, and he placed little emphasis on it. The obvious capitalist response is to ask how you will motivate someone who has huge abilities but few needs. It implies huge inequalities of altruism. |
22972 | Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' just tolerates all sorts of religious intolerance [Marx] |
Full Idea: Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' is just the toleration of all possible kinds of religious unfreedom of conscience, and the workers' party should endeavour to liberate the conscience from the witchery of religion. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
A reaction: We see this in modern 'faith' schools in the UK, which do not seem to be required to live up to the standards of freedom of belief expected in the rest of a liberal society. |