14 ideas
9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Organisms come to better understand their worlds by coming to better understand themselves and the ways in which their own structures engage their worlds. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §III) | |
A reaction: Van Gulick is defending a higher-order theory of consciousness, but this strikes me as a good rationale for the target of philosophy, which has increasingly (since Descartes) focused on understanding our own minds. |
13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
Full Idea: 'Ultimate sortals' are said to be non-subordinated, disjoint from one another, and uniquely paired with each object. Because of this, the ultimate sortal cannot be a satisfactory explication of the notion of an ontological category. | |
From: comment on David Wiggins (Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity [1971], p.75) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §26 | |
A reaction: My strong intuitions are that Wiggins is plain wrong, and Westerhoff gives the most promising reasons for my intuition. The simplest point is that objects can obviously belong to more than one category. |
9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
Full Idea: In contrast with standard notions of knowledge, the concept of understanding emphasizes the element of practical engagement from the outset. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §II) | |
A reaction: This could be the very interesting germ of a huge revolution in our approach to epistemology, which I find rather appealing. Plato's desire that knowledge should have 'logos' seems to me in the same area. It sounds rather internalist, which is good. |
9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §II) | |
A reaction: This thought could rather rapidly revive the discredited notion of knowing-how. I think it might slot into an account of the mind in terms of levels, so that my internalist view of knowledge emerges at higher levels, built on more basic responses. |
9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is a really good key question, which has hovered over the debate since Locke's definition of a person (as 'self-aware'). I take the self to be a mechanism of most brains, which is prior to consciousness. Maybe the two are inseparable. |
9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Higher-order thought (HOT) models treat metastates as thought-like, and higher-order perception (HOP) models regard them as at least quasi-perceptual and resulting from some form of inner monitoring or inner sense. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I) | |
A reaction: I would understand 'thought' to at least partially involve judgements. The HOT theory (Carruthers) seems to suit epistemological foundationalists, who want truth to enter on the ground floor. This pushes me towards the HOP model (Lycan) as more plausible. |
9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Higher-order models would effectively reduce the problem of consciousness to that of intentionality. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I) | |
A reaction: This gives the bigger picture - that higher-order theories are the cutting edge of attempts to give a naturalistic, reductivist account of consciousness. That seems to be the only way to go, so we should encourage them in the enterprise. |
9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
Full Idea: Some higher-order theorists say we have qualitative but unconscious mental states of color or pain (qualia), but there is nothing it is like to be in such a state, which needs higher-order awareness. The meta-states are devoid of qualia. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I.5) | |
A reaction: He calls this the 'stranded qualia' problem. Clearly one begins to sharpen Ockham's Razor at this point, if the higher-level state isn't contributing something. I don't rule out unconscious qualia. The strength of a real pain is distorted in a dream. |
22971 | In moving from capitalism to communism a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is needed [Marx] |
Full Idea: Between the capitalist and communist society lies the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
A reaction: This hugely influential idea was catastrophic for the twentieth century, because the leaders of the proletarian dictatorship adored and abused the power, and wouldn't give it up for some feeble next stage. |
22000 | From each according to his ability, to each according to his need [Marx] |
Full Idea: From each according to his ability, to each according to his need. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875]), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 9 | |
A reaction: Singer says this was not original to Marx, and he placed little emphasis on it. The obvious capitalist response is to ask how you will motivate someone who has huge abilities but few needs. It implies huge inequalities of altruism. |
22970 | Freedom is making the state subordinate to its society [Marx] |
Full Idea: Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed on society into one completely subordinate to it. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
A reaction: The intermediate stage is dictatorship of the proletariat (presumably exercised by the communist leadership). No twentieth century marxist state ever got near the freedom which Marx was seeking. A liberal society might achieve it! |
22969 | People who only have their labour power are the slaves of those permitting them to work [Marx] |
Full Idea: The man who possesses no other property than his labour power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labour. He can only work with their permission. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], I) | |
A reaction: In a world of vast multinationals, the person giving the permission to work is nearly always dependent on some higher level permission. In any sort of society people can only work with the consensus of other people. |
22972 | Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' just tolerates all sorts of religious intolerance [Marx] |
Full Idea: Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' is just the toleration of all possible kinds of religious unfreedom of conscience, and the workers' party should endeavour to liberate the conscience from the witchery of religion. | |
From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
A reaction: We see this in modern 'faith' schools in the UK, which do not seem to be required to live up to the standards of freedom of belief expected in the rest of a liberal society. |
9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |
Full Idea: From the teleopragmatic perspective, life itself is largely an informational process. | |
From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006]) | |
A reaction: From the cynical perspective a human is just 'blood and foul smell in a bag', but that may not give you whole story. The point here is that the informational view will cover both the genetic and the mental levels of human life. True but unilluminating? |