17 ideas
15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: My current use of the Aristotelian term 'definition' is intended to correspond to what is typically accessible to a scientist only at the end of a successful investigation into the nature of a particular phenomenon. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1) | |
A reaction: It is crucial to understand that Aristotle's definitions could be several hundred pages long. It has nothing to do with dictionary definitions. He proposes 'nominal' and 'real' definitions. |
15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Since essences cause the other necessary features of a thing, so definitions, as the linguistic correlates of essences, explain, together with other axioms, the propositions describing those necessary features. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1) | |
A reaction: This is nice and clear. Definitions are NOT essences - they are the linguistic correlates of essences, and mirror those essences. The necessary features are not the only things needing explanation. That picture is too passive. |
13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
Full Idea: 'Ultimate sortals' are said to be non-subordinated, disjoint from one another, and uniquely paired with each object. Because of this, the ultimate sortal cannot be a satisfactory explication of the notion of an ontological category. | |
From: comment on David Wiggins (Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity [1971], p.75) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §26 | |
A reaction: My strong intuitions are that Wiggins is plain wrong, and Westerhoff gives the most promising reasons for my intuition. The simplest point is that objects can obviously belong to more than one category. |
15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: We can distinguish (as Aristotle and Fine do) between what belongs to the essence of an object, and what merely follows from the essence of an object. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.1) | |
A reaction: This can help to clarify the confusions that result from treating necessary properties as if they were essential. |
15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Individual instances of a kind of phenomenon, in Aristotle's view, can only be perceived through sense-perception; but they are not the proper subject-matter of scientific demonstration and definition. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1) | |
A reaction: A footnote (11) explains that this is because they involve syllogisms, which require universals. I take Aristotle, and anyone sensible, to rest on individual essences, but inevitably turn to generic essences when language becomes involved. |
15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: If an object has a certain property essentially, then it follows that the object has the property necessarily (if it exists). | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.2) | |
A reaction: She is citing Fine, who says that the converse (necessity implying essence) is false. I agree with that. I also willing to challenge the first bit. I suspect an object can retain identity and lose essence. Coma patient; broken clock; aged athlete. |
15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Demonstration encompasses more than deductive entailment, in that the explanatory order of priority represented in a successful demonstration must mirror precisely the causal order of priority present in the phenomena in question. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.1) | |
A reaction: She is referring to Aristotle's 'Posterior Analytics'. Put so clearly this sounds like an incredibly useful concept in discussing how we present good modern scientific explanations. Reinstating Aristotle is a major priority for philosophy! |
15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: In a proper demonstrative argument, the middle term must be explanatory of the conclusion, in a very specific sense: the middle term must state what properly belongs to the definition of the kind of phenomenon in question. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1) | |
A reaction: So 'All men are mortal, S is a man, so S is mortal'. The middle term is 'man', which gives a generic explanation for why S is mortal. Explanation as categorisation? I don't think this is the whole story of Aristotelian explanation. |
15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The Greek does not disambiguate between 'cause' and 'explanation', since the same terms ('aitia' and 'aition') can be translated in both ways. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1 n15) | |
A reaction: This is essential information if we are to understand Aristotle's Four Causes, which are quite baffling if we take 'causes' in the modern way. The are the Four Modes of Explanation. |
15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Both the question 'what is thunder?', and the question 'why does thunder occur?', for Aristotle, are answered simultaneously, once it has been discovered what the essence of thunder it, i.e. what it is to be thunder. | |
From: Kathrin Koslicki (Essence, Necessity and Explanation [2012], 13.3.1 n10) | |
A reaction: I take this idea to be pretty much the whole story about essences. |
6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced by this, as a simple rule. If I spend my whole life doing just the minimum for my own survival, I don't see why I should have to justify that, and I don't see a state is obliged to justify it either. |
6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
Full Idea: My own view is that moral justification must be capable of motivating, but not in virtue of reliance on pre-moral motives. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This may well be the core and essence of Kantian moral theory. I'm inclined to think of it as 'Kant's dream', which is of ultra-rational beings who are driven by pure rationality as a motivator. People who fit this bill tend to be academics. |
6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
Full Idea: I do not favour the route taken by Hobbes's modern descendants, using game theory, since I believe the impersonal standpoint makes an essential contribution to individual motivation which must be addressed by any ethically acceptable theory. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The assumption of self-seeking at the core of game theory seems very bizarre, and leads to moral approval of free riders. Nagel offers the best response, which is the Kantian impersonal view. Nagel may be optimistic about motivation, though. |
6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
Full Idea: In pursuit of the kind of objectivity needed in the physical sciences, we abstract even from our humanity; but nothing further than abstraction from our identity (that is, who we are) enters into ethical theory. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The 'brief' summary of this boils down to a nice and interesting slogan. It epitomises the modern Kantian approach to ethics. But compare Idea 4122, from Bernard Williams. |
6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
Full Idea: It is implicit in the categorical imperative that I can will that everyone should adopt as a maxim only what everyone else can also will that everyone should adopt as a maxim. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This is a nice move, because it shifts the theory away from a highly individualistic Cartesian view of morality towards the idea that morality is a community activity. |
6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
Full Idea: A legitimate system is one which reconciles the two universal principles of impartiality and reasonable partiality so that no one can object that his interests are not being accorded sufficient weight or that the demands on him are excessive. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This seems an appealing principle, and a nice attempt at stating the core of Kantian liberalism. It is obviously influenced by Scanlon's contractualist view, in the idea that 'no one can object', because everyone sees the justification. |
6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |
Full Idea: As things are, democracy is the enemy of comprehensive equality, once the poor cease to be a majority. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: This is obvious once you think about it, but it is well worth saying, because it is tempting to think that we live in an 'equal' society, merely because we are equal in things such as voting rights and equality before the law. |