Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity', 'The Problem of Possibilia' and 'Conjectures and Refutations'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

7 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
13128 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
     Full Idea: 'Ultimate sortals' are said to be non-subordinated, disjoint from one another, and uniquely paired with each object. Because of this, the ultimate sortal cannot be a satisfactory explication of the notion of an ontological category.
     From: comment on David Wiggins (Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity [1971], p.75) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §26
     A reaction: My strong intuitions are that Wiggins is plain wrong, and Westerhoff gives the most promising reasons for my intuition. The simplest point is that objects can obviously belong to more than one category.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
12177 Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper]
     Full Idea: One might adopt the view that certain things of our own making, such as clocks, may well be said to have 'essences', viz. their 'purposes', and what makes them serve these purposes.
     From: Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations [1963], 3.3 n17)
     A reaction: This is from one of the arch-opponents of essentialism. Could we take him on a slippery slope into essences for evolved creatures, or their organs? His argument says admitting an essence for a clock prevents using it for another purpose.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
9212 Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Possible states of affairs have often been taken to be propositions, but this cannot be correct, since any possible state of affairs is possibly a state of affairs, but no proposition is possibly a state of affairs.
     From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
     A reaction: The point is, presumably, that the state of affairs cannot be the proposition itself, but (at least) what the proposition refers to. I can't see any objection to that.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
9213 The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: A possible world can't be defined (by Stalnaker and Plantinga) as a way the world might have been, because a possible world is possibly the world, yet no way the world might have been is possibly the world.
     From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
     A reaction: His point is that any definition of a possible world must cover the actual world, because that is one of them. 'Might have been' is not applicable to the actual world. It seems a fairly important starting point for discussion of possible worlds.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
12176 Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper]
     Full Idea: I contest the essentialist doctrine that science aims at ultimate explanations, one which cannot be further explained, and which is in no need of any further explanation.
     From: Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations [1963], 3.3)
     A reaction: If explanations are causal, this seems to a plea for an infinite regress of causes, which is an odd thing to espouse. Are the explanations verbal descriptions or things in the world. There can be no perfect descriptions, but there may be ultimate things.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12175 Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper]
     Full Idea: The third of the Galilean doctrines of science is that the best, the truly scientific theories, describe the 'essences' or the 'essential natures' of things - the realities which lie behind the appearances. They are ultimate explanations.
     From: Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations [1963], 3.3)
     A reaction: This seems to be the seventeenth century doctrine which was undermined by Humeanism, and hence despised by Popper, but is now making a comeback, with a new account of essence and necessity.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
12179 Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]
     Full Idea: The essentialist view of Newton (due to Roger Cotes) ...prevented fruitful questions from being raised, such as, 'What is the cause of gravity?' or 'Can we deduce Newton's theory from a more general independent theory?'
     From: Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations [1963], 3.3)
     A reaction: This is Popper's main (and only) objection to essentialism - that it is committed to ultimate explanations, and smugly terminates science when it thinks it has found them. This does not strike me as a problem with scientific essentialism.