Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity', 'Lysis' and 'The Basing Relation'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
     Full Idea: 'Ultimate sortals' are said to be non-subordinated, disjoint from one another, and uniquely paired with each object. Because of this, the ultimate sortal cannot be a satisfactory explication of the notion of an ontological category.
     From: comment on David Wiggins (Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity [1971], p.75) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §26
     A reaction: My strong intuitions are that Wiggins is plain wrong, and Westerhoff gives the most promising reasons for my intuition. The simplest point is that objects can obviously belong to more than one category.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
There are reasons 'for which' a belief is held, reasons 'why' it is believed, and reasons 'to' believe it [Neta]
     Full Idea: We must distinguish between something's being a 'reason for which' a creature believes something, and its being a 'reason why' a creature believes something. ...We must also distinguish a 'reason for which' from a 'reason to' believe something.
     From: Ram Neta (The Basing Relation [2011], Intro)
     A reaction: He doesn't spell the distinctions out clearly. I take it that 'for which' is my personal justification, 'why' is the dodgy prejudices that cause my belief. and 'to' is some actual good reasons, of which I may be unaware.
The basing relation of a reason to a belief should both support and explain the belief [Neta]
     Full Idea: A reason has a 'basing relation' with a belief if it (i) rationally supports holding the belief, and (ii) explains why the belief is held.
     From: Ram Neta (The Basing Relation [2011], Intro)
     A reaction: Presumably a false reason would fit this account. Why not talk of 'grounding', or is that word now reserved for metaphysics? If I hypnotise you into a belief, would my hypnotic power be the basing reason? Fits (ii), but not (i).
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is beautiful [Plato]
     Full Idea: The good is beautiful.
     From: Plato (Lysis [c.400 BCE], 216d)
     A reaction: also Timaeus 87c
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
People say that friendship exists only between good men [Plato]
     Full Idea: People say that friendship exists only between good men.
     From: Plato (Lysis [c.400 BCE], 214d)