Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity', 'The Evolution of Co-Operation' and 'Survival and Identity, with postscript'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
13128 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
     Full Idea: 'Ultimate sortals' are said to be non-subordinated, disjoint from one another, and uniquely paired with each object. Because of this, the ultimate sortal cannot be a satisfactory explication of the notion of an ontological category.
     From: comment on David Wiggins (Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity [1971], p.75) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §26
     A reaction: My strong intuitions are that Wiggins is plain wrong, and Westerhoff gives the most promising reasons for my intuition. The simplest point is that objects can obviously belong to more than one category.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
16079 De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Lewis, by Rudder Baker]
     Full Idea: Lewis is perhaps the most prominent proponent of the view that de re modal predicates are ambiguous.
     From: report of David Lewis (Survival and Identity, with postscript [1983]) by Lynne Rudder Baker - Why Constitution is not Identity n25
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
22725 When players don't meet again, defection is the best strategy [Axelrod]
     Full Idea: When players will never meet again, the strategy of defection is the only stable strategy.
     From: Robert Axelrod (The Evolution of Co-Operation [1984], 5)
     A reaction: This gives good grounds for any community's mistrust of transient strangers, such as tourists. And yet any sensible tourist will want communities to trust tourists, and will therefore behave in a reliable way.
22724 Good strategies avoid conflict, respond to hostility, forgive, and are clear [Axelrod]
     Full Idea: Successful game strategies avoid unnecessary conflict, are provoked by an uncalled for defection, forgive after a provocation, and behave clearly so the other player can adapt.
     From: Robert Axelrod (The Evolution of Co-Operation [1984], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] Exactly what you would expect from a nice but successful school teacher. The strategies for success in these games is the same as the rules for educating a person into cooperative behaviour. TIT FOR TAT does all these.