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All the ideas for 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity', 'Frege on Apriority' and 'Quantification and Descriptions'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
18776 Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B]
     Full Idea: A 'contextual' definition shows how to eliminate a description from a context.
     From: Bernard Linsky (Quantification and Descriptions [2014], 2)
     A reaction: I'm trying to think of an example, but what I come up with are better described as 'paraphrases' than as 'definitions'.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
18774 Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B]
     Full Idea: Definite descriptions seem to have a logical structure in a way that proper names do not.
     From: Bernard Linsky (Quantification and Descriptions [2014], 1.1.1)
     A reaction: Thus descriptions have implications which plain names do not.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
9159 You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge]
     Full Idea: Although one can translate geometrical propositions into algebraic ones and produce equivalent models, the meaning of geometrical propositions seems to me to be thereby lost. Pure geometry involves spatial content, even if abstracted from physical space.
     From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority [2000], IV)
     A reaction: This supports Frege's view (against Quine) that geometry won't easily fit into the programme of logicism. I agree with Burge. You would be focusing on the syntax of geometry, and leaving out the semantics.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
13128 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
     Full Idea: 'Ultimate sortals' are said to be non-subordinated, disjoint from one another, and uniquely paired with each object. Because of this, the ultimate sortal cannot be a satisfactory explication of the notion of an ontological category.
     From: comment on David Wiggins (Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity [1971], p.75) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §26
     A reaction: My strong intuitions are that Wiggins is plain wrong, and Westerhoff gives the most promising reasons for my intuition. The simplest point is that objects can obviously belong to more than one category.