Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity', 'Reply to Hellman' and 'What do powers do when they are not manifested?'

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3 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic

17996	Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos]
	Full Idea: The argument for fundamental powers is that fundamental particles are simple, without internal structure. Hence they have no parts which can be the bearers of further properties (powers or non-powers) which in turn ground the properties of the particles.
	From: Stathis Psillos (What do powers do when they are not manifested? [2006], p.151), quoted by Anna Marmodoro - Do powers need powers to make them powerful? 'The Problem'
	A reaction: If a power is basic, what has the power? I think the best answer is that at the fundamental level this is a false dichotomy. If you could zoom in, you would say that basic substance is active in a way that everyday stuff doesn't appear to be.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind

13128	'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
	Full Idea: 'Ultimate sortals' are said to be non-subordinated, disjoint from one another, and uniquely paired with each object. Because of this, the ultimate sortal cannot be a satisfactory explication of the notion of an ontological category.
	From: comment on David Wiggins (Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity [1971], p.75) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §26
	A reaction: My strong intuitions are that Wiggins is plain wrong, and Westerhoff gives the most promising reasons for my intuition. The simplest point is that objects can obviously belong to more than one category.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence

9379	A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine]
	Full Idea: A sentence is obvious if (a) it is true and (b) any speaker of the language is prepared, for any reason or none, to assent to it without hesitation, unless put off by being asked so obvious a question.
	From: Willard Quine (Reply to Hellman [1975], p.206), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
	A reaction: This comes from someone who is keen to deny a priori knowledge, but what are we to make of the expostulations "It's obvious, you idiot!", and "Now I see it, it's obvious!", and "It seemed obvious, but I was wrong!"?