16 ideas
17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
Full Idea: The alleged paradox of analysis asserts that if one knew what was involved in the concept, one would not need the analysis; if one did not know what was involved in the concept, no analysis could be forthcoming. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 1) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of problem that seemed to bug Plato a lot. You certainly can't analyse something if you don't understand it, but it seems obvious that you can illuminatingly analyse something of which you have a reasonable understanding. |
17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
Full Idea: The 'symmetry thesis' holds that there is only a pragmatic, or epistemic, but no logical, difference between explaining and predicting. …The only difference is in what the producer of the deduction knows just before the deduction is produced. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 4) | |
A reaction: He cites Mill has holding this view. It seems elementary to me that I can explain something but not predict it, or predict it but not explain it. The latter case is just Humean habitual induction. |
17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
Full Idea: Plato, Aristotle, Mill and Hempel believed that an explanatory product can be characterized solely in terms of the kind of information it conveys, no reference to the act of explaining being required. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 1) | |
A reaction: Achinstein says it's about acts, because the same information could be an explanation, or a critique, or some other act. Ruben disagrees, and so do I. |
17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
Full Idea: Objects or events in the world must really stand in some appropriate 'structural' relation before explanation is possible. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 7) | |
A reaction: An important point. These days people talk of 'dependence relations'. Some sort of structure to reality (mainly imposed by the direction of time and causation, I would have thought) is a prerequisite of finding a direction to explanation. |
17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
Full Idea: Typically, full explanations are not arguments, but singular sentences, or conjunctions thereof. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 6) | |
A reaction: This is mainly objecting to the claim that explanations are deductions from laws and facts. I agree with Ruben. Explanations are just information, I think. Of course, Aristotle's demonstrations are arguments. |
17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
Full Idea: The fault of the causal theory of explanation was to overlook the fact that there are more ways of making something what it is or being responsible for it than by causing it. …Causation is a particular type of determinative relation. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 7) | |
A reaction: The only thing I can think of is that certain abstract facts are 'determined' by other abtract facts, without being 'caused' by them. A useful word. |
17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
Full Idea: The reduction of one science to another has often been taken as paradigmatic of explanation. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 5) | |
A reaction: It seems fairly obvious that the total reduction of chemistry to physics would involve the elimination of all the current concepts of chemistry. Could this possibly enhance our understanding of chemistry? I would have thought not. |
17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
Full Idea: Facts explain facts only when the features and the individuals the facts are about are appropriately conceptualized or named. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 5) | |
A reaction: He has a nice example that 'Cicero's speeches stop in 43 BCE' isn't explained by 'Tully died then', if you don't know that Cicero was Tully. Ruben is not defending pragmatic explanation, but to this extent he must be right. |
20937 | The state should produce higher civilisations for all, in tune with the economic apparatus [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: The role of the State is always that of creating new and higher types of civilisation; of adapting the 'civilisation' and the morality of the broades popular masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Collective') | |
A reaction: This makes education virtually the prime role of the state. Reminiscent of Sir John Reith's original dream, in the 1930s, for the BBC. Many marxists feel that the economy is in direct conflict with morality and civilisation. |
20935 | Eventually political parties lose touch with the class they represent, which is dangerous [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: At a certain point in their lives, social classes become detached from their traditional parties. In that particular form ...the parties are no longer recognised by their class as its exopression. ...The field is then open for violent solutions. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Parties') | |
A reaction: Left wing parties pursue ideologies that don't connect with the actual current interests of the working class, and righ wing parties are taken over by rich elites who don't value safe traditonal communities. (This thought is resonant in the 2018 UK). |
20936 | Caesarism emerges when two forces in society are paralysed in conflict [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: Caesarism (as the emergence of a 'heroic' personality) expresses a situation in which the forces in conflict balance each other in a catastrophic manner ...which can only terminate in their reciprocal destruction. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Caesarism') | |
A reaction: He goes on to distinguish progressive and reactionary versions of Caesarism. Gramsci's interest is in the circumstances that throw up such people. Marx had identified 'Bonapartism'. |
20941 | Totalitarian parties cut their members off from other cultural organisations [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: A totalitarian party ensures that members find in that particular party all the satisfactions that they formerly found in a multiplicity of organisations. They break the threads that bind them to extraneous cultural organisms. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Organisation') | |
A reaction: British parties traditionally had a 'club house', where you could do most of your socialising. Presumably Nazis left the church, and various interest groups. |
20939 | What is the function of a parliament? Does it even constitute a part of the State structure? [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: The question has to be asked: do parliaments, even in fact constitute a part of the State structure? In other words, what is the real function? | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Parliament') | |
A reaction: Nice question. In the UK it is only the cabinet which has active power. Backbench MPs are usually very frustrated, especially if their party has a comfortable majority, and their vote is not precious. They are privileged lobbyists. |
20938 | Liberalism's weakness is its powerful rigid bureaucracy [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: Liberalism's weakness is the bureacracy - the crystallisation of the leading personnel - which exercises power, and at a certain point it becomes a caste. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'Hegemony') | |
A reaction: This sounds more like what is called 'the Establishment' in Britain, which is the hidden controllers of power, rather than the administrators (whose role is only despised by right-wingers). |
20940 | Perfect political equality requires economic equality [Gramsci] |
Full Idea: The idea that complete and perfect political equality cannot exist without economic equality ...remains correct. | |
From: Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Prison Notebooks [1971], 2 'The State') | |
A reaction: In the west we are living in a period (2018) when the top 0.1% of the wealthy are racing away, creating huge inequality. Their wealth controls the media, and it seems unrestrainable. The belief that we live in a 'democracy' is an illusion. |
22824 | Magna Carta forbids prison without trial, and insists on neutral and correct process [-, by Charvet] |
Full Idea: The Magna Carta forbids the King to imprison indefinitely without trial, and also binds the King to follow due process in his courts and not allow the justice provided to be for sale. | |
From: report of - (Magna Carta [1215]) by John Charvet - Liberalism: the basics 02 | |
A reaction: Very exasperating for a medieval monarch. In current times British law is exceedingly slow (so long imprisonment before trial), and the necessary effective advocates cost vastly too much for all but a tiny minority. So it's going badly. |