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All the ideas for 'Explaining Explanation', 'Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root'' and 'The Flow of Time'

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben]
     Full Idea: The alleged paradox of analysis asserts that if one knew what was involved in the concept, one would not need the analysis; if one did not know what was involved in the concept, no analysis could be forthcoming.
     From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 1)
     A reaction: This is the sort of problem that seemed to bug Plato a lot. You certainly can't analyse something if you don't understand it, but it seems obvious that you can illuminatingly analyse something of which you have a reasonable understanding.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The Principle may be stated as 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be', which is a generalisation of the assumption which justifies the question 'Why?', which is the mother of all science.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This faith is the core of philosophy, to be maintained against all defeatists like Wittgenstein and Colin McGinn. Reality must be rational, or we wouldn't be here to think about it. (Maybe!)
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Necessity has no meaning other than the irresistible sequence of the effect where the cause is given. All necessity is thus conditioned, and absolute or unconditioned necessity is a contradiction in terms.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.VIII)
     A reaction: I.e. there is only natural necessity, and no such thing as metaphysical necessity. But what about logical necessity(e.g. 2+3=5)? I think there may be metaphysical necessity, but we can't know much about it, and we are over-confident in assessing it.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.IV)
     A reaction: Based, I take it, on Hume. Presumably he means a posteriori understanding, as it hardly fits an understanding of arithmetic. Understanding needs more than just causation. What aspects of causation?
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben]
     Full Idea: The 'symmetry thesis' holds that there is only a pragmatic, or epistemic, but no logical, difference between explaining and predicting. …The only difference is in what the producer of the deduction knows just before the deduction is produced.
     From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 4)
     A reaction: He cites Mill has holding this view. It seems elementary to me that I can explain something but not predict it, or predict it but not explain it. The latter case is just Humean habitual induction.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
     Full Idea: Plato, Aristotle, Mill and Hempel believed that an explanatory product can be characterized solely in terms of the kind of information it conveys, no reference to the act of explaining being required.
     From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 1)
     A reaction: Achinstein says it's about acts, because the same information could be an explanation, or a critique, or some other act. Ruben disagrees, and so do I.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben]
     Full Idea: Objects or events in the world must really stand in some appropriate 'structural' relation before explanation is possible.
     From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 7)
     A reaction: An important point. These days people talk of 'dependence relations'. Some sort of structure to reality (mainly imposed by the direction of time and causation, I would have thought) is a prerequisite of finding a direction to explanation.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben]
     Full Idea: Typically, full explanations are not arguments, but singular sentences, or conjunctions thereof.
     From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 6)
     A reaction: This is mainly objecting to the claim that explanations are deductions from laws and facts. I agree with Ruben. Explanations are just information, I think. Of course, Aristotle's demonstrations are arguments.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben]
     Full Idea: The fault of the causal theory of explanation was to overlook the fact that there are more ways of making something what it is or being responsible for it than by causing it. …Causation is a particular type of determinative relation.
     From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 7)
     A reaction: The only thing I can think of is that certain abstract facts are 'determined' by other abtract facts, without being 'caused' by them. A useful word.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben]
     Full Idea: The reduction of one science to another has often been taken as paradigmatic of explanation.
     From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 5)
     A reaction: It seems fairly obvious that the total reduction of chemistry to physics would involve the elimination of all the current concepts of chemistry. Could this possibly enhance our understanding of chemistry? I would have thought not.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben]
     Full Idea: Facts explain facts only when the features and the individuals the facts are about are appropriately conceptualized or named.
     From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 5)
     A reaction: He has a nice example that 'Cicero's speeches stop in 43 BCE' isn't explained by 'Tully died then', if you don't know that Cicero was Tully. Ruben is not defending pragmatic explanation, but to this extent he must be right.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: What we know in ourselves is never what knows, but what wills, the will.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.VII)
     A reaction: An interesting slant on Hume's scepticism about personal identity. Hume was hunting for a thing-which-experiences. If he had sought his will, he might have spotted it.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The identity of the subject of willing with that of knowing by virtue whereof ...the word 'I' includes and indicates both, is the knot of the world, and hence inexplicable.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], p.211-2), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 4 'Self'
     A reaction: I'm struggling to see this as a deep mystery. If we look objectively at animals and ask 'what is their brain for?' the answer seems obvious. This may be a case of everything looking mysterious after a philosopher has stared at it for a while.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.IV)
     A reaction: An off-beat philosophical view of the question. Sounds more like a consequence of time than its essential nature.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentists lack the materials for a realist view of change [Price,H]
     Full Idea: The presentist view seems to have lost the materials for a realist view of passage, change or temporal transition.
     From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 2)
     A reaction: It is a nice point. How can a presentist talk of change if the only component that exists is the present time slice? Price says change can only be a kind of fiction for the presentist. Change in existence and in properties are distinct concepts.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
The present moment, time's direction, and time's dynamic quality seem to be objective facts [Price,H]
     Full Idea: The flow of time seems to be an objective feature of reality because of 1) the present moment can be objectively distinguished, 2) time has an objective direction, of earlier and later, and 3) there is something objectively dynamic about time.
     From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 1.1)
     A reaction: Price sets out to undermine all three of these claims, in implicit defence of a psychological view. I disagree with him.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
We must explain either the existence of a time direction, or our psychological sense of it [Price,H]
     Full Idea: If the world comes equipped with a time orientation, where does it come from? If it doesn't, what explains our psychological feeling of a direction for time?
     From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 3.5)
     A reaction: The chances of 'explaining' either one look slim to me. That is, the fact would explain our experience, but the experience without the fact looks ridiculous, and I cannot conceive of any time-free entity which could explain the fact.