17 ideas
17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
Full Idea: The alleged paradox of analysis asserts that if one knew what was involved in the concept, one would not need the analysis; if one did not know what was involved in the concept, no analysis could be forthcoming. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 1) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of problem that seemed to bug Plato a lot. You certainly can't analyse something if you don't understand it, but it seems obvious that you can illuminatingly analyse something of which you have a reasonable understanding. |
10269 | Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Mathematics has got rid of possibility by simply assuming that, up to isomorphism anyway, all possibilities are simultaneous actual - actual, that is, in the universe of 'sets'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (What is Mathematical Truth? [1975], p.70), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.5 |
17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
Full Idea: The 'symmetry thesis' holds that there is only a pragmatic, or epistemic, but no logical, difference between explaining and predicting. …The only difference is in what the producer of the deduction knows just before the deduction is produced. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 4) | |
A reaction: He cites Mill has holding this view. It seems elementary to me that I can explain something but not predict it, or predict it but not explain it. The latter case is just Humean habitual induction. |
17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
Full Idea: Plato, Aristotle, Mill and Hempel believed that an explanatory product can be characterized solely in terms of the kind of information it conveys, no reference to the act of explaining being required. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 1) | |
A reaction: Achinstein says it's about acts, because the same information could be an explanation, or a critique, or some other act. Ruben disagrees, and so do I. |
17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
Full Idea: Objects or events in the world must really stand in some appropriate 'structural' relation before explanation is possible. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 7) | |
A reaction: An important point. These days people talk of 'dependence relations'. Some sort of structure to reality (mainly imposed by the direction of time and causation, I would have thought) is a prerequisite of finding a direction to explanation. |
17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
Full Idea: Typically, full explanations are not arguments, but singular sentences, or conjunctions thereof. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 6) | |
A reaction: This is mainly objecting to the claim that explanations are deductions from laws and facts. I agree with Ruben. Explanations are just information, I think. Of course, Aristotle's demonstrations are arguments. |
17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
Full Idea: The fault of the causal theory of explanation was to overlook the fact that there are more ways of making something what it is or being responsible for it than by causing it. …Causation is a particular type of determinative relation. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 7) | |
A reaction: The only thing I can think of is that certain abstract facts are 'determined' by other abtract facts, without being 'caused' by them. A useful word. |
17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
Full Idea: The reduction of one science to another has often been taken as paradigmatic of explanation. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 5) | |
A reaction: It seems fairly obvious that the total reduction of chemistry to physics would involve the elimination of all the current concepts of chemistry. Could this possibly enhance our understanding of chemistry? I would have thought not. |
17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
Full Idea: Facts explain facts only when the features and the individuals the facts are about are appropriately conceptualized or named. | |
From: David-Hillel Ruben (Explaining Explanation [1990], Ch 5) | |
A reaction: He has a nice example that 'Cicero's speeches stop in 43 BCE' isn't explained by 'Tully died then', if you don't know that Cicero was Tully. Ruben is not defending pragmatic explanation, but to this extent he must be right. |
2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The chief difficulty with the behaviour-disposition account is the virtual impossibility of specifying a disposition except as a 'disposition of x to behave as though x were in pain'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.57) | |
A reaction: This has become the best-known objection to behaviourism - that you can't specify a piece of behaviour clearly unless you mention the mental state which it is expressing. The defence is to go on endlessly mentioning further behaviour. |
2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Two animals with all motor nerves cut will have the same actual and potential behaviour (i.e. none), but if only one has uncut pain fibres, it will feel pain where the other won't. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.57) | |
A reaction: This is a splendidly literal and practical argument against behaviourism - if you prevent all the behaviour, you don't thereby prevent the experience. Clearly we have to say something about what is inside the 'black box' of the mind. |
2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
Full Idea: I propose the hypothesis that pain, or the state of being in pain, is a functional state of a whole organism. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.54) | |
A reaction: This sounds wrong right from the start. Pain hurts. The fact that it leads to avoidance behaviour etc. seems much more like a by-product of pain than its essence. |
2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The functional-state hypothesis is not incompatible with dualism, as a system consisting of a body and a soul could meet the required conditions. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.55) | |
A reaction: He doesn't really believe this, of course. This claim led to all the weak objections to functionalism involving silly implementations of minds. A brain is the only plausible way to implement our mental functions. |
2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The presence of a certain functional state is not merely 'correlated with' but actually explains the pain behaviour on the part of the organism. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.58) | |
A reaction: Does it offer any further explanation beyond saying that it is the brain state that causes the behaviour? The pain is just a link between damage and avoidance. I wish that is all that pain was. |
2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The concept of temperature is not the same as the concept of mean molecular kinetic energy. But temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.52) | |
A reaction: This is the standard analogy for mind-brain identity, and it seems fair enough to me. The mind is the activity of the brain. It is rather unhelpful to think of weather in terms of chemistry, but it is actions of chemicals. |
6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
Full Idea: Putnam was too quick to assert neuroscientific support for multiple realizability; current evidence does not reveal it, and there is some reason to think the enterprises of neuroscience are premised on the hypothesis of brain-state identity. | |
From: comment on Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968]) by Thomas W. Polger - Natural Minds Ch.1.4 | |
A reaction: I have always been suspicious of the glib claim that mental states were multiply realisable. I see no reason to think that octupi see colours as we do, or experience fear as we do, even though their behaviour has to be similar, for survival. |
2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
Full Idea: Mental states have vastly diverse physical/biological realizations in different species and structures (e.g. pain in humans and in molluscs), so no mental state can be identified with any single physical/biological state. | |
From: report of Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968]) by Jaegwon Kim - Mind in a Physical World n p.120 | |
A reaction: But maybe mollusc and human nervous systems ARE the same in the respects that matter. We don't know enough about pain to deny that possibility. |