Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics', 'Mechanism, purpose and explan. exclusion' and 'Euthyphro'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


5 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Do the gods also hold different opinions about what is right and honourable? [Plato]
     Full Idea: Do the gods too hold different opinions about what is right, and similarly about what is honourable and dishonourable, good and bad?
     From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 07e)
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim]
     Full Idea: The general principle of explanatory exclusion states that two or more complete and independent explanations of the same event or phenomenon cannot coexist.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mechanism, purpose and explan. exclusion [1989], 3)
     A reaction: This is a rather optimistic view of explanations, with a strong element of reality involved. I would have thought there were complete explanations at different 'levels', which were complementary to one another.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg]
     Full Idea: The emotivist gets things backwards: evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotions are types of evaluation.
     From: Deborah Achtenberg (Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics [2002], 6.1)
     A reaction: A nice comment, though a bit optimistic. It is certainly a valuable corrective to emotivist to pin down the cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion, rather than regarding them as 'raw' feelings.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? (the 'Euthyphro Question') [Plato]
     Full Idea: Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it?
     From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 10a)
     A reaction: The famous Euthyphro Question, the key question about the supposed religious basis of morality. The answer of Socrates is Idea 337.
It seems that the gods love things because they are pious, rather than making them pious by loving them [Plato]
     Full Idea: So things are loved by the gods because they are pious, and not pious because they are loved? It seems so.
     From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 10e)
     A reaction: Socrates' answer to the Euthyphro Question (see Idea 336). The form of piety precedes the gods.