7 ideas
| 24069 | Much metaphysical debate concerns what is fundamental, rather than what exists [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Some of the most important debates in metaphysics or ontology do not concern existential questions, but focus on questions of fundamentality. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 5 Intro) | |
| A reaction: In modern times we have added the structure of existence to the mere ontological catalogue, and this idea makes another important addition to our concept of metaphysics. She gives disagreement over tropes as an example. |
| 24065 | Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: A structured whole derives its unity from the way in which its parts interact with other parts to allow both the whole and its parts to manifest those of their capacities which require 'team work' among the parts. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is a culminating thesis of her book. She defends it at length. It looks like a nice theory for things which are lucky enough to have capacities involving teamwork. Does this mean a pebble can't be unified? She wants a dynamic view. |
| 24066 | The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Hylomorphists tend to agree that the form (rather than matter) explains 1) kind membership, 2) structure, 3) unity, 4) characteristic activities. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 3.2.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed; she explains each of them] Personally I would add continuity through change (statue/clay). Glad to see that kind membership is not part of the form. And what about explaining observed properties? Does form=essence? |
| 24067 | Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: It is difficult to see how forms could serve as cross-world identity principles for hylomorphic compounds, unless these forms are particular or individual entities. | |
| From: Kathrin Koslicki (Form, Matter and Substance [2018], 3.4.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a key part of her objection to treating the form as universal or generic. I agree with her view. |
| 14894 | Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| Full Idea: Kaplan distinguished two different semantic features of indexical expressions: a 'character' that captures the standing meaning of the expression, and a 'content' that consists of their truth-conditional contribution in particular contexts. | |
| From: report of David Kaplan (Demonstratives [1989]) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 1 | |
| A reaction: This seems so clearly right that there isn't much to dispute. You can't understand the word 'I' or 'now' if you don't understand both its general purpose, and what it is doing in a particular utterance. But will this generalise to other semantics? |
| 14700 | 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: Kaplan sees two aspects of meaning, the 'content', reflecting a thing's modal profile, which is modelled by standard possible worlds semantics, and 'character', giving rules for different contexts. Proper names have constant character; indexicals vary. | |
| From: report of David Kaplan (Demonstratives [1989]) by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 1.1.1 | |
| A reaction: This gives rise to 2-D matrices for representing meaning, and the possible worlds are used twice, for evaluating meaning and then for evaluating context of use. I've always been struck by the two-dimensional semantics of passwords. |
| 4375 | Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg] |
| Full Idea: The emotivist gets things backwards: evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotions are types of evaluation. | |
| From: Deborah Achtenberg (Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics [2002], 6.1) | |
| A reaction: A nice comment, though a bit optimistic. It is certainly a valuable corrective to emotivist to pin down the cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion, rather than regarding them as 'raw' feelings. |