4 ideas
23900 | Chance is compatible with necessity, and the two occur together [Weil] |
Full Idea: Chance is not the contrary of necessity; it is not incompatible with necessity. On the contrary, it never appears except at the same time as necessity. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Scientific Image [1941], p.175) | |
A reaction: She illustrates it with the six terminating results of a die throw, and the innumerabe ways the throw can occur. This thought strikes me as relevant to discussions of free will. …But I'm not sure I fully understand it. |
6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Chomsky now contends that not only the syntax of natural language but also the concepts expressible in it have an innate basis. | |
From: report of Noam Chomsky (Chomsky on himself [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.7 n25 | |
A reaction: This seems to follow Fodor, who has been mocked for implying that we have an innate idea of a screwdriver etc. Note that Chomsky says concepts have an innate 'basis'. This fits well with modern (cautious) rationalism, with which I am happy. |
23899 | The secret of art is that beauty is a just blend of unity and its opposite [Weil] |
Full Idea: A just blend of unity and that which opposes it is the condition of the beautiful, and it is the secret of art. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Scientific Image [1941], p.169) | |
A reaction: Rather sweeping, but the observation strikes me as fairly accurate. It seems to work for most novels, paintings and music, though more recent art may provide counterexamples. |
4375 | Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg] |
Full Idea: The emotivist gets things backwards: evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotions are types of evaluation. | |
From: Deborah Achtenberg (Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics [2002], 6.1) | |
A reaction: A nice comment, though a bit optimistic. It is certainly a valuable corrective to emotivist to pin down the cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion, rather than regarding them as 'raw' feelings. |