Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics', 'On Anger (Book 3)' and 'Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking)'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


11 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: I can start with a triangle, and rise by degrees to all straight-lined figures and to extension itself. The lower degree will include the higher degree. Since the higher degree is less determinate, it can represent more things.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
     A reaction: [compressed] This attempts to explain the generalising ability of abstraction cited in Idea 10501. If you take a complex object and eliminate features one by one, it can only 'represent' more particulars; it could hardly represent fewer.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: We can have knowledge of what is outside us only through the mediation of ideas in us.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], p.63), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc'
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: The form is what renders a thing such and distinguishes it from others, whether it is a being really distinct from the matter, according to the Schools, or whether it is only the arrangement of the parts. By this form one must explain its properties.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], III.18 p240), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 27.6
     A reaction: If we ask 'what explains the properties of this thing' it is hard to avoid coming up with something that might be called the 'form'. Note that they allow either substantial or corpuscularian forms. It is hard to disagree with the idea.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We know by abstraction because we only understand composite things a part at a time [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: The mind cannot perfectly understand things that are even slightly composite unless it considers them a part at a time. ...This is generally called knowing by abstraction. (..the human body, for example).
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
     A reaction: This adds the interesting thought that the mind is forced to abstract, rather than abstraction being a luxury extra feature. Knowledge through analysis is knowledge by abstraction. Also a nice linking of abstraction to epistemology.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: If I draw an equilateral triangle on a piece of paper, ..I shall have an idea of only a single triangle. But if I ignore all the particular circumstances and focus on the three equal lines, I will be able to represent all equilateral triangles.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
     A reaction: [compressed] They observed that we grasp composites through their parts, and now that we can grasp generalisations through particulars, both achieved by the psychological act of abstraction, thus showing its epistemological power.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
No one denies that a line has width, but we can just attend to its length [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: Geometers by no means assume that there are lines without width or surfaces without depth. They only think it is possible to consider the length without paying attention to the width. We can measure the length of a path without its width.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
     A reaction: A nice example which makes the point indubitable. The modern 'rigorous' account of abstraction that starts with Frege seems to require more than one object, in order to derive abstractions like direction or number. Path widths are not comparatives.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg]
     Full Idea: The emotivist gets things backwards: evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotions are types of evaluation.
     From: Deborah Achtenberg (Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics [2002], 6.1)
     A reaction: A nice comment, though a bit optimistic. It is certainly a valuable corrective to emotivist to pin down the cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion, rather than regarding them as 'raw' feelings.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
True greatness is never allowing events to disturb you [Seneca]
     Full Idea: There is no more reliable proof of greatness than to be in a state where nothing can happen to make you disturbed.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §06)
     A reaction: He specifically opposes Aristotle's view that there are times when anger is appropriate, and failure to be very angry indeed is a failure of character.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Every night I critically review how I have behaved during the day [Seneca]
     Full Idea: When the lamp has been removed from my sight, and my wife, no stranger now to my habit, has fallen silent, I examine the whole of my day and retrace my actions and words; I hide nothing from myself.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §36)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Anger is a vice which afflicts good men as well as bad [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Other vile passions affect only the worst sort of men, but anger creeps up even on enlightened me who are otherwise sane.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §04)
     A reaction: A very interesting observation for anyone who is trying to analyse the key issues in virtue theory.
Anger is an extreme vice, threatening sanity, and gripping whole states [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Other vices drive the mind on, anger hurls it headlong; ..other vices revolt from good sense, this one from sanity; ...other vices seize individuals, this is the one passion that sometimes takes hold of an entire state.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §01)
     A reaction: He particularly dislikes anger because it is the vice that leads to violence.