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All the ideas for 'reports', 'Semantics for Natural Languages' and 'Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments'

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35 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: In power of persuasion, reasoning is far stronger than gold.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B051), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.04.12
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: There is no difference between a true statement and a false statement, because they can use exactly the same words.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §4)
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Thracians think tattooing adds to a girl's beauty, but elsewhere it is a punishment [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: Thracians think that tattooing enhances a girl's beauty, whereas for everyone else tattooing is a punishment for a crime.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2)
Anything can be acceptable in some circumstances and unacceptable in others [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: Anything can be acceptable under the right circumstances, and unacceptable under the wrong circumstances.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2)
Lydians prostitute their daughters to raise a dowery, but no Greek would marry such a girl [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: The Lydians find it acceptable for their daughters to work as prostitutes to raise money for getting married, but no one in Greece would be prepared to marry such a girl.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2)
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames]
     Full Idea: Davidson held that knowledge of truth and reference could give us a notion of meaning. He embraced Quine's rejection of analyticity, synonymy and ordinary meaning, and substituted truth and reference, when there was something genuine to capture.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Semantics for Natural Languages [1970]) by Scott Soames - Philosophy of Language 2.3
     A reaction: I always get a warm glow when anyone suggests that the concept of meaning involves the concept of truth. I largely reject Quine. Davidson made a helpful suggestion!
Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart]
     Full Idea: Davidson's program was to show the underlying structure of natural languages as that of first-order logic.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Semantics for Natural Languages [1970], 2) by J.J.C. Smart - The Tenseless Theory of Time 2
     A reaction: First order logic just reasons about a domain of objects with predicates attached to them. Language appears to refer to properties and relations as well as objects.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
How could someone who knows everything fail to act correctly? [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: If someone knows the nature of everything, how could he fail to be able also to act correctly in every case?
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §8)
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Physical beauty is merely animal unless intelligence be present.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B105)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Do not say or do what is base, even when you are alone. Learn to feel shame in your own eyes much more than before others.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B244), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.31.7
     A reaction: I like this. How you think and behave when unobserved is the true test of who you are. Feeling shame at a very private failing is an interesting phenomenon.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Every apparent crime can be right in certain circumstances [Anon (Diss), by PG]
     Full Idea: It can be right, in certain circumstances, to steal, to break a solemn promise, to rob temples, and even (as Orestes did) to murder one's nearest and dearest.
     From: report of Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: Not sure about the last one! I suppose you can justify any hideousness if the fate of the universe depends on it. It must be better to die than the perform certain extreme deeds.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Good breeding in cattle depends on physical health, but in men on a well-formed character.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B057), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.29.18
     A reaction: In our ultra-democratic age (supposedly) it is heresy to talk about good breeding, or some people being superior to others. But surely people should aim to improve their characters?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B073), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.5.23
     A reaction: Is it possible to love something without seeing it as beautiful? A badly crippled dog, for example. If not, that seems to reveal something about beauty.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
It is right to lie to someone, to get them to take medicine they are reluctant to take [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: It is right to lie to your parents, in order to get them to take a good medicine they are reluctant to take.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3)
     A reaction: I dread to think what the medicines were which convinced the writer of this. A rule such as this strikes me as dangerous. Justifiable in extreme cases. House on fire etc.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: For all men, good and true are the same; but pleasant differs for different men.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B069)
     A reaction: Truth is not 'for' anyone, but there's good-in-itself, and good-for-me. Are there some pleasures we should all enjoy (such as watching our children flourish)?
We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: One should choose not every pleasure, but only that concerned with the beautiful.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B207), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.22
     A reaction: The pleasures we should prefer are those which involve the whole person, rather than the mere stimulation of one sense. Sez me.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Accept no pleasure unless it is beneficial.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B074)
     A reaction: Maybe all pleasures bestow some benefit - even if they are linked to harm. I struggle to see what is wrong with a harmless and non-beneficial pleasure, and I doubt if anyone could explain it to me.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B194), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.03.46
     A reaction: Only, of course, for those able to perceive the nobility. In what does the 'nobility' consist, other than in the morally acceptable pleasure? Hard to explain 'noble'. Just 'wow!'?
Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Moderation multiplies pleasures, and increases pleasure.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B211), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.27
     A reaction: So moderation is a sneaky trick to avoid moderation? I presume the most intense pleasures are mostly unfamiliar, and so add novelty to the mix. Apart from eating chocolate, of course.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not a man.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B070)
     A reaction: Not factually correct, since the world is full of adults who have immoderate desires (notably for money). However, there are plenty of grown ups who don't seem very adult.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy, but he who is stronger than pleasures. Some men are masters of cities, but are enslaved by women.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B214), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.07.25
     A reaction: I'm not sure if 'bravery' is the relevant virtue here.Sounds like self-control or temperance. I suspect that mastering a city is quite pleasurable, if that's your thing.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Virtue consists, not in avoiding wrong-doing, but in having no wish thereto.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B062), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.17.37
A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: To live badly is not just to live badly, but to spend a long time dying.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B160), quoted by (who?) - where?
Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Refrain from crimes not through fear but through duty [deon].
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B041), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.95
     A reaction: [not sure about the translation here]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Repentance for shameful deeds is salvation in life.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B043)
Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: More men become good through practice than by nature.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B242), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.66
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B190), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.91
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the man wronged.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B045)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Unless a point of satiety is reached, the desire for money is far more cruel than the utmost poverty, because the greater the desire, the greater the need
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B219), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.10.43
Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Small appetite makes poverty equivalent to wealth.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B284), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.33.24
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The friendship of one intelligent man is better than that of all the unintelligent.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B098)
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B042), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.44.68
     A reaction: Something wrong with the translation here, if there is no Greek word for 'duty'.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Poverty in a democracy is as preferable to what is called prosperity under autocracy as freedom is to slavery.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B251), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.40.42
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
The first priority in elections is to vote for people who support democracy [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: A lottery is not democratic, because every state contains people who are not democratic, and if the lottery chooses them they will destroy the democracy. People should elect those who are observed to favour democracy.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §7)
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it [Anon (Diss)]
     Full Idea: We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it.
     From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §6)