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All the ideas for 'works', 'The Ages of the World' and 'On the General Idea of Proof Theory'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
13827 Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz]
     Full Idea: Defining logical consequence in the way Tarski does is a rather meagre result, treating an argument as a black box, observing input and output, while disregarding inner structure. We should define logical consequence on the basis of valid arguments.
     From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §2)
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
13826 Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz]
     Full Idea: In model theory, which has dominated the last decades, one concentrates on logically valid sentences, and what follows logically from what, but one disregards questions concerning how we know these things.
     From: Dag Prawitz (On the General Idea of Proof Theory [1974], §1)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
7667 There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin]
     Full Idea: Diderot is among the first to preach that there are two men: the artificial man, who belongs in society and seeks to please, and the violent, bold, criminal instinct of a man who wishes to break out (and, if controlled, is responsible for works of genius.
     From: report of Denis Diderot (works [1769], Ch.3) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism
     A reaction: This has an obvious ancestor in Plato's picture (esp. in 'Phaedrus') of the two conflicting sides to the psuché, which seem to be reason and emotion. In Diderot, though, the suppressed man has virtues, which Plato would deny.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
20957 We don't choose our characters, yet we still claim credit for the actions our characters perform [Schelling]
     Full Idea: Nobody has chosen their character; and yet this does not stop anybody attributing the action which follows from his character to themself as a free action.
     From: Friedrich Schelling (The Ages of the World [1810], I.93)
     A reaction: This pinpoints a very nice ambivalence about our attitudes to our own characters. We all have some pride and shame about who we are, without having chosed who we are. At least when we are young. But we make the bed we lie in.