8511
|
Stout first explicitly proposed that properties and relations are particulars [Stout,GF, by Campbell,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
In modern times, it was G.F. Stout who first explicitly made the proposal that properties and relations are as particular as the substances that they qualify.
|
|
From:
report of G.F. Stout (The Nature of Universals and Propositions [1923]) by Keith Campbell - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars §1
|
|
A reaction:
Note that relations will have to be tropes, as well as properties. Williams wants tropes to be parts of objects, but that will be tricky with relations. If you place two objects on a table, how does the 'to the left of' trope come into existence?
|
8842
|
The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor]
|
|
Full Idea:
The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but from considering examples, such as I have a headache, I am raising my arm, I am imagining my grandmother, or seeing how dominoes could fill a chessboard.
|
|
From:
James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §3)
|
|
A reaction:
Most of his examples depend on the fact that they cannot be challenged by anyone else, because they are within his own mind. The dominoes require complex thought. The first two could be erroneous if he was dreaming.
|
8843
|
Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor]
|
|
Full Idea:
Pure coherentists claim that a belief can only be justified by its relations to other beliefs; impure coherentists are willing to give some non-beliefs, such as perceptual experiences, a justifying role.
|
|
From:
James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §4)
|
|
A reaction:
I think I would vote for the pure version. The distinction that is needed, I think, is between justification and evidence. You have to surmise causal links and explanations before you can see an experience as evidence, and then justification.
|
8846
|
Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor]
|
|
Full Idea:
If you have reasons for your belief, they should be considerations you could in principle cite, or give, to someone who doubted or challenged the belief. You can't give some else a non-propositional state like a headache.
|
|
From:
James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §6)
|
|
A reaction:
On the whole I agree, but if someone asked you to justify your claim that there is a beautiful sunset over the harbour, you could just say 'Look!'. Headaches are too private. The person must still see that the sunset is red, and not the window.
|
7667
|
There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin]
|
|
Full Idea:
Diderot is among the first to preach that there are two men: the artificial man, who belongs in society and seeks to please, and the violent, bold, criminal instinct of a man who wishes to break out (and, if controlled, is responsible for works of genius.
|
|
From:
report of Denis Diderot (works [1769], Ch.3) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism
|
|
A reaction:
This has an obvious ancestor in Plato's picture (esp. in 'Phaedrus') of the two conflicting sides to the psuché, which seem to be reason and emotion. In Diderot, though, the suppressed man has virtues, which Plato would deny.
|