Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'On the Ultimate Origination of Things' and 'works'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The wiser one is, the more one is determined to do that which is most perfect.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.151)
     A reaction: Debatable. 'Perfectionism' is a well-known vice in many areas of life. Life is short, and the demands on us are many. Skilled shortcuts and compromises are one hallmark of genius, and presumably also of wisdom.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934 [Gentzen, by Read]
     Full Idea: Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934.
     From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.8
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
The inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning [Gentzen, by Hanna]
     Full Idea: Gentzen argued that the inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning.
     From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 5.3
     A reaction: Possibly inspired by Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as use? This idea was the target of Prior's famous connective 'tonk', which has the role of implying anything you like, proving sentences which are not logical consequences.
The logical connectives are 'defined' by their introduction rules [Gentzen]
     Full Idea: The introduction rules represent, as it were, the 'definitions' of the symbols concerned, and the elimination rules are no more, in the final analysis, than the consequences of these definitions.
     From: Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]), quoted by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.8
     A reaction: If an introduction-rule (or a truth table) were taken as fixed and beyond dispute, then it would have the status of a definition, since there would be nothing else to appeal to. So is there anything else to appeal to here?
Each logical symbol has an 'introduction' rule to define it, and hence an 'elimination' rule [Gentzen]
     Full Idea: To every logical symbol there belongs precisely one inference figure which 'introduces' the symbol ..and one which 'eliminates' it. The introductions represent the 'definitions' of the symbols concerned, and eliminations are consequences of these.
     From: Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938], II.5.13), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - "Yes" and "No" III
     A reaction: [1935 paper] This passage is famous, in laying down the basics of natural deduction systems of logic (ones using only rules, and avoiding axioms). Rumfitt questions whether Gentzen's account gives the sense of the connectives.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions beyond arithmetic [Gentzen, by Musgrave]
     Full Idea: Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions which transcend arithmetic.
     From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §5
     A reaction: This does not contradict Gödel's famous result, but reinforces it. The interesting question is what assumptions Gentzen felt he had to make.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette]
     Full Idea: The historical honour of having first raised the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" belongs to Leibniz.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697]) by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.3
     A reaction: I presume that people before Leibniz may well have had the thought, but not bothered to even articulate it, because there seemed nothing to say by way of answer, other than some reference to the inscrutable will of God.
There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Since something rather than nothing exists, there is a certain urge for existence, or (so to speak) a straining toward existence in possible things or in possibility or essence itself; in a word, essence in and of itself strives for existence.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.150)
     A reaction: Thus 'essence precedes existence'. Not sure I understand this, but at least it places an active power at the root of everything (though Leibniz probably sees that as divine). The Big Bang triggered by a 'quantum fluctuation'?
Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: From the very fact that something exists rather than nothing, we recognise that there is in possible things, that is, in the very possibility or essence, a certain exigent need of existence, and, so to speak, some claim to existence.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347)
     A reaction: I love the fact that Leibniz tried to explain why there is something rather than nothing. Bede Rundle and Dale Jacquette are similar heroes. As Leibniz tells us, contradictions have no claim to existence, but non-contradictions do.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Although the world is not metaphysically necessary, such that its contrary would imply a contradiction or logical absurdity, it is necessary physically, that is, determined in such a way that its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.139)
     A reaction: How does Leibniz know things like this? The distinction between 'metaphysical' necessity and 'natural' (what he calls 'physical') necessity is a key idea. But natural necessity is controversial. See 'Essentialism'.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In practical affairs one always follows the decision rule in accordance with which one ought to seek the maximum or the minimum: namely, one prefers the maximum effect at the minimum cost, so to speak.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.150)
     A reaction: Animals probably do that too, and even water sort of obeys the rule when it runs downhill.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin]
     Full Idea: Diderot is among the first to preach that there are two men: the artificial man, who belongs in society and seeks to please, and the violent, bold, criminal instinct of a man who wishes to break out (and, if controlled, is responsible for works of genius.
     From: report of Denis Diderot (works [1769], Ch.3) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism
     A reaction: This has an obvious ancestor in Plato's picture (esp. in 'Phaedrus') of the two conflicting sides to the psuché, which seem to be reason and emotion. In Diderot, though, the suppressed man has virtues, which Plato would deny.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There is always in things a principle of determination which is based on consideration of maximum and minimum, such that the greatest effect is obtained with the least, so to speak, expenditure.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347)
     A reaction: This is obvious in human endeavours. Leibniz applied it to physics, producing a principle that shortest paths are always employed. It has a different formal name in modern physics, I think. He says if you make an unrestricted triangle, it is equilateral.