Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Sense and Sensibilia' and 'Facts and Propositions'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
"It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: It is evident that "It is true that Caesar was murdered" means no more than that Caesar was murdered.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Facts and Propositions [1927])
     A reaction: At the very least, saying it is true adds emphasis. One sentence is about Caesar, the other about a proposal concerning Caesar, so they can't quite be the same. Note Frege's priority in making this suggestion.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
Austin revealed many meanings for 'vague': rough, ambiguous, general, incomplete... [Austin,JL, by Williamson]
     Full Idea: Austin's account brought out the variety of features covered by 'vague' in different contexts: roughness, ambiguity, imprecision, lack of detail, generality, inaccuracy, incompleteness. Even 'vague' is vague.
     From: report of J.L. Austin (Sense and Sensibilia [1962], p.125-8) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 3.1
     A reaction: Some of these sound the same. Maybe Austin distinguishes them.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: The meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Facts and Propositions [1927], p.51), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought
     A reaction: I find this idea quite bizarre. Most sentences have no connection to any action or behavior at all. Do we have to ingeniously contrive some possible action? That is the worst sort of behaviourism. See context - Ramsey wasn't stupid!
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin]
     Full Idea: Diderot is among the first to preach that there are two men: the artificial man, who belongs in society and seeks to please, and the violent, bold, criminal instinct of a man who wishes to break out (and, if controlled, is responsible for works of genius.
     From: report of Denis Diderot (works [1769], Ch.3) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism
     A reaction: This has an obvious ancestor in Plato's picture (esp. in 'Phaedrus') of the two conflicting sides to the psuché, which seem to be reason and emotion. In Diderot, though, the suppressed man has virtues, which Plato would deny.