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20100
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Classical liberalism seeks freedom of opinion, of private life, of expression, and of property [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
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Full Idea:
The classical liberals agreed on a basic list of freedoms: of opinion (including religion), of private life, of expression, and of property
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From:
Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 9)
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A reaction:
Mill is main articulator of this. Modern neo-liberals focus on economic freedom. Neither of them seem to make freedom of opportunity central, though I suspect our modern Liberal Party would.
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8348
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If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
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Full Idea:
The assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events, is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our most common talk.
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From:
Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4)
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A reaction:
He considers events to be unanalysable basics. Explanation of normal talk also needs ghosts, premonitions, telepathy and Father Christmas. It is extremely hard to individuate events, unless they are subatomic, and rather numerous.
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7667
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There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin]
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Full Idea:
Diderot is among the first to preach that there are two men: the artificial man, who belongs in society and seeks to please, and the violent, bold, criminal instinct of a man who wishes to break out (and, if controlled, is responsible for works of genius.
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From:
report of Denis Diderot (works [1769], Ch.3) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism
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A reaction:
This has an obvious ancestor in Plato's picture (esp. in 'Phaedrus') of the two conflicting sides to the psuché, which seem to be reason and emotion. In Diderot, though, the suppressed man has virtues, which Plato would deny.
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20097
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The welfare state aims at freedom from want, and equality of opportunity [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
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Full Idea:
In the classical liberal tradition freedom meant freedom from external control, and equality meant equality before the law. In the welfare state (of Beatrice Webb) freedom was reinterpreted as freedom from want, and equality as equality of opportunity.
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From:
Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3)
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A reaction:
The authors call this the 'third revolution' in government, after 17th century centralisation and early 19th century accountability. Tawney 1931 is the key text.
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10371
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Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
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Full Idea:
Davidson distinguishes between causation, an extensional relation that holds between coarse events, and explanation, which is an intensional relation that holds between the coarse events under a description.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2
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A reaction:
I'm unclear why everything has to be so coarse, when reality and causal events seem to fine-grained, but the distinction strikes me as good. Explanations relate to human understanding and human interests. Cf. Anscombe's view.
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8346
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Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
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Full Idea:
The fuller we make the description of a cause, the better our chances of demonstrating that it was sufficient (as described) to produce the effect, and the worse our chances of demonstrating that it was necessary. (For the effect, it is the opposite).
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From:
Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §3)
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A reaction:
If the fullness of description is relevant, this suggests that Davidson is focusing on human explanations, rather than on the ontology of causation. If the cause IS necessary, why wouldn't a better description make that clearer?
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