36 ideas
23853 | Truth is not a object we love - it is the radiant manifestation of reality [Weil] |
Full Idea: Love of truth is not a correct form of expression. Truth is not an object of love. It is not an object at all. …Truth is the radiant manifestation of reality. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing') | |
A reaction: Wow! Love that one! |
23855 | Creation produced a network or web of determinations [Weil] |
Full Idea: What is sovereign in this world is determinateness, limit. Eternal Wisdom imprisons this universe in a network, a web of determinations. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growth') | |
A reaction: Love this, because I take 'determination' to be the defining relationship in ontology. It covers both physical causation and abstract necessities. |
14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: Under certain conditions a clay statue is identical with the piece of clay of which it is made, and if this is so then the identity is contingent. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], Intro) | |
A reaction: This initiated the modern debate about statues, and it is an attack on Kripke's claim that if two things are identical, then they are necessarily identical. Kripke seems right about Hesperus and Phosphorus, but not about the statue. |
14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: A 'piece' of clay is a portion of clay which comes into existence when all of its parts come to be stuck to each other, and cease to be stuck to any clay which is not a part of the portion. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], I) | |
A reaction: The sort of gormlessly elementary things that philosophers find themselves having to say, but this is a good basic assertion for a discussion of statue and clay, and I can't think of an objection to it. |
14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: The piece of clay and the statue are 'objects' - that is to say, they can be designated with proper names, and the logic we ordinarily use will still apply. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], I) | |
A reaction: An interesting indication of the way that 'object' is used in modern analytic philosophy, which may not be the way that it is used in ordinary English. The number 'seven', for example, seems to be an object by this criterion. |
14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: To ask meaningfully what that thing would be, we must designate it either as a statue or as a piece of clay. What that thing would be, apart from the way it is designated, is a question without meaning. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], III) | |
A reaction: He obviously has a powerful point, but to suggest that we can only investigate a mysterious object once we have designated it as something sounds daft. It would ruin the fun of archaeology. |
14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: Essentialism for a class of entities is that for one entity and a condition which it fulfills, the question of whether it necessarily fulfills the condition has a definite answer apart from the way the entity is specified. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], VII) | |
A reaction: Yet another definition of essentialism, but resting, as usual in modern discussions, entirely on the notion of necessity. Kit Fine's challenge is that if you investigate the source of the necessity, it turns out to be an essence. |
14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: Essentialism for the class of concrete things is false, since a statue necessarily fulfils a condition as 'Goliath', but only contingently fulfils it as 'lumpl'. On the other hand, essentialism for the class of individual concepts can be true. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], VII) | |
A reaction: This rests on his definition of essentialism in Idea 14076. He rests his essentialism about concepts on an account given by Carnap ('Meaning and Necessity' §41). The essence of a statue and the essence of a lump of clay do seem distinct. |
14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: A proper name like 'Goliath' denotes a thing in the actual world, and invokes a sortal with certain persistence criteria. Hence its origin makes a statue the statue that it is, and if statues in different worlds have the same beginning, they are the same. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], III) | |
A reaction: Too neat. There are vague, ambiguous and duplicated origins. Persistence criteria can shift during the existence of a thing (like a club which changes its own constitution). In replicated statues, what is the status of the mould? |
14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: The most prominent objection to contingent identity (as in the case of the statue and its clay) is that it violates Leibniz's Law. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], V) | |
A reaction: Depends what you mean by a property. The trickiest one would be that the statue has (right now) a disposition to be worth a lot, but the clay doesn't. But I don't think that is really a property of the statue. Properties are a muddle. |
14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: For two things to be strictly identical, they must have all properties in common. That means, among other things, that they must start to exist at the same time and cease to exist at the same time. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], I) | |
A reaction: I don't accept that coming into existence at time t is a 'property' of a thing. Coincident objects give you the notion of 'existing as' something, which complicates the whole story. |
14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: As a general law of substitutivity of identicals, Leibniz's Law is false. It is a law about properties and relations, that if two things are identical, they have the same properties and relations. It only works in contexts which attribute those. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], V) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced about relations, which are not intrinsic properties. Under different descriptions, the relations to human minds might differ. |
14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: Identity across possible worlds makes sense only with respect to a sortal | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], IV) | |
A reaction: See Gibbard's other ideas from this paper. I fear that the sortal invoked is too uncertain and slippery to do any useful job, and I can't see any principled difficulty with naming something before you can think of a sortal for it. |
14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: It is meaningless to talk of the same concrete thing in different possible worlds, ...but it makes sense to speak of the same individual concept, which is just a function which assigns to each possible world in a set an individual in that world. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], VII) | |
A reaction: A lovely bold response to the problem of transworld identity, but one which needs investigation. It sounds very promising to me. 'Aristotle' is a cocept, not a name. There is no separate category of 'names'. Wow. (Attach dispositions to concepts?). |
14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: To use Kripke's semantics, one needs extensive intuitions that certain properties are essential and others accidental. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], X) | |
A reaction: As usual, we could substitute the word 'necessary' for 'essential' without changing his meaning. If we are always referring to 'our' Hubert Humphrey is speculations about him, then nearly all of his properties will be necessary ones. |
14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
Full Idea: The reference of a name in the actual world is fixed partly by invoking a set of persistence criteria which determine what thing it names. | |
From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], III) | |
A reaction: This is offered as a modification to Kripke, to deal with the statue and clay. I fear that the 'persistence criteria' may be too vague, and too subject to possible change after the origin, to do the job required. |
23848 | The aesthete's treatment of beauty as amusement is sacreligious; beauty should nourish [Weil] |
Full Idea: The aesthete's point of view is sacreligious, not only in matters of religion but even in those of art. It consists in amusing oneself with beauty by handling it and looking at it. Beauty is something to be eaten: it is a food. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Country') | |
A reaction: She is endorsing the 'food' view against the 'handling' view. Beauty should nourish, she says. |
23854 | Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil] |
Full Idea: When the subject in question is the good, beauty is a rigorous and positive proof. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing') | |
A reaction: Purest platonism! It is incomprehensible to say 'this thing is evil, but it is beautiful'. But there are plenty of things which strike me as beautiful, without connecting that in any way to moral goodness. |
7667 | There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin] |
Full Idea: Diderot is among the first to preach that there are two men: the artificial man, who belongs in society and seeks to please, and the violent, bold, criminal instinct of a man who wishes to break out (and, if controlled, is responsible for works of genius. | |
From: report of Denis Diderot (works [1769], Ch.3) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism | |
A reaction: This has an obvious ancestor in Plato's picture (esp. in 'Phaedrus') of the two conflicting sides to the psuché, which seem to be reason and emotion. In Diderot, though, the suppressed man has virtues, which Plato would deny. |
23837 | Respect is our only obligation, which can only be expressed through deeds, not words [Weil] |
Full Idea: Humans have only one obligation: respect. The obligation is only performed if the respect is effectively expressed in a real, not a fictitious, way; and this can only be done through the medium of Man's earthly needs. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Needs') | |
A reaction: She says man's 'eternal destiny' imposes this obligation. I read this as saying that you should not imagine that you treat people respectfully if you are merely polite to them. Col. Pickering and Eliza Doolittle! Respect is the supreme virtue. |
23844 | The most important human need is to have multiple roots [Weil] |
Full Idea: To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognised need of the human soul. …Every human being needs to have multiple roots. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Uprootedness') | |
A reaction: Agree. I think we are just like trees, in that we need roots to grow well, and plenty of space to fully flourish. Identifying those roots is the main task of parents and teachers. |
23838 | The need for order stands above all others, and is understood via the other needs [Weil] |
Full Idea: Order is the first need of all; it evens stands above all needs properly so-called. To be able to conceive it we must know what the other needs are. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Order') | |
A reaction: This may be music to conservative ears, but you should examine Weil's other ideas to see what she has in mind. |
23836 | Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil] |
Full Idea: Obligations are only binding on human beings. There are no obligations for collectivities, as such. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Needs') | |
A reaction: I take it that 'as such' excludes the institutions created by collectivities, such as parliaments and courts. A nomadic tribe seems to have no duties, as a tribe, apart from mutual obligations among its members. Does this excuse crimes by the tribe? |
23840 | A citizen should be able to understand the whole of society [Weil] |
Full Idea: A man needs to be able to encompass in thought the entire range of activity of the social organism to which he belongs. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Responsibility') | |
A reaction: She is urging the active involvement of citizens in decision making - for which they need appropriate knowledge. |
23843 | Even the poorest should feel collective ownership, and participation in grand display [Weil] |
Full Idea: Participation in collective possessions is important. Where real civic life exists, each feels he has a personal ownership in the public monuments, gardens, ceremonial pomp and circumstances; sumptuousness is thus place within the reach of the poorest. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Collective') | |
A reaction: OK with gardens. Dubious about fobbing the poor off with pomp. Monuments are a modern controversy, when they turn out to commemorate slavery and colonial conquest. I agree with her basic thought. |
23846 | Culture is an instrument for creating an ongoing succession of teachers [Weil] |
Full Idea: Culture - as we know it - is an instrument manipulated by teachers for manufacturing more teachers, who, in their turn, will manufacture still more teachers. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Towns') | |
A reaction: Lot of truth in this. We tend to view our greatest successes in students who become academics and teachers. Culture is very much seen as something which must be 'transmitted' to each new generation. |
23839 | A lifelong head of society should only be a symbol, not a ruler [Weil] |
Full Idea: Wherever a man is placed for life at the head of a social organism, he ought to be a symbol and not a ruler, as is the case with the King of England. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Obedience') | |
A reaction: Nice to hear a radical French thinker endorsing an ancient British tradition! She may not be endorsing a lifelong head of state. Lifelong rulers are the main agents of totalitarianism. |
23842 | Party politics in a democracy can't avoid an anti-democratic party [Weil] |
Full Idea: A democracy where public life is made up of strife between political parties is incapable of preventing the formation of a party whose avowed aim is the overthrow of that democracy. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Opinion') | |
A reaction: We have seen this around 2020 in the USA and the UK. Freedom is compulsory? Weil hates political parties (as did Rousseau). |
23847 | Socialism tends to make a proletariat of the whole population [Weil] |
Full Idea: What is called Socialism tends to force everybody without distinction into the proletarian condition. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Towns') | |
A reaction: For example, Weil favours maximising private house ownership, rather than communally owned housing. She is describing wholesale nationalisation. I would incline towards nationalisation only of all basic central services. |
23845 | The capitalists neglect the people and the nation, and even their own interests [Weil] |
Full Idea: The capitalists have betrayed their calling by criminally neglecting not only the interests of the people, not only those of the nation, but even their own. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Towns') | |
A reaction: It is certainly true that the dedicated capitalist has little loyalty either to the people or to the nation. She doesn't spell out their failure of self-interest. I guess it produces a way of life they don't really want, deep down. |
23841 | By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil] |
Full Idea: By making money the sole, or almost the sole, motive of all actions, the sole, or almost the sole, measure of all things, the poison of inequality has been introduced everywhere. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Equality') | |
A reaction: Presumably this dates right back to the invention of money, and then increases with the endless rise of capitalism. |
23835 | People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil] |
Full Idea: A right is effectual only in relation to its corresponding obligation, springing not from the individual who possesses it, but from others who consider themselves under an obligation to him. In isolation a man only has duties, and only others have rights. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Needs') | |
A reaction: This seems correct, and obviously refutes the idea that people have intrinsic natural rights. However, it may be our sense of what nature requires which gives rise to the obligations we feel towards others. |
23852 | To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil] |
Full Idea: In order to have the right to punish the guilty, we ought first of all to purify ourselves of their crimes. …But once this is accomplished we shall no longer feel the least desire to punish, or as little as possible and with extreme sorrow. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing') | |
A reaction: Elsewhere she endorses punishment, as a social necessity, and a redemption for the wicked. This idea looks like a bit of a change of heart. She may be thinking of Jesus on the mote in someone's eye. |
23850 | The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil] |
Full Idea: The distinction between soldiers and civilians, which the pressure of circumstances has already almost obliterated, should be entirely abolished. Every individual in the population owes his country the whole of his strength, resources and life itself. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Nation') | |
A reaction: Written in London in 1943. The year carpet bombing seriously escalated. The facts of warfare can change the ethics. |
23851 | Education is essentially motivation [Weil] |
Full Idea: Education - whether its object be children or adults, individuals or an entire people, or even oneself - consists in creating motives. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing') | |
A reaction: I can't disagree. Intellectual motivation is simply what we find interesting, and there is no formula for that. A teacher can teach a good session, and only 5% of the pupils find it interesting. A bad session could be life-changing for one student. |
23849 | Religion should quietly suffuse all human life with its light [Weil] |
Full Idea: The proper function of religion is to suffuse with its light all secular life, public or private, without in any way dominating it. | |
From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Nation') | |
A reaction: Even for the non-religious there is something attractive about some view of the world which 'suffuses our lives with light'. It probably describes medieval Christendom, but that contained an awful lot of darkness. |