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9757
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A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard]
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Full Idea:
In forming a particular plan of life, you need to identify with your future in order to be what you are even now. When the person is viewed as an agent, no clear content can be given to the idea of a merely present self.
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From:
Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §2)
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A reaction:
I certainly like the notion that we should treat persons primarily as agents, since I take personhood to be more like a process than an existent entity. If a large brick is about to hit you, you actually have no future, though you think you have.
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7667
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There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin]
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Full Idea:
Diderot is among the first to preach that there are two men: the artificial man, who belongs in society and seeks to please, and the violent, bold, criminal instinct of a man who wishes to break out (and, if controlled, is responsible for works of genius.
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From:
report of Denis Diderot (works [1769], Ch.3) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism
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A reaction:
This has an obvious ancestor in Plato's picture (esp. in 'Phaedrus') of the two conflicting sides to the psuché, which seem to be reason and emotion. In Diderot, though, the suppressed man has virtues, which Plato would deny.
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9760
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Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard]
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Full Idea:
For utilitarians, self-concern causes needless pain; for Kantians, it evinces a lack of respect for one's own humanity; for the religious moralist, it is a failure of responsibility for what has been placed in one's special care.
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From:
Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5)
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A reaction:
Worryingly, given my heathenish views, I find the third one the most congenial. If we don't take responsibility for our own selves (e.g. for having a great talent), then no one (even parents) will take responsibility for anything.
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23674
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If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid]
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Full Idea:
If a man should give to his neighbour a potion which he really believes will poison him, but which, in the event, proves salutary, and does much good; in moral estimation, he is a poisoner, and not a benefactor.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
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A reaction:
I take Reid to mean that morality concerns how we assess the agent, and not the results of his actions. Mill and Bentham concede that we judge people this way, but don't think morality mainly concerns judging people.
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9761
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Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard]
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Full Idea:
The personal concern which begins with one's life in a particular body finds its place in ever-widening spheres of agency and enterprise, developing finally into a personal concern for the impersonal.
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From:
Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5)
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A reaction:
I am very struck by this nice thought, which comes from a very committed Kantian. It seems to me to capture the modern orthodoxy in ethical thinking - that concern for one's self, rather than altruism, is central, but altruism should follow from it.
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23673
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Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid]
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Full Idea:
I presume it will be granted, that, in every man of real worth, there is a principle of honour, a regard to what is honourable or dishonourable, very distinct from a regard to his interest.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
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A reaction:
Note that there is a 'principle' of honour in a person's character, and there are also actions which are intrinsically honourable or not. I fear that only the worthy are honourable, and only the honourable are worthy!
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