7667
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There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin]
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Full Idea:
Diderot is among the first to preach that there are two men: the artificial man, who belongs in society and seeks to please, and the violent, bold, criminal instinct of a man who wishes to break out (and, if controlled, is responsible for works of genius.
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From:
report of Denis Diderot (works [1769], Ch.3) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism
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A reaction:
This has an obvious ancestor in Plato's picture (esp. in 'Phaedrus') of the two conflicting sides to the psuché, which seem to be reason and emotion. In Diderot, though, the suppressed man has virtues, which Plato would deny.
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23674
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If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid]
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Full Idea:
If a man should give to his neighbour a potion which he really believes will poison him, but which, in the event, proves salutary, and does much good; in moral estimation, he is a poisoner, and not a benefactor.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
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A reaction:
I take Reid to mean that morality concerns how we assess the agent, and not the results of his actions. Mill and Bentham concede that we judge people this way, but don't think morality mainly concerns judging people.
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23673
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Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid]
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Full Idea:
I presume it will be granted, that, in every man of real worth, there is a principle of honour, a regard to what is honourable or dishonourable, very distinct from a regard to his interest.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
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A reaction:
Note that there is a 'principle' of honour in a person's character, and there are also actions which are intrinsically honourable or not. I fear that only the worthy are honourable, and only the honourable are worthy!
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23530
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The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
For Mill and De Tocqueville the greatest of the dangers was not that in fact the majority might use their power to oppress a minority, but that, with the spread of democratic ideas, it might come to be thought unobjectionable that they should do so.
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], III 'Populism')
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A reaction:
This was vivid in the 2016 Brexit referendum, which was 52-48 in favour of leaving. There were lots voices saying 'you lost, get over it'. It should be a basic (if neglected) principle that the winners of elections now represent the whole population.
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23528
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The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
Recognition of individual liberty as a value involves, as a minimum, acceptance of the principle that the individual may do what he wants, even if others are distressed when the learn what it is that he does.
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Private')
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A reaction:
He notes that there could be other reasons to block the freedom, such as harm done. This idea seems to identify a key component of liberalism - that we must all tolerate actions which we dislike.
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23521
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Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
Four questions: 1) Has the development of law been influenced by morals? 2) Must reference to morality enter into an adequate definition of law or legal system? 3) Is law open to moral criticism? 4) Does immorality justify legal punishment?
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Enforcement')
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A reaction:
[compressed] Three nice questions, which are his agenda for the book. It is obvious that immoral laws can be created, and that laws can be criticised for being too concerned with morality, so there is no clear general answer to these dilemmas.
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23527
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Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
Leslie Stephen argued that when the question is how severely an offender should be punished, an estimate of the degree of moral wickedness involved in the crime is always relevant.
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Moral')
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A reaction:
[Stephen 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' 1873] The degree of responsibility (after excuses etc.) is obviously also highly relevant. If vicious murder is punished more harshly, that seems to be an assessment of the character of the murderer.
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