10 ideas
15842 | An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Judicious use of an opponent's assumptions is quite capable of producing a perfectly reasonable ad hominem refutation of the opponent's thesis. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.6) |
15841 | Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Historically, the evolution of mereology was associated with the desire to find alternatives to set theory for those with nomimalist qualms about the commitment to abstract objects like sets. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Goodman, for example. It is interesting to note that the hardline nominalist Quine, pal of Goodman, eventually accepted set theory. It is difficult to account for things by merely naming their parts. |
15858 | Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Earth, air, fire and water, viewed as elements, are, by tradition, the leading candidates for being the things that persist through change. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 4.4) | |
A reaction: Physics still offers us things that persist through change, as conservation laws. |
15848 | Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Mereologists do suppose that constitution is a criterion of identity. This view is enshrined in the Mereological axiom of extensionality; that objects with the same parts are identical. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 3.1) | |
A reaction: A helpful explanation of why classical mereology is a very confused view of the world. It is at least obvious that a long wall and a house are different things, even if built of identical bricks. |
15837 | What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: The difficulty with the claim that a whole is (just) the sum of its parts is what are we to understand by 'the sum'? ...If we say wholes are 'composites' of parts, how are we to understand the relation of composition? | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) |
15839 | If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Holism inherits all the difficulties associated with the term 'sum' and adds one of its own, when it says a whole is 'more than' the sum of its parts. This seems to say it has something extra? Is this something extra a part? | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Most people take the claim that a thing is more than the sum of its parts as metaphorical, I would think (except perhaps emergentists about the mind, and they are wrong). |
15838 | The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: For my money, the real problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Her point is that the surface grammar makes you accept a unity here, with no account of what unifies it, or even whether there is a unity. Does classical mereology have a concept (as the rest of us do) of 'disunity'? |
8406 | Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford] |
Full Idea: Although not all explanations are causal, anything which can be explained in any way can be explained causally. | |
From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.79) | |
A reaction: A nice bold claim with which I am in sympathy, but he would have a struggle proving it. Does this imply that causal explanations are basic, or in some way superior? Note that functional explanations would thus have underlying causal explanations. |
7667 | There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin] |
Full Idea: Diderot is among the first to preach that there are two men: the artificial man, who belongs in society and seeks to please, and the violent, bold, criminal instinct of a man who wishes to break out (and, if controlled, is responsible for works of genius. | |
From: report of Denis Diderot (works [1769], Ch.3) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism | |
A reaction: This has an obvious ancestor in Plato's picture (esp. in 'Phaedrus') of the two conflicting sides to the psuché, which seem to be reason and emotion. In Diderot, though, the suppressed man has virtues, which Plato would deny. |
8407 | A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford] |
Full Idea: A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is jointly sufficient for it. This is a widely held but controversial view, and it is not a logical truth. | |
From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.82) | |
A reaction: This wouldn't work for an impossible occurrence. What are the necessary conditions to produce a large planet made of uranium? One of them would have to be a naturally impossible necessity. |