Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wisdom', 'Alcibiades' and 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


4 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb]
     Full Idea: The devil is evil but nonetheless wise; he was a wise angel, and through no loss of knowledge, but, rather, through some sort of affective restructuring tried and failed to take over the throne.
     From: Dennis Whitcomb (Wisdom [2011], 'Argument')
     A reaction: ['affective restructuring' indeed! philosophers- don't you love 'em?] To fail at something you try to do suggests a flaw in the wisdom. And the new regime the devil wished to introduce doesn't look like a wise regime. Not convinced.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The leading rivals to a theory of universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory.
     From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.110)
     A reaction: If that is the complete menu, I choose resemblance nominalism. All discussion of properties in terms of classes is wildly misguided (because properties come first). Why not 'natural' tropes?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
     Full Idea: We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same.
     From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109)
     A reaction: This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Man uses his body, so must be separate from it [Anon (Plat), by Maslin]
     Full Idea: A man uses his whole body to do things, and therefore, just as a person is distinct from a tool he uses, so it follows that a man must be distinct from his body.
     From: report of Anon (Plat) (Alcibiades [c.340 BCE]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 2.3
     A reaction: This 'follows'? Every part of my body and my mind makes 'use' of every other part. My body uses my mind to achieve reproduction. He presumably means 'person' rather than 'man'.