3 ideas
19695 | The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: The devil is evil but nonetheless wise; he was a wise angel, and through no loss of knowledge, but, rather, through some sort of affective restructuring tried and failed to take over the throne. | |
From: Dennis Whitcomb (Wisdom [2011], 'Argument') | |
A reaction: ['affective restructuring' indeed! philosophers- don't you love 'em?] To fail at something you try to do suggests a flaw in the wisdom. And the new regime the devil wished to introduce doesn't look like a wise regime. Not convinced. |
18801 | Classical negation is circular, if it relies on knowing negation-conditions from truth-conditions [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Explanations of classical negation assume that knowing what it is for the truth-condition of some statement to obtain, independently of recognising it to obtain, we thereby know what it is for it NOT to obtain; but this presupposes classical negation. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The Logical Basis of Metaphysics [1991], p.299), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 1.1 | |
A reaction: [compressed wording] This is Dummett explaining why he prefers intuitionistic logic, with its doubts about double negation. |
21547 | On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: To my contention that, on his principles, 'the existent round square' exists, Meinong replies that it is existent but does not exist. I must confess that I see no difference between existing and being existent, and I have no more to say on this head. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Uber die Stellung...' [1907], p.93) | |
A reaction: Russell is obviously invoking the famously dubious ontological argument for God's existence. Normally impossible objects are rejected because of contradictions, but there might also be category mistakes. 'The slow square'. |