Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Wisdom', 'Sources of the Self' and 'works'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb]
     Full Idea: The devil is evil but nonetheless wise; he was a wise angel, and through no loss of knowledge, but, rather, through some sort of affective restructuring tried and failed to take over the throne.
     From: Dennis Whitcomb (Wisdom [2011], 'Argument')
     A reaction: ['affective restructuring' indeed! philosophers- don't you love 'em?] To fail at something you try to do suggests a flaw in the wisdom. And the new regime the devil wished to introduce doesn't look like a wise regime. Not convinced.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer]
     Full Idea: From the intuitionist standpoint the dogma of the universal validity of the principle of excluded third in mathematics can only be considered as a phenomenon of history of civilization, like the rationality of pi or rotation of the sky about the earth.
     From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (works [1930]), quoted by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite VI.2
     A reaction: [Brouwer 1952:510-11]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: In his early writing, Brouwer took a real number to be a Cauchy sequence determined by a rule. Later he augmented rule-governed sequences with free-choice sequences, but even then the attitude is that Cauchy sequences are potential, not actual infinities.
     From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (works [1930]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.6
     A reaction: This is the 'constructivist' view of numbers, as espoused by intuitionists like Brouwer.
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: The modern notion of the self is defined by disengaged reason (with its associated freedom and dignity), by self-exploration, and by personal commitment.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1)
     A reaction: Taylor makes a good case that this broader view of how the self is seen is as important as narrow debates about personal identity.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: My entire way of proceeding involves mapping connections between the sense of the self and moral visions, between identity and the good.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], Pref)
     A reaction: An interesting project. Modern brain research supports the idea that emotions and values are tightly integrated into al thought.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: As a being who grows and becomes I can only know myself through the history of my maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §2.3)
     A reaction: An important insight. My immediate sense of self makes my personal history central, not an extra. But a history must be a history OF something.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1)
     A reaction: This seems an inevitable convergence of three centuries of thought about personal identity and morality.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1)
     A reaction: Which is why war is required. The growth of civil society meant the inevitable rise of other virtues.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: If you want to discriminate more finely what makes humans worthy of respect, you must call to mind the claim of human suffering, or what is repugnant about justice, or the awe you feel about human life.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1)
     A reaction: A persuasive part of the claim that such feelings are inseparable from thinking about people in any way at all.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: The issue of consistency presupposes intrinsic description.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1)
     A reaction: This may be the key criticism of Kant. The so-called 'maxim' of an action can be almost infinitely re-expressed to suit the agent.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: In mature utilitarianism , the stress on modern freedom emerges in the rejection of paternalism.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3)
     A reaction: This seems good; it is the beginnings of a rejection of paternalism. What is better, happiness or freedom? What is the value of freedom?
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: Late medieval nominalism defended the sovereignty of God as incompatible with there being an order in nature which by itself defined good and bad.
     From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3)
     A reaction: Part of their attack on Platonism. But what made them place such a high value on the sovereignty of God?