51 ideas
19695 | The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: The devil is evil but nonetheless wise; he was a wise angel, and through no loss of knowledge, but, rather, through some sort of affective restructuring tried and failed to take over the throne. | |
From: Dennis Whitcomb (Wisdom [2011], 'Argument') | |
A reaction: ['affective restructuring' indeed! philosophers- don't you love 'em?] To fail at something you try to do suggests a flaw in the wisdom. And the new regime the devil wished to introduce doesn't look like a wise regime. Not convinced. |
7834 | Great philosophies are confessions by the author, growing out of moral intentions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy has hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author, and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir, ...with moral intentions being the real germ of its life. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §006) | |
A reaction: This attitude is what places Nietzsche as the parent of post-modernism, and is the reason why most 'continental' philosophers seem to have given up the attempt to simply reason about life. It is anti-Enlightenment, and it is wicked. |
7080 | Metaphysics divided the old unified Greek world into two [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche famously defines metaphysics as the division of one world into two; the unity of the mythical pre-philosophical experience of the world is sundered, with Plato, into being and seeming, reality and appearance, supersensible and sensible. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro | |
A reaction: (Critchley doesn't give a reference; Idea 2860 is close). This is the discredited status that metaphysics gradually acquired after Kant, but I see modern metaphysics as reuniting human thought by digging down to the foundations to reveal roots and links. |
11090 | Why do we want truth, rather than falsehood or ignorance? The value of truth is a problem [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What really is it in us that wants 'the truth'? ...Granted we want truth: why not rather untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? The problem of the value of truth stepped before us. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §001) | |
A reaction: I think this is one of the great moments in philosophy, when something that has been taken for granted, as a kind of mantra, is suddenly looked in the face and challenged. Truth at all costs? What sacrifices would you make for truth? |
7079 | Nietzsche resists nihilism through new values, for a world of becoming, without worship [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche's work is a resistance to nihilism. This is why he insists that new categories and values are required that would permit us to endure this world of becoming without either falling into despair or inventing some new god and bowing before it. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro | |
A reaction: The trouble is that all Nietzsche offers is the invention of values out of nothing by some wretched Germanic übermensch who is obsessed with militarism and dominance. If values don't grow out of human nature, then 'all is permitted'. |
2878 | We see an approximation of a tree, not the full detail [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We do not see a tree exactly and entire with regard to its leaves, branches, colour and shape; it is so much easier for us to see an approximation of a tree. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §192) |
20140 | We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The falseness of a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgement. To what extent is it life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserving. Our fundamental tendency is to assert that our falsest judgements are the most indispensable. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §004) | |
A reaction: This is the standard objection to pragmatism, that what is false may still be useful, and that clever blighter Nietzsche embraces the idea! |
2877 | Morality becomes a problem when we compare many moralities [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The real problems of morality come into view only if we compare many moralities. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §186) |
20355 | The ranking of a person's innermost drives reveals their true nature [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To know 'who he is', we must know the order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relative to one another. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §006) | |
A reaction: This is clearly an essentialist view of a person, as having a 'nature', which is 'inner', and which we can try to specify. Ranking drives and values seems a good proposal for getting at it. I'm also intrigued by what people find interesting. |
2291 | A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §017) | |
A reaction: A wonderful remark (which I have since found in Schopenhauer). I don't see how the most enthusiastic free will libertarian can deny it. |
2871 | Wanting 'freedom of will' is wanting to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The desire for 'freedom of will' is nothing less than the desire to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §021) |
20381 | It is psychology which reveals the basic problems [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Psychology is now once again the road to the fundamental problems. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §023) | |
A reaction: This may become the epigraph of my great book, which will have as working title 'The Psychology of Metaphysics'. If you trawl through this collection, you will see where I am going! (A tough job, but easier than reading Hegel). |
6248 | Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: We boast of our mighty reason above other animals, but its processes are too slow, too full of doubt, to serve us in every exigency, either for our preservation, without external senses, or to influence our actions for good without the moral sense. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.III) | |
A reaction: This idea was taken up by Hume, and it must have influence Hume's general scepticism about the importance of reason. What this idea misses is the enormous influence of prior reasoning on our quick decisions. |
2860 | The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The worst, most wearisomely protracted and most dangerous of all errors hitherto has been a dogmatist's error, namely Plato's invention of pure spirit and the good in itself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], Pref) | |
A reaction: A landmark observation about the history of philosophy. Imagine if all the Aristotle had survived, but all the Plato had been lost. |
6238 | We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: By a superior sense, which I call a moral one, we approve the actions of others. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], Intro) | |
A reaction: This tries to present moral insight as being on a par with the famous five senses. This doesn't seem quite right to me; separate parts of me can operate individual senses, but the whole of me is required for moral judgements, based on evidence. |
6239 | We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Let us consider if a traitor, who would sell his own country to us, may not often be as advantageous to us, as an hero who defends us: and yet we can love the treason, and hate the traitor. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §I.VI) | |
A reaction: A nice example, which certainly refutes any claim that morality is entirely and directly self-interested. High-minded idealism, though, is not the only alternative explanation. We admire loyalty, but not loyalty to, say, Hitler. |
6240 | The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: The moral sense is not an innate idea or knowledge, but a determination of our minds to receive the simple ideas of approbation or condemnation, from actions observed, antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §I.VIII) | |
A reaction: This may claim a pure moral intuition, but it is also close to Kantian universalising of the rules for behaviour. It is also a variation on Descartes' 'natural light' of reason. Of course, if we say the ideas are 'received', where are they received from? |
6242 | We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Neither benevolence nor any other affection or desire can be directly raised by volition; if they could, then we could be bribed into any affection whatsoever toward any object. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.IV) | |
A reaction: Of course, notoriously, the vast mass of people have often been bribed to love a politician, by low taxes, or bread and circuses. Still, you cannot choose to love or admire someone, you just do. Not much free will there. |
6247 | Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Every mortal is made uneasy by any grievous misery he sees another involved in, unless the person be imagined morally evil. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §V.VIII) | |
A reaction: This is the natural compassion on which Hume built his moral theory. This remark emphasises that a concern for justice is just as important as a compassion for pain. Kant was more interested in what we deserve than in what we get. |
1568 | Nietzsche felt that Plato's views downgraded the human body and its brevity of life [Nietzsche, by Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche believed that by elevating the importance of the mind, Plato downplayed the wonders of the body, and by searching for a timeless Truth he degraded the indisputable fact of human temporality. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], Pref) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason Prol. X | |
A reaction: Both ideas are very important. The second is widely misunderstood. Nietzsche was not a denier of truth. He asked us to scrutinise the role and value we assign to truth. |
2883 | Noble people see themselves as the determiners of values [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of values. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §260) | |
A reaction: So do criminals |
23440 | Nietzsche's judgement of actions by psychology instead of outcome was poisonous [Foot on Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche wants to judge actions not by what is done, but by the nature of the person who does them, and that is poisonous. We have to be horrified by what is done by Hitler and Stalin, without inquiring into their psychology. | |
From: comment on Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Philippa Foot - Interview with Philippa Foot p.37 | |
A reaction: She says morality should focus on social needs, not on spontaneity, energy and passion. Nietzsche was very much a product of romanticism. Some of Nietzsche's heroes are military conquerors, so I think she is right. |
2875 | That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §153) | |
A reaction: He is referring to the conventional morality of his contemporary society. Nietzsche clearly thought that actions motivated by love are intrinsically good. (Apart from murders by the jealous!). |
2868 | Nature is totally indifferent, so you should try to be different from it, not live by it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: You Stoics want to "live according to nature"? Oh you noble Stoics, what fraudulent words! Nature is prodigal and indifferent beyond measure - how could you live by such indifference? Living is wanting to be other than nature. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §009) | |
A reaction: I think this is simply indicative of the slide from optimism to pessimism about nature in the intervening centuries. Stoics thought nature rational. See 'King Lear' for the transition. |
6244 | Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Human nature seems scarce capable of malicious disinterested hatred, or an ultimate desire of the misery of others, when we imagine them not pernicious to us, or opposite to our interests; ..that is only the effect of self-love, not disinterested malice. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.VII) | |
A reaction: I suppose it is true that even the worst criminals brooding in prison don't wish the entire population of some foreign country to die in pain. Only a very freakish person would wish the human race were extinct. A very nice observation. |
6243 | As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: How comes it that we do not lose, at the approach of death, all concern for our families, friends, or country? | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.V) | |
A reaction: A nice question. No doubt some people do cease to care, but on the whole it raises the 'last round' problem in social contract theory, which is why fulfil your part of a bargain if it is too late to receive the repayment afterwards? |
2882 | Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Designation of moral values was everywhere first applied to human beings, and only later and derivatively to actions. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §260) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche was a great expert on ethics in the ancient world, so you should trust him on this one. In ordinary life assessment of people is what counts. Actions are for law courts. |
6246 | My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: No good effect, which I did not actually foresee and intend, makes my action morally good. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §III.XII) | |
A reaction: This is one of the parents of utilitarianism repudiating pure consequentialism. Bentham sharply divided the action (which is consequentialist) from the person (who has useful intentions, but is not particulary important); this division is misleading. |
2872 | In the earliest phase of human history only consequences mattered [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Throughout the longest part of history ('prehistoric times') the value or non-value of an action was derived from its consequences. …but now men are unanimous that the value of an action is in the intention behind it. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §032) | |
A reaction: This seems to be Kant's fault. No one thinks that a reckless or malicios action is innocent if no actual harm results. |
2885 | The noble soul has reverence for itself [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The noble soul has reverence for itself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §287) |
20134 | Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All moralities are baroque and unreasonable ...because they address themselves to 'all', because they generalise where one must not generalise. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §198) | |
A reaction: 'Particularism' is a recent label, but one finds passing remarks from many earlier philosophers which support that approach to ethics. No one was ever more opposed to strict moral rules than Nietzsche. |
2881 | Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: May I be forgiven for the discovery that 'virtue' has been harmed by nothing more than it has been by the boringness of its advocates. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §228) |
20382 | The four virtues are courage, insight, sympathy, solitude [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To remain master of one's four virtues: courage, insight, sympathy, solitude. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §284) | |
A reaction: Compare this with 'Daybreak (Dawn)' 556. Solitude is the surprising addition, defended as the urge to 'cleanliness', when since humanity is 'unclean'. |
6241 | Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Mere courage, or contempt of danger, if we conceive it to have no regard to the defence of the innocent, or repairing of wrongs or self-interest, would only entitle its possessor to bedlam. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.I) | |
A reaction: If many criminals would love to rob a bank, but only a few have the nerve to attempt it, we can hardly deny that the latter exhibit a sort of courage. The Greeks say that good sense must be involved, but few of them were so moral about courage. |
2879 | In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: An act of pity was during the finest age of Rome considered neither good nor bad. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §201) |
2859 | The idea of the categorical imperative is just that we should all be very obedient [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What does the claim that there exists in us a categorical imperative say of the man who asserts it? …that 'what is worthy of respect in me is that I know how to obey - and things ought to be no different with you'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §187) |
6245 | That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number; and that worst, which, in like manner, occasions misery. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §III.VIII) | |
A reaction: The first use of a phrase taken up by Bentham. This is not just an anticipation of utilitarianism, it is utilitarianism, with all its commitment to consequentialism (but see Idea 6246), and to the maximising of happiness. It is a brilliant idea. |
2884 | The morality of slaves is the morality of utility [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Slave morality is essentially the morality of utility. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §261) |
2880 | The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §203) |
2876 | The thought of suicide is a great reassurance on bad nights [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The thought of suicide is a powerful solace: by means of it one gets through many a bad night. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §157) |
7078 | The freedom of the subject means the collapse of moral certainty [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: In the 1880s Nietzsche diagnosed the concept of nihilism for a whole range of continental thinkers: the recognition of the subject's freedom goes hand in hand with the collapse of moral certainty in the world. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.5 | |
A reaction: Avoiding this dilemma is just one of the many bonuses offered to those who abandon the idea of free will. The fact that one can decide to be wicked doesn't bring an end to morality. Philosophers should think more concretely about human life. |
2874 | Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §062) |
6869 | Nietzsche thinks the human condition is to overcome and remake itself [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche thinks that the human condition is precisely to overcome itself; we continually remake ourselves. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Keith Ansell Pearson - Interview with Baggini and Stangroom p.261 | |
A reaction: This is why I think of Nietzsche as a straightforwardly existentialist philosopher. There is a crucial distinction between 'remaking' ourselves and 'realising all our possibilities'. The latter seems right. Which view did Nietzsche take? |
20137 | The great person engages wholly with life, and is happy to endlessly relive the life they created [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is an ideal ...of the most exuberant, most living and most world-affirming man, who has not only learned to get on and treat with all that was and is, but who wants to have it again as it was and is to all eternity. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §056) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the main point of the idea of eternal recurrence. Could we inculcate this vision into the teenagers of our nation - that they should each try to design for themselves a life which they would be happy to endlessly repeat? Hm. |
20139 | Only aristocratic societies can elevate the human species [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Every elevation of the type 'man' has thitherto been the work of an aristocratic society - and so it will always be: a society which believes in a long scale of orders of rank and differences of worth between man and man, and needs slavery in some sense. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §257) | |
A reaction: The aim of 'elevating the type "man"' does not figure in works of political philosophy very much! I doubt whether one could base a political party on the idea, and win a general election. Could the people still be sold the idea of aristocracy? |
20373 | A healthy aristocracy has no qualms about using multitudes of men as instruments [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A good and healthy aristocracy ...accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of innumerable men who for its sake have to be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §258) | |
A reaction: Something similar might be said of a democracy - that a slavelike workforce is needed to create the great universal goods we all want and need. Do the aristocrats want sacrifices for great art, or for wild parties and fox hunting? |
22394 | Democracy diminishes mankind, making them mediocre and lowering their value [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To us the democratic movement is ...a form of decay, namely the diminution, of man, making him mediocre and lowering his value. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §203), quoted by Philippa Foot - Nietzsche: the Revaluation of Values p.88 | |
A reaction: It is not clear how a society of natural aristocrats followed by sheep would increase the value of mankind. Nor if the talented people are given total freedom, and the rest of us are servants. The value of humanity cannot reside in a few individuals. |
6251 | The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: Perfect rights are necessary to the public good, and it makes those miserable whose rights are thus violated; …imperfect rights tend to the improvement and increase of good in a society, but are not necessary to prevent universal misery. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.VI) | |
A reaction: This is a very utilitarian streak in Hutcheson, converting natural law into its tangible outcome in actual happiness or misery. The distinction here is interesting (taken up by Mill), but there is a very blurred borderline. |
6250 | We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: We call the Deity morally good, when we apprehend that his whole providence tends to the universal happiness of his creatures. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.V) | |
A reaction: From the point of view of eternity, we might accept that God aims at some even greater good than the happiness of a bunch of miserable little creatures whose bad behaviour merits little reward. The greater good needs to be impressive, though. |
6249 | If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson] |
Full Idea: To call the laws of the supreme Deity good or holy or just, if these be constituted by laws, or the will of a superior, must be an insignificant tautology, amounting to no more than 'God wills what he wills' or 'His will is conformable to his will'. | |
From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.V) | |
A reaction: This argues not only against God as the source of morality, but also against any rules, such as those of the Categorical Imperative. Why should I follow the Categorical Imperative? What has value must dictate the rules. Is obedience the highest value? |
2867 | Christianity is Platonism for the people [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Christianity is Platonism for the people. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], Pref) |