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All the ideas for 'Wisdom', 'Causes and Events: Mackie on causation' and 'Putnam's Paradox'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated

19695	The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb]
	Full Idea: The devil is evil but nonetheless wise; he was a wise angel, and through no loss of knowledge, but, rather, through some sort of affective restructuring tried and failed to take over the throne.
	From: Dennis Whitcomb (Wisdom [2011], 'Argument')
	A reaction: ['affective restructuring' indeed! philosophers- don't you love 'em?] To fail at something you try to do suggests a flaw in the wisdom. And the new regime the devil wished to introduce doesn't look like a wise regime. Not convinced.

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms

14212	A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
	Full Idea: A consistent theory is, by definition, one satisfied by some model; an isomorphic image of a model satisfies the same theories as the original model; to provide the making of an isomorphic image of any given model, a domain need only be large enough.
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Model')
	A reaction: This is laying out the ground for Putnam's model theory argument in favour of anti-realism. If you are chasing the one true model of reality, then formal model theory doesn't seem to offer much encouragement.

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events

4779	For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times [Kim, by Psillos]
	Full Idea: A dominant view, attributed mainly to Kim, is that events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times.
	From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Events: Mackie on causation [1971]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6
	A reaction: The obvious thought is that we might not describe something as an 'event' just because a property was exemplified (seeing red?). And WWII was an event, but a bit more than a 'property exemplification'.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism

14213	Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Anti-realists say the only world is imaginary, or only has the parts or classes or relations we divide it into, or doubt that reference to the world is possible, or doubt that our interpretations can achieve truth.
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Anti-R')
	A reaction: [compression of a paragraph on anti-realism] Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. A nice example of the rhetorical device of ridiculing an opponent by suggesting that they don't even know what they themselves believe.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts

14210	A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints of nature.
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Might')
	A reaction: In that case they do, but if there are no atoms at the root of physics then presumably their could also be thoroughly jointless assemblages, involving probability distributions etc. Even random scattered atoms seem rather short of joints.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

14215	Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Whatever happens in special cases, causal theories usually make it easy to be wrong about the thing we refer to.
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Is')
	A reaction: I suppose the point of this is that there are no checks and balances to keep reference in focus, but just a requirement to keep connected to an increasingly attenuated causal chain.

19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description

14209	Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families].
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc')
	A reaction: (The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference.