11 ideas
19695 | The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: The devil is evil but nonetheless wise; he was a wise angel, and through no loss of knowledge, but, rather, through some sort of affective restructuring tried and failed to take over the throne. | |
From: Dennis Whitcomb (Wisdom [2011], 'Argument') | |
A reaction: ['affective restructuring' indeed! philosophers- don't you love 'em?] To fail at something you try to do suggests a flaw in the wisdom. And the new regime the devil wished to introduce doesn't look like a wise regime. Not convinced. |
15873 | Laws of nature are just records of regularities and correlations, with concepts to make recording them easier [Mach, by Harré] |
Full Idea: For Mach, the laws of nature are simply the compendious record of sensory regularities, correlations of elements. Any additional concepts are no more than symbols or devices for the convenient recording of general sensory patterns. | |
From: report of Ernst Mach (Popular Scientific Lectures [1894], pp.201-5) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2 | |
A reaction: Mach is the high priest of scientific positivism, which is really just hard-line empiricism. |
15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
Full Idea: The chief philosophical interest in quantified modal logic lies with metaphysical necessity, essentialism, and the nontrivial modal de re. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) |
15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
Full Idea: The indefinite description in 'A man will meet you' is naturally treated as quantificational, but an occurrence in predicative position, in 'Jones is not a philosopher', doesn't have a natural quantificational counterpart. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.23) |
15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
Full Idea: Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, rather than a singular term, is a real insight. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.22) | |
A reaction: 'Would the man who threw the stone come forward' seems like a different usage from 'would the man in the black hat come forward'. |
15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
Full Idea: Since Frege and Russell were mainly interested in formalizing mathematics, the only quantifiers they needed were the universal and existential one. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.22) |
15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
Full Idea: The set of metaphysically necessary truths is larger than the set of logically necessary truths. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Likewise, the set of logically possible truths is much larger than the set of metaphysically possible truths. If a truth is logically necessary, it will clearly be metaphysically necessary. Er, unless it is necessitated by daft logic... |
15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
Full Idea: Our understanding of metaphysical necessity is intuitive - drawn from our ordinary thought and talk. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) | |
A reaction: This, of course, is a good reason for analytic philosophers to dislike metaphysical necessity. |
15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
Full Idea: The systematic study of meaning requires a framework for specifying the truth conditions of sentences on the basis of their syntactic structure, and the representational contents of their parts. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: Soames presents this as common sense, on the first page of his book, and it is hard to disagree. Representation will shade off into studying the workings of the mind. Fodor seems a good person to start with. |
15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
Full Idea: The truth conditions provided by Tarski's theories (based on references of subsentential constituents) are too weak to determine meanings, because they lacked context-sensitivity and various forms of intensionality. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: Interesting. This suggests that stronger modern axiomatic theories of truth might give a sufficient basis for a truth conditions theory of meaning. Soames says possible worlds semantics was an attempt to improve things. |
15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |
Full Idea: Instead of explaining the representationality of sentences and cognitive states in terms of propositions, we must explain the representationality of propositions in terms of the representationality of the relevant cognitive states. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: Music to my ears. I am bewildered by this Russellian notion of a 'proposition' as some abstract entity floating around in the world waiting to be expressed. The vaguer word 'facts' (and false facts?) will cover that. It's Frege's fault. |