9 ideas
| 14637 | Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael] |
| Full Idea: Essentialism is not verified by the observation that numbers have interesting essential properties, since they are properties of classes and so are entities of a higher logical type than individuals. | |
| From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This relies on a particular view of number (which might be challenged), but is interesting when it comes to abstract entities having essences. Only ur-elements in set theory could have essences, it seems. Why? Rising in type destroys essence? |
| 14636 | Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael] |
| Full Idea: Essentialism says some individuals have certain 'interesting' necessary properties. If it exists, it has that property. The properties are 'interesting' as had in virtue of their own peculiar natures, rather than as general necessary truths. | |
| From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], Intro) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This is a modern commentator caught between two views. The idea that essence is the non-trivial-necessary properties is standard, but adding their 'peculiar natures' connects him to Aristotle, and Kit Fine's later papers. Good! |
| 14640 | Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael] |
| Full Idea: There is a tendency to think of essential properties as having some characteristic in addition to their necessity, such as intrinsicality. | |
| From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], VIII) | |
| A reaction: Personally I am inclined to take this view of all properties, and not just the 'essential' ones. General necessities, relations, categorisations, disjunctions etc. should not be called 'properties', even if they are 'predicates'. Huge confusion results. |
| 14638 | Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael] |
| Full Idea: Essentialism entails the existence of necessary singular propositions that are not instances of necessary generalizations. Therefore, since there are no such propositions, essentialism is false. | |
| From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], I) | |
| A reaction: This summarises the attack which McMichael wishes to deal with. I am wickedly tempted to say that essences actually have a contingent existence (or a merely hypothetical dependent necessity), and this objection might be grist for my mill. |
| 4741 | A very powerful computer might have its operations restricted by the addition of consciousness [Clark,T] |
| Full Idea: It seems possible that if a powerful multi-tasking computer was then given consciousness, this might restrict its operations instead of enhancing them. | |
| From: Tom Clark (talk [2003]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: A nice thought, because it challenges the usual view - that consciousness brings huge intellectual liberty to a mind, and that a mind without it is necessarily restricted. Maybe consciousness is a bottleneck. |
| 6000 | The goal is rationality in the selection of things according to nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the goal to be rationality in the selection and rejection of the things according to nature. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
| A reaction: This captures the central Stoic idea quite nicely. 'Live according to nature', but this always meant 'live according to reason', because that is (as Aristotle had taught) the essence of our nature. This only makes sense if reason and nature coincide. |
| 5999 | The good is what is perfect by nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the good as what is perfect by nature. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
| A reaction: This might come close to G.E. Moore's Ideal Utilitarianism, but its dependence on the rather uneasy of concept of 'perfection' makes it questionable. Personally I find it appealing. I wish we had Diogenes' explanation. |
| 6001 | Justice is a disposition to distribute according to desert [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined justice as the disposition which distributes to everyone what he deserves. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
| A reaction: The questions that arise would be 'what does a new-born baby deserve?', and 'what do animals deserve?', and 'does the lowest and worst of criminals deserve anything at all?' |
| 14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |
| Full Idea: Individuals appear to enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations. | |
| From: Alan McMichael (The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims [1986], VIII) | |
| A reaction: This is a very significant chicken-or-egg issue. The remark seems to offer the vision of pre-existing general laws, which individuals then join (like joining a club). But surely the laws are derived from the individuals? Where else could they come from? |