Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Intro to III: Quantifiers' and 'Summula philosophiae naturalis'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette]
     Full Idea: The substitutional interpretation says the universal quantifier is true just in case it remains true for all substitutions of terms of the same type as that of the universally bound variable.
     From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to III: Quantifiers [2002], p.143)
     A reaction: This doesn't seem to tell us how it gets started with being true.
Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette]
     Full Idea: Some substitutional quantificationists in logic hope to avoid philosophical entanglements about the metaphysics of objects, ..and nominalists can find aid and comfort there.
     From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to III: Quantifiers [2002], p.143)
     A reaction: This has an appeal for me, particularly if it avoids abstract objects, but I don't see much problem with material objects, so we might as well have a view that admits those.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Ockham was an anti-realist about the categories [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Ockham is the scholastic paradigm of anti-realism with respect to the categories.
     From: report of William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 05.3
     A reaction: These are the ten categories mentioned in Aristotle's book 'Categories'.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Ockham says matter must be extended, so we don't need Quantity [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Ockham regards Quantity as an entirely superfluous ontological category, …because matter is intrinsically extended.
     From: report of William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.4
Matter gets its quantity from condensation and rarefaction, which is just local motion [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Matter is made to have a greater or lesser quantity not through its receiving any absolute accident, but through condensation and rarefaction alone. Parts come more or less close together, which can happen with local motion.
     From: William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320], I.13), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.1
     A reaction: This is Ockham at his most modern, rejecting the odd idea of Quantity in favour of a modern corpuscular view of the mere motions of matter.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
The goal is rationality in the selection of things according to nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]
     Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the goal to be rationality in the selection and rejection of the things according to nature.
     From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon
     A reaction: This captures the central Stoic idea quite nicely. 'Live according to nature', but this always meant 'live according to reason', because that is (as Aristotle had taught) the essence of our nature. This only makes sense if reason and nature coincide.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is what is perfect by nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]
     Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the good as what is perfect by nature.
     From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon
     A reaction: This might come close to G.E. Moore's Ideal Utilitarianism, but its dependence on the rather uneasy of concept of 'perfection' makes it questionable. Personally I find it appealing. I wish we had Diogenes' explanation.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice is a disposition to distribute according to desert [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]
     Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined justice as the disposition which distributes to everyone what he deserves.
     From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon
     A reaction: The questions that arise would be 'what does a new-born baby deserve?', and 'what do animals deserve?', and 'does the lowest and worst of criminals deserve anything at all?'