Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Of the Origin of Government' and 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
     Full Idea: Quine rejects Carnap's view that the methods of science and philosophy are distinct.
     From: report of Willard Quine (On Carnap's Views on Ontology [1951]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 5
     A reaction: I can't decide this one. Leibniz agreed with Carnap, but rated philosophy more highly. I like the view of philosophy as continuous with science, but that doesn't make it a branch of science. I incline towards science being a branch of philosophy.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
     Full Idea: I think there is no commitment to entities through use of alleged names of them; other things being equal, we can always deny the allegation that the words in question are names.
     From: Willard Quine (On Carnap's Views on Ontology [1951], p.205)
     A reaction: Hm. So why can't you deny that variables actually refer to existing entities? If I say 'I just saw James', it's a bit cheeky to then deny that James refers to anyone. He uses Russell's technique to paraphrase names.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
     Full Idea: Through our variables of quantification we are quite capable of committing ourselves to entities which cannot be named individually at all in the resources of our language; witness the real numbers.
     From: Willard Quine (On Carnap's Views on Ontology [1951], p.205)
     A reaction: The real numbers are uncountable, and thus cannot all be named. This is quite an impressive point. I've always had doubts about the existence of real numbers, on the grounds that they could never all be named.
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]
     Full Idea: If there is no proper distinction between analytic and synthetic, then no basis at all remains for the contrast which Carnap urges between ontological statements and empirical statements of existence. Ontology then ends up on a par with natural science.
     From: Willard Quine (On Carnap's Views on Ontology [1951], p.211)
     A reaction: Carnap says ontology is relative to a linguistic framework. 'External' ontology is empty. This quotation gives Quine's main motivation for denying the analytic/synthetic distinction.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
The goal is rationality in the selection of things according to nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]
     Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the goal to be rationality in the selection and rejection of the things according to nature.
     From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon
     A reaction: This captures the central Stoic idea quite nicely. 'Live according to nature', but this always meant 'live according to reason', because that is (as Aristotle had taught) the essence of our nature. This only makes sense if reason and nature coincide.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is what is perfect by nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]
     Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the good as what is perfect by nature.
     From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon
     A reaction: This might come close to G.E. Moore's Ideal Utilitarianism, but its dependence on the rather uneasy of concept of 'perfection' makes it questionable. Personally I find it appealing. I wish we had Diogenes' explanation.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice is a disposition to distribute according to desert [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]
     Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined justice as the disposition which distributes to everyone what he deserves.
     From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon
     A reaction: The questions that arise would be 'what does a new-born baby deserve?', and 'what do animals deserve?', and 'does the lowest and worst of criminals deserve anything at all?'
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The only purpose of government is to administer justice, which brings security [Hume]
     Full Idea: Man is engaged to establish political society in order to administer justice, without which there could be no peace among them, nor safety, nor mutual intercourse. ...Government has no other purpose but the distribution of justice.
     From: David Hume (Of the Origin of Government [1750], p.28)
     A reaction: The need for a society in order to ensure mutual intercourse sounds like Hobbes, and a pessimism about trust. By 'justice' he means the administration of law.