6 ideas
| 12221 | 'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine] |
| Full Idea: A 'quasi-quotation' [corner quotes, Quine quotes] designates that (unspecified) expression which is obtained from the contents of the corners by replacing the Greek letters by the (unspecified) expressions which they designate. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Mathematical Logic (revised) [1940], 1.6) | |
| A reaction: Filed under 'variables', as they seem to be variables that can refer to actual expressions, like algebra. Quine was determined to distinguish clearly between 'mention' and 'use'. 'Half-hearted substitutional quantification', says Fine. |
| 10670 | A 'singulariser' converts a plural like 'number of' to a syntactically neutral form [Cartwright,H, by Hossack] |
| Full Idea: Helen Cartwright calls 'a number of' a 'singulariser', an expression whose linguistic function is to convert to a syntactically neutral form an expression whose semantic value remains plural. It is a great convenience grammatically. | |
| From: report of Helen Cartwright (On Plural Reference and Set Theory [1993]) by Keith Hossack - Plurals and Complexes 2 | |
| A reaction: Compare Hofweber's Idea 10004, suggesting it is a crucial psychological convenience for reasoning, as well as a 'grammatical' convenience. |
| 19321 | We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham] |
| Full Idea: Quine suggests that we can have a language with just predicates and no names. Thus for 'Ralph is red' we say 'x Ralphises and x is red'. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (Mathematical Logic (revised) [1940]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.6 | |
| A reaction: Kirkham discusses this as a way of getting round the lack of names in Tarski's theory of truth (which just uses objects, predicates and quantifiers). Otherwise you must supplement Tarski with an account of what the names refer to. |
| 6000 | The goal is rationality in the selection of things according to nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the goal to be rationality in the selection and rejection of the things according to nature. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
| A reaction: This captures the central Stoic idea quite nicely. 'Live according to nature', but this always meant 'live according to reason', because that is (as Aristotle had taught) the essence of our nature. This only makes sense if reason and nature coincide. |
| 5999 | The good is what is perfect by nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the good as what is perfect by nature. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
| A reaction: This might come close to G.E. Moore's Ideal Utilitarianism, but its dependence on the rather uneasy of concept of 'perfection' makes it questionable. Personally I find it appealing. I wish we had Diogenes' explanation. |
| 6001 | Justice is a disposition to distribute according to desert [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined justice as the disposition which distributes to everyone what he deserves. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
| A reaction: The questions that arise would be 'what does a new-born baby deserve?', and 'what do animals deserve?', and 'does the lowest and worst of criminals deserve anything at all?' |